In the years since the invasion, there have been substantial disagreements among scholars regarding the explanations of why the United States invaded Iraq. Nonetheless, it is clear in the decision to declare war against Iraq was multifaceted and included political, economic, ideological, and strategic motives. This article will take into account the various reasons for the invasion of Iraq by U.S. military forces. This analysis of this study is derived from the hegemonic stability theory in the international relations which is based on a combination of power and consent. This study concludes that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was influenced by both declared and undeclared reasons, however, the undeclared causes such as ending the threat to Israel, oil interests, dominance in the Middle East and unfinished First Gulf War may be described as the main and primary reasons for deciding to go to war.

Keywords: Iraq, US foreign policy, George w. bush, hegemonic stability theory, neoconservatives, war and military intervention.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial actions of American military intervention was the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 (Lynch and Singh 2008, p.148). The U.S. decision to use force to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power was motivated by a variety of reasons, and from a number of perspectives (Duffield 2005). In the years since the invasion, there have been substantial disagreements among scholars regarding the explanations of why the United States invaded Iraq. Nonetheless, it is clear in the decision to declare war against Iraq was multifaceted and included political, economic, ideological, and strategic motives. This essay will take into account the various reasons for the invasion of Iraq by U.S. military forces. While this study argues that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was influenced by both declared and undeclared reasons, the latter may be described as the main and primary reasons for deciding to go to war. In term of theoretical aspect, the invasion of Iraq is a good case for testing the hegemonic theory in the US foreign policy making during the Bush administration.

The argument will be structured around five main sections. Section One of these studies will examine the reasons given for the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and begins by examining the evaluation of the evidence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Secondly, the argument will focus on the sponsoring of terrorism by the Iraqi regime, which was one of the justifications for U.S. military intervention. Thirdly, the ideas of liberation and the promotion of democracy will be considered. Section Two will consider the threat to Israel as a motivation for the invasion of Iraq, and Section Three will present a discussion of the role of oil interests in the removal of the Iraqi regime. Thereafter, Section Four will consider the impact of power and U.S. supremacy in the Middle East as part of a global
hegemony. Finally, Section Five will explore the role the First Gulf War played in the decision to declare war, before a conclusion is provided.

Pronounced Reasons

Before beginning the war, in 2002, Condoleezza Rice’s staff prepared the rationale for war in a paper entitled, ‘Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime’. This paper provided a range of main reasons for the invasion of Iraq following the CIA assessment that Saddam Hussein had WMD: firstly, Iraq’s WMD capability; secondly, its support for terrorism; thirdly, threats to its neighbours, and finally, its tyrannical nature (Feith, 2008: p.304). In a similar fashion, President George W. Bush announced that America’s purpose in declaring war on Iraq was clear, and was characterised by three main reasons, including destroying their “weapons of mass destruction”, to end Saddam’s support of terrorism and the freedom of the Iraqi people (Cramer and Thrall, 2011: p.1). This section contends show the Bush administration created a case against Saddam Hussein. Therefore, this section will examine the three pronounced reasons for the war on Iraq.

“Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMDs)

The first part of this examination of the analysis of the U.S. attacks on Iraq is the statement that Iraq possessed WMDs. Before the war, the central dominant argument of the U.S. administration was centered on their belief in the possession and development of WMD by the Iraqi regime (Schmidt and Williams, 2008). This reason was identified as a core reason for the invasion of the Iraq by the Bush administration (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: p.156). The U.S. estimation was dependent on an interpretation of the intelligence assessment that Iraq possessed WMD (Enemark and Michaelsen, 2005: p.548). Additionally, U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in the Security Council, provided evidence to show that Iraq was successively developing WMD programmes. Similarly, former Vice President of the United States, Dick Cheney, confirmed that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us” (Cheney 2002).

In terms of WMD, neoconservatives had a significant role to play in the making of the decision to go to war, which had been advocating this case since the end of the First Gulf War (Halper and Clarke, 2004: p.202). As pointed out by Wolfowitz in 2003, “for bureaucratic reasons, the administration had to settle on weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on” (cited in Halper and Clarke 2004, p.202). The United States argued that the Iraqi regime would use chemical weapons against the United States (Miller 2008, p.45). This was because Saddam Hussein had used chemical and biological weapon against the Kurdish people in northern Iraq in 1988 and against the Iranian people during the Iraq-Iran War. Following this line of argument, Bush pointed out that “Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons, against his own people. I do not want him in a position to use chemical agents again” (cited in Fisher 2003, p.391).

However, realist assumption rejected the assessment that the neoconservatives and the Bush administration, had made, with regard to the possession of chemical weapons by Iraqi regime (Schmidt and Williams, 2008: p. 208). In this regard, Mearsheimer and Walt strongly disagreed with the explanation of the neoconservatives and Bush’s assessment that the Iraqi regime would use chemical weapons against the United States, also arguing that had used chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iranians, people who were completely different; because they could not “retaliate in kind” (2003). Therefore, Mearsheimer and Walt argued that “this sample logic explains why Saddam Hussein did not use WMD against U.S. during the Gulf War and has not fired chemical or biological warheads at Israel” (2003, p.55).

Contrary to expectations, in the aftermath of the war, finding certain evidence of Iraq’s WMD failed, and the intelligence was not precise before going to War (Enemark and Michaelsen 2005, p.548). After the 1991 war, UN weapon’s inspectors tried to dismantle Iraq’s nuclear programme; therefore, it was difficult to find evidence of the possession of WMD. In this context, Hussein Kamill, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and head of Iraq’s biological weapons program until his defection in 1995, arguing that Iraq secretly destroyed its WMD in the early 1990s (Kristof, 2003). Despite what many American policy makers believed, it may not be possible to find an effective point on this issue. While Iraq did not have any active and expanding WMD programs, there is a strong possibility that United States was created as a key justification for the invasion of Iraq.

Sponsoring terrorism

One of the most important factors in the justification for invading Iraq was the terrorism threat posed by Saddam Hussein. For the Bush administration, the invasion of Iraq was presented as an extension of the war on terror. The terrorist attacks of 11 September led to a paradigm shift and thus emerged a new phase in U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy. In the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11th, many U.S policy makers called for the invasion of Iraq (Dumbrell, 2005: p.34). For instance, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld advocated using military forces against Saddam Hussein (Lieberfeld, 2005: p. 24). Cramer and Thrall argue that “the events of
9/11 provided a window of opportunity for the administration to do something they already wanted to do” (2011, p.17). Therefore, the Bush administration declared the use of military power; first, against Afghanistan and then against Iraq in reaction to the September 11th attacks (Galbraith 2007, p.5). From the standpoint of U.S., Saddam Hussein would have been supportive of international terrorism. As Bush stated, that Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda “work in concert” and that the Iraqi regime “has longstanding and continuing ties to terrorist organizations, and there are Al-Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq” (cited in Fisher 2003, p.399). The U.S. administration clearly tried to create a link between Iraqi regime and terrorism in order to give a persuasive reason.

Furthermore, Bush administrators and American decision makers acknowledged that there were widespread ties between the Iraqi regime and Osama Bin Laden. By way of illustration, Cheney said that evidence of a relationship between them was “overwhelming and had long-established ties with al Qaeda” (Pimcus and Milbank, 2004). The U.S. administration confirmed there was clear evidence for a relationship between the Iraqi regime and Al-Qaeda was Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and his links to Ansar-al- Islam, a terrorist organization effective in the northern Kurdish areas (Halper and Clarke, 2004, p.212). Consequently, Bush suggested that “We must strike because Iraq and Al Qaeda are connected, and Saddam has arsenals of weapons of mass destruction that he could make available to terrorist groups” (quoted in Phillips 2004, p.311).

However, the evidence in the case of terrorism does not support the U.S. decision makers. Despite the existence of Al-Qaeda activities in the northern part of Iraq, Senator Joseph Biden discussed the fact that reliable evidence had not been presented about the relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Fisher 2003, p.399). The evidence presented here suggests that the main point behind the established connection between Saddam and Al-Qaeda was the use of raw intelligence, in order to produce a public case for the war (Pillar 2006, p.20). Pillar argues that this misunderstanding about the alliance between Saddam and Al-Qaeda goes back to an intelligence policy analysis that was misused publicly to justify decisions (2006). Although, according to commission staff, it was reported that the “collaborative relationship” between Iraq and Al-Qaeda had not been found, it was possible that there was contact between each of them (Pimcus and Milbank, 2004). Overall, one of the more significant findings to emerge from this part is that the events of 9/11 provided a persuasive public opinion to military action in Iraq.

Liberation and the promotion of democracy

The United States announced that liberation was one of the main reasons for war on Iraq. According to American policy makers, the Iraq war was entitled to be seen as a process of liberty, rather than invasion because Saddam’s regime was described as one of the world’s evil dictatorships. The U.S. administration and allied coalition military intervention began what was known in the United States as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The liberation and promotion of democracy had a significant role in the changing of the Iraqi regime (Global Security2005). In this regard, President Bush made his ambitions regarding freedom in speech in which he a stated, “I believe the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world. And I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom” (quoted in Woodward 2004, p.88). As such, Bush has made it clear that the “American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger” (Bush 2003a).

The promotion of democracy during different periods has been the attention of U.S. policy makers. Since the time of President Woodrow Wilson, promoting democracy abroad has been one the main aims of U.S. foreign policy (Dalacoura2005, p.963). In particular, in the aftermath of September11th, the promotion of democracy has become a key principle of U.S. administration in the Middle East (Dalacoura2005, p.963). Therefore, the U.S. administration was called to change the Iraqi regime to spread democracy and freedom. In this way, some support of liberal theory for the invasion, which Lieberfeld proposes, is that “decision makers were genuinely motivated by liberal goals” (2005, p.7).

In addition, the neoconservative ideology was providing the theoretical and policy content of the American foreign policy of the Bush administration (Schmidt and Williams 2008, p.194). For this reason, promoting democracy was a significant element of neoconservative which suggested that “the spread of liberal democracy improves U.S. security” (Dalacoura2005, p.974). Thus, many foreign policy analysts argue that the spread of liberal values and democratic institutions abroad are important for the United States, in both terms of economics and security. An example of this is a study carried out by Charles Krauthammer, who asserted that “with the decline of communism, the advancement of democracy should become the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy” (Schmidt and Williams 2008, p. 200). According to neoconservatives, the first step in the democratizing the Middle East was required to change Saddam Hussein regime (FoongKkong2008, p.258). It could be argued that Bush administration did hold some neoconservative perspective on the liberation and promotion of democracy.

The liberation and promotion of democracy were articulated by the U.S as a vital reason for removing dictator, Saddam Hussein(Schmidt and Williams 2008, p. 200). For instance, in President Bush’s 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, arguing that
“Iraqi democracy will succeed and that success will send forth news, from Damascus to Tehran- that freedom can be the future of every nation” (cited in Schmidt and Williams 2008, p.200). The American power was identified as representing a force for democratization and freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein. Hence, the U.S. effort in making the liberation process one reason for the invasion of Iraq was provided for the coalition and one that persuaded public opinion.

**Ending the threat to Israel**

The unique alliance and partnership formed between the United States and Israel to counter the developing strategic threats in the Middle East provided benefits for both parties (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: p.32). The security of Israel was of the utmost importance to the United States, which has supported the former since the 1990s as a result of the threat both countries feel from terrorist groups originating in the Arab or Muslim world and other rogue states (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: p.32). Thus, for Bush’s administration, concerns about the security of Israel were paramount the decision-making process.

Despite the different reasons for the war on Iraq, it can be argued that the desire to make Israel more secure was perceived by the United States as a vital motive for the invasion of Iraq. This has been clearly illustrated by Philip Zelikow, a member of the Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, who asserted that the real threat from Iraq was not a threat to the United States, but a threat against Israel. As such, Zelikow has made it clear that the primary reason for the invasion of Iraq was to remove the threat to Israel (Mekay, 2004). American policy makers argue that Saddam Hussein remained a threat to the security of Israel in the Middle East, which was of key importance for the United States, as they are significant allies, who share strategic interests in the Middle East. Furthermore, Israel was supportive of the United States in the war on terror (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006). According to realist assumption, a secondary purpose for the targeting of Iraq would be to increase the security of Israel, the main regional ally of the United States (Lieberfeld, 2005: p.4).

According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2006), since the Second World War, the United States has provided economic, military and diplomatic support to aid Israel. In this respect, some notable neoconservative advisers, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Peri had a successful “Israel Lobby” to change the Iraqi regime during the Bush administration.

The strategic position of Israel in the Middle East has been of significant importance for the neoconservatives. Thus, the security of Israel was a highly important motive, and it played a significant role in the administration’s decision to go to war with Iraq (Cramer and Thrall, 2011: p. 1). It is clear that the neoconservatives were predominantly concerned about the Iraqi threat to Israel, with Wolfowitz calling for the attack on Iraq before Afghanistan, even though there was no evidence of relations between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, this suggestion was rejected by Bush (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, p.55). It can be concluded that the security of Israel played an important role the decision to go toward in Iraq.

**Oil interests**

The relationship between oil and military power returned in the early years of the twentieth century (Klare, 2004: p.148), in this respect, the U.S. interest in oil and energy resources is not a new subject. By way of illustration, Sherle Schwenniger shows that the “American policy has been driven by two at times incompatible goals: the support of Israel and indirect control over the world’s oil markets for more than three decades” (cited in Hinnebusch, 2007: p.216). In order to understand the real reason behind the war on Iraq, it is important to highlight the role of oil interests. In this section, this study evaluates and examines the possibility that oil was a major factor in the decision to declare war against Iraq.

Many scholars hold the view that, a key driver of the war and the core reason behind the invasion of Iraq was U.S. desire to control Iraq’s oil reserves in order to secure future energy supplies (Hinnebusch, 2007: p.212). Gaining control of Iraq’s oil was necessary so that the United States could become less dependent than European and East Asian countries on Persian Gulf oil (Zunes, 2006: p.29), and there is no doubt that the U.S. hegemony depends on oil and energy resources. As Simon Bromely illustrates, since the Second World War, the key pillar of U.S. hegemony has been dominated by U.S. companies and their control of the world’s oil resources concentrated in the Middle East. Oil has also been essential in the provision of military power (Hinnebusch, 2007: p.212). In addition, Smith has argued that the Iraq war can be seen as part of a significant effort to control regional oil supplies in the Middle East (2005).

Moreover, in his work entitled “Blood Oil” Klare concludes that, for Bush, the top foreign policy priority was not terrorism or the need to control the spread WMDs, but rather to increase the energy sources from external suppliers to markets in the United States (2004). Recent cases reported by Phillips (2004, p.330) also support the hypothesis that, since the 1990s, oil supplies have become integral to U.S. concerns in the Middle East. In this way, the United States tried to find reliable energy resources in order to lessen its dependence upon Saudi Arabia, which can be unreliable and lacks stability in the long run (Cramer and Thrall 2011, p.11). By contrast, some analysts have opposed the oil hypothesis and explanation as a central reason for
the invasion of Iraq. For example, Cramer and Duggan argue that the cost of an invasion would be greater than the economic benefits of any such action (2011, p.228).

However, the evidence presented thus supports the idea that the oil interest was widespread and played a role in the assessment of an explanation for the removal of the Iraqi regime. The control of Iraqi oil provides considerable future geopolitical leverage for the United States (Smith 2005, p.184). Therefore, Kathryn Talantino argues that, “for many, oil rather than principle seemed most relevant in the U.S. approach to Iraq” (2004, p.323). Although, oil justification has been absent among members of the Bush administration (Duffield 2005, p.109), one key driver of the Iraq war was controlling oil interests and energy sources. In short, oil is a central and major concern in any war in the Middle East. While it is widely recognised that it was not long after U.S. forces overthrew the Iraqi regime that the priority of oil as a real motive became apparent (Zunes, 2009: p.101), oil was not only the relevant reason for the invasion of Iraq.

**Power and U.S. hegemony in the Middle East: Transforming a region**

In order to understand why the Bush administration led the attack on Iraq, it is necessary to shift the focus from security threats against the United States to its strategic position in the Middle East. The Bush doctrine began with the assumption that the United States was at the time the only superpower in the world and one which attempted to preserve its hegemonic position for the indefinite future. As Robert Jervis argues, empire was the main element of the Bush administration (cited in Schmidt and Williams 2008, p.195). Hence, redesigning the Middle East was likely to be important to the success of this strategy (Hinnebusch, 2007: p.220). Philosopher and scholar Slavoj Žižek supports this argument, arguing that the real underlying reasons for the attack on Iraq was “the urge to brutally assert and signal unconditional U.S. hegemony” (2004), since the U.S. administration viewed Iraq as a ripe target in the Middle East (Ehteshami, 2006: p.107).

The National Security Strategy of the Bush administration reflected this agenda which called for translating America’s “position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” (Bush, 2002). It argued that the war on Iraq could be comprehended as part of U.S. hegemony. Hinnebusch (2007, p.219) therefore claims that the hegemony policy offers to provide a global currency for world trade, ensures the flow of cheap energy supplies to the global economy and spreads liberal economic rules universally. The United States needs to be the most potent military power in order to play this role in this region. As mentioned in the previous arguments, thinking about a new order in the Post-Cold War world can broadly be seen among U.S. policy makers. According to Hinnebusch, the invasion of Iraq was part of the grand strategy of the United States and the Bush administration to maintain the dominance of its global hegemony (2007, p.219). In terms of a realist perspective, the invasion was a rational means for the United States to accomplish its key goal of demonstrating its power to allies and competitors alike (Lieberfeld, 2005: p.4). This desire goes back to the previous U.S. policy of strategy enlargement in order to fulfill this purpose; the first step began with the Iraq War (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: p.58).

To support this claim, one of the common themes of the neoconservatives’ unity is their focus on the Middle East and global Islam as the main threats to U.S. foreign interests (Halper and Clarke, 2004: p.11). Therefore, the neoconservatives played a significant role in the military intervention in Iraq, to obtain regional power and global strategic goals. In this context, the main concern for the United States was Iran, which impacted upon U.S. policy makers towards the invasion of Iraq, with Condoleezza Rice identifying that Iran presented the main setbacks to U.S. interests in the Middle East (Ehteshami, 2006: p.107). Therefore, the U.S. argued that the removal of the Iraqi regime would undermine Iran because after the war, Iraqi Shiites would become U.S. allies. According to Ehteshami, the war on Iraq could accelerate the process of developing to a new regional order in the Middle East (2006), which consequently was re-engineered by the neoconservatives. In order to obtain this aim, they used the image of a “cakewalk” as an enormous project in a variety of dimensions, including political, cultural, economic, and religious aspects for Iraq at the beginning of this project with Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia (Halper and Clarke, 2004: p. 202).

It has been argued that U.S. supremacy in the Middle East, as part of its global hegemony, was linked with the war on Iraq. According to U.S. policy makers, the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime as a threat to U.S. interests and its allies was necessary in order to change the strategic position of the United States in the Middle East. As American journalist Jay Bookman suggests, the war on Iraq would allow for the making of permanent military bases to control the region (Bookman, 2002). As a result of this, the invasion was not only about Iraq but was also relevant to the global role of U.S. hegemony in world politics. It can be argued that this goal could also be identified as the main reason for the invasion of Iraq.

**The ongoing First Gulf War**

Having discussed the various elements involved in the U.S.’s decision to go to war in Iraq, the final part of this study considers the First Gulf War as a primary reason. This war did not result a solution to the problems in the Persian Gulf because no stable political relationship was reached between the United States and Saddam Hussein. According to various scholars, the starting point
for the invasion of Iraq goes back to the Gulf War as part of the grand strategy of U.S. policy. For instance, Fawn argues that the war on Iraq was proposed as a continuation of the unfinished First Gulf War of 1990-1991, and that “Bush sought to finish his father’s earlier war” (2006, p.1).

After the First Gulf War, the United Nations attempted to ensure that Iraq never again threatened its neighbours or world peace, and to prevent Saddam Hussein’s aggression against the Iraqi people (Lake 1994, p.50). Therefore, after the end of the first Gulf War, the Security Council applied UN Resolution 687, which determined that Iraq should unconditionally accept the destruction and removal of all its WMDs and ballistic missiles. As a result, this resolution permitted the United States and its allies to use force in Iraq if it was proven that the country possessed chemical and biological weapons (Jakobsen and Jakobsen, 2009: p.666). Thus, the United States argued that Saddam Hussein had repeatedly violated this UN Resolution, largely because Iraq had rejected international inspections within its borders in 1998 (Fischer 2012, p.141). Subsequently, the Iraqi regime continued to pose challenges both to the United States and the United Nations (Jentleson, 2007: p.419).

Within this context, one of the most challenging questions to face the Clinton administration was Iraq’s aggressive behavior since the end of the Cold War era, and thereby the containing of Iraq was a major element of Clinton’s policy during the 1990s (Hyland 1999, p.171). In this regard, the Iraq Liberation Act was announced by the U.S. administration in 1998. Kenneth Pollack argues that Clinton believed that the only solution to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was to remove his regime (Pollack 2002, p.94) and, undoubtedly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was politically connected with the Gulf War. Then, Bush stated that “peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again” (Bush 2003b). Subsequently, the United States claimed that sanctions against the Iraqi regime were insufficient. Therefore, neoconservatives argued that the containment policy was not working and that military force was the only way to achieve U.S. aims (Foong Khong, 2008: p.258).

Consequently, the United States asserted that Iraq was developing WMD and was guilty of ceasefire violation with regard to Security Council Resolution 687 (Shah 2008, p.123). This dynamic process after the Gulf War was a contributing cause for the invasion of Iraq. The range of events from 1991 to 2003 was to a large extent linked to the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, the strategies of the First Gulf War played a highly significant role because unresolved conflict with Iraq provided a good reason for the invasion. This analysis is important to an understanding of why the United States entered into a war with Iraq. Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that the First Gulf War had not ended, which served as a primary reason to topple Saddam Hussein.

CONCLUSION

This study has explored why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, providing an understanding of the evidences and reasons. The war on Iraq seems to have been motivated by different causes, including both declared and undeclared reasons. It could be argued that there is a significant gap between the U.S. administration’s public reasons and the real reasons behind the invasion of Iraq. On the lines of this argument, three motives were given as public justification for the U.S. attack on Iraq, as declared by the Bush administration and official statements, including the presence of WMDs, the sponsoring of terrorism by the Iraqi regime and oppression of the Iraqi people. However, the Foundation of Intelligence and the Coalition could not find reliable evidence regarding the existence of WMDs in any part of the country. In the case of terrorism, there was no proof of a direct link with international terrorism, and no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the events of 9/11. As a consequence, the U.S. administration sought to build a persuasive case and manipulate public opinion for a war on Iraq as a response to the perceived threat.

Despite the challenges for foreign policy analysts to identify the most important reasons, this study shows that the invasion of Iraq was driven by undeclared reasons, such as ending the threat to Israel, oil interests, and dominance in the Middle East. These motives, therefore, provided the essential and specific context for the war on Iraq. From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the potential of oil-linked benefits to the United States was due to a regime change in Iraq. Furthermore, the protection of Israel was significant motivating factor. In addition, the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein as the first step in the process was motivated by a desire to transform the Middle East as part of a global strategy. Despite these significant reasons and motives, it is also possible that the unfinished First Gulf War could be a primary reason for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In examining links across the theoretical perspectives, the invasion of Iraq underlined as a consequences of US hegemony in world politics as well as neoconservative ideology played a significant role in the Bush administration’s decision to declare war against Iraq, and has been involved in each of the reasons, building a case for invasion.

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