Full Length Research


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In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of under sanctioning but of over sanctioning.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution and Preventions, International Law, Arms Embargo, International Conflict, Pressure Groups.


INTRODUCTION

In a recent comprehensive review on the scientific study of conflict and war, Bremer (1993) summarizes what is known about these phenomena and, traces the parameters of the 'mental model' of conflict. Bremer's catalogue of research findings, surveying hundreds of studies, is quite impressive. It is also, alas, a reminder of how little we know about conflict termination and Conflict Resolution and Preventions. The causes, characteristics and consequences, as well as the dynamics of conflict, and the various modes of transition from conflict formation to maturation are well represented in a myriad of studies. The final phase of the process that of conflict termination has been all but neglected. At no time has the study of conflict termination faced such challenges, nor been so relevant to policy-makers, as it has since the end of the Cold War. The growing number of new forms of conflict (eg. ethnic, religious, etc.), the persistence of some armed conflicts (eg. Korea, India-Pakistan, Arab-Israeli), and the growing cooperation between the major powers, have all helped to affirm global interest in dealing with, or responding to, conflict. Responses to conflict are not pre-determined; parties may respond to conflict in a variety of ways ranging from unilateral methods to multilateral measures (Fogg, 1985). Here we wish to
articulate the components of a conceptual framework of multilateral Conflict Resolution and Preventions, and examine the effects of a particular kind of conflict on this strategy. The class of conflicts we wish to examine is that of intractable or enduring conflict, and the specific Conflict Resolution and Preventions strategy is that of mediation. International conflict cannot be viewed as a unitary phenomenon. They have different dimensions and show different degrees of amenability to Conflict Resolution and Preventions. Common strategies or approaches that might be applicable in some conflicts may be quite inapplicable in others. If we are to bridge the gap between the scholarly community and policymakers, we should, at the very least, suggest prescriptions regarding the efficacy of different methods and strategies of Conflict Resolution and Preventions, and how they may be used to affect the termination of enduring or intractable conflicts. Learning how to deal with the most difficult and persistent conflicts can take us a long way toward understanding the dynamics of Conflict Resolution and Preventions in all other conflicts.

Edward Azar (1986) first drew attention to the special features of what he termed protracted conflicts. One of the defining characteristics of these conflicts was the difficulty of managing them peacefully. Kriesberg (1993) talks about intractable conflicts which often sink into self-perpetuating violent antagonisms, and resist any technique of negotiation or mediation, or indeed other methods of peaceful management. More recently the scholarly literature emphasized the fact that some conflicts are connected over time through high intensity, repeated cycles of violence, and general resistance to Conflict Resolution and Preventions by invoking the concept of enduring conflicts (e.g. Goertz and Diehl, 1993). Some analysts (e.g. Waltz, 1979) conceive of all interstate conflict as being essentially the result of one cause only (i.e. the structure of the system), and as exhibiting similar patterns irrespective of the actors involved or the life cycle of the conflict. We believe that there are fundamental differences between interstate conflicts; differences that may be expressed in terms of causes, issues, participants, and the history, or life-cycle, of a conflict. Each of these differences may have prescriptive consequences for international Conflict Resolution and Preventions. Little work, however, has been done on how these features of a conflict affect its termination. Here we wish to examine Conflict Resolution and Preventions in the context that poses the greatest intellectual and practical obstacle; that of intractable or enduring conflicts.

To talk about enduring or intractable conflict implies a concern with the longitudinal and dynamic aspects of a relationship. At its simplest the concept is no more than a belated recognition by scholars that conflicts do not manifest themselves in a series of single, unrelated episodes. Conflicts have a past (which may cast a heavy shadow on the parties), a present context, and presumably a future of some sort. States involved in an intractable conflict learn to use coercive means, and are prepared to do so in a future conflict. An intractable or enduring conflict is thus a process of competitive relationships that extend over a period of time, and involves hostile perceptions and occasional military actions. The term itself acts as an integrating concept connoting a competitive social process where states become enmeshed in a web of negative interactions and hostile orientations. This pattern is repeated, indeed worsened, every so often, with the actors involved unable to curb, or manage, the escalation of their relationships.

Gochman and Maoz (1984) first drew attention to the presence of these conflicts. Their work demonstrated empirically how a relatively small number of states have been involved in a disproportionately large number of militarized disputes. Furthermore, they showed that this was a pattern that was likely to repeat itself. Gochman and Maoz define these conflict-prone states as 'enduring rivals', and their conflict as an 'enduring conflict'. These enduring conflicts account for a large percentage of all militarized disputes - about 45% of all militarized disputes between 1816-1986 took place between such rivals (Bremmer, 1992; Goertz & Diehl, 1992). Half the wars since 1816 occurred between enduring rivals. The likelihood of a military dispute escalating to a full scale war is twice that of a non-enduring conflict. Whatever enduring conflicts may be, they appear prima facie to be very different from other conflicts, and should be viewed, wherever possible, within a different theoretical context. What we are in effect suggesting is that it makes sense to move from an episodic approach, and study conflicts, and Conflict Resolution and Preventions, from a historical dimension, where prior interactions affect present behavior. Shifting the unit of analysis from a single conflict to a long-term relationship, may have serious implications for the way we approach and manage conflicts. We use the historical relationship of a conflict as one of our independent, contextual variables that may explain their course and outcome.

There has been a long debate in the political and economic literature on the merits of imposing economic or military sanctions on countries violating certain rules governing international behavior. "Conflict is a crisis that forces us to recognize explicitly that we live with multiple realities and must negotiate a common reality; That we bring to each situation differing –frequently contrasting– stories and must create together a single shared story with a role for each and for both."(Augsburger, 1992:11)

Conflict has become an unavoidable component of human activity (Brahnam et al., 2005, 204) that may be viewed as a
situation in which the concerns of two or more individuals appear to be incompatible (Darling & Fogliasso, 1999, 394), and which tends to occur when individuals or groups perceive that others are preventing them from attaining their goals (Antonioni, 1998, 336). Channelling conflict in a positive or negative way may affect the nature of the conflict whether beneficial or destructive (Cetin & Hacifazlioglu, 2004, 325). If not managed properly, conflicts can result in bad feelings, high turnover and costly litigation (Hirschman, 2001, 59), and are said to be one of the most difficult challenges organizational members face (Phillips & Cheston, 1979) and one of the most frustrating and uncomfortable experiences for managers (Earnest & McCaslin, 1994). At the most serious levels conflicts can bring teams, departments and sometimes whole organizations to a virtual standstill (Fritchie & Leary, 1998). However, looking at the brighter side if properly managed, conflict can “increase individuals’, innovativeness and productivity” (Uline, Tschannenmoran, & Perez, 2003), offer “interpersonal relationship satisfaction, creative problem solving, the growth of the global workforce, and domestic workplace diversity” (TingToomey & Oetzel, 2001, p. 3) and leads to “improved efficiency, creativity, and profitability” (Axelrod & Johnson, 2005, p. 42). The goal of these sanctions is to produce in the target country a desired political change. However, some scholars have put forth the view that sanctions can be ineffective or even counterproductive - see e.g. Pape (1997). Their arguments have included the perverse political responses in the target country to the perceived ‘un-warranted’ third party interference represented by international sanctions, such as exacerbated nationalism or xenophobic behavior - a ‘rally round the flag’ type of behavior - or the likely punishment of innocent individuals in the target country who are not responsible for their government’s policy - see White (1994) for a survey of these arguments.

In the context of a military conflict between two countries subject to sanctions imposed by third parties, our paper explores the effectiveness of sanctioning within a game theoretic model where sanctions are not taken exogenously but generated endogenously. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. This result comes from the interaction between all players in the international political market, and constitutes an alternative explanation to the two types of arguments discussed above. Our starting point is the observation that individuals in local jurisdictions, with the possible exception of legislators and judges, perceive their ability to actually influence the law under which their acts will be judged to be very small. Suppose an individual subject to a particular judicial system considers whether or not to commit an act which the law defines as criminal (plausibly, because it produces a negative externality). By committing this act the individual becomes a criminal and, as such, faces some expected punishment. How high such expected punishment is depends on the judicial system the individual is subject to, e.g., whether it is a common law system or a civil code system. Of course an individual may not be detected, he may not get convicted, and he may even bribe his way out. However, under a minimally functioning judicial system, in terms of lost utility, his expected punishment will be strictly positive, and the punishment imposed is independent of the individual in question: the law is by definition general.

In contrast, when considering the international public law governing inter-national relations, countries perceive that they have some ability to actually influence both its design as well as its enforcement. For example, a country committing an act of war might violate international law and will face a given expected punishment. However, depending on the extent to which its allies and enemies can exert power in the international arena, and depending on the economic, military and political interests aects by both the act of war and its punishment, it may well be the case that an international agency such as the UN is unable to enforce the rules governing international relations in this specific case. One can even regard the expected punishment as dependent on the country in question, and as being insignificant in many instances. Finally, we should note that the situation analyzed in our paper, where two conflicting parties invest resources in weaponry so as to defend their own endowment of productive capacity and possibly appropriate the other’s, being then be subject to sanctions imposed by third parties, is somewhat different from a situation of ‘anarchy’ in international relations as defined and analyzed by Hirshleifer (1995a, 1995b).

Even though we recognize the role that a ‘rally around the flag’ effect can have in reducing the effectiveness of sanctions, we propose in our paper an alternative explanation for such reduced effectiveness. Our explanation has to do with a ‘buy allies’ effect in the international political market, according to which a target country tries to buy opposition to the imposition of sanctions by making use of its role as an importer of weapons from at least some of the very same third countries that would carry out the imposition of sanctions. The paper goes as follows: the basic model is introduced in section 2, and the political market for sanctions is discussed in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper with some final remarks.

**DEFINITION OF CONFLICT**

Conflict is understood differently by different people and so there exist a big list of definitions of conflict. Oxford Online Dictionary defines the term as “a situation in which people, groups or countries are involved in a serious
disagreement or argument", many scholars have viewed conflict from different perspective such as a process, situation or an interaction. Some of the authors who have defined conflict as a process are includes, Thomas who believes it to be "the process which begins when one party perceives that the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his". Wall and Callister see conflict as "a process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party". For Vecchio, it is, "the process that results when one person (or a group of people) perceives that another person or group is frustrating, or about to frustrate, an important concern. Conflict involves incompatible differences between parties that result in interference or opposition".

Rahim looks it as, "an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities (i.e., individual, group, organization, etc.)" and at last Poole and Putnam (1997) define conflict as the process of interaction by interdependent individuals who perceive incompatible goals. There are other for whom conflict is just a situation and nothing beyond it, as for Donohue and Kolt, it is "a situation in which interdependent people express (manifest or latent) differences in satisfying their individual needs and interests and they experience interference from each other in accomplishing these goals". Giving one more angle to conflict as "interactive", L.L. Putnam and M.S. Poole, 1987, expresses it to be an "interaction of interdependent people who perceive opposition of goals, aims and values and who see the other party as potentially interfering with the realization of these goals". Conflict is not only defined differently by different authors, but it's definition is different in different cultures as well, for instance, in France, conflict is associated with "a war – an encounter between contrary elements that oppose each other and 'to oppose' is a strong term, conveying powerful antagonism" (Fearon, 1995, pp. 4142).

In China, conflict is seen as any unpleasant dispute, serious fighting and "contradictory struggle." In other words, any types of unharmonious situations in Chinese culture will initiate a conflict (TingToomey & Oetzel, 2001). As far as Anglo Saxons are concerned, conflict is defined diversely as any disagreement and undesired conditions preventing an individual from reaching one’s goals (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 2000; Lulofs & Cahn, 2000). If we just give a thought, we can always arrive at the logical conclusion that if conflict’s definition is so varied in different context and for different people, then the modes to resolve this very conflict can take how many varied forms. So, what are the factors that can impact our response to conflict gender, self concept, expectations, situations, position, power, practice, communication skills, life experiences, values or the culture in which we have born and brought up. We cannot pick up any one and leave the rest, since our conflict resolution strategy is effected by all of these combined together. But it has been believed that Conflict Resolution and Preventions strategies are not only influenced by personal characteristics, but also defined by socio cultural norms (Haar & Krahé, 1999). What might be an appropriate way of managing disputes in one society may not be acceptable in the other due to different assumptions regarding behavioral natures, expectations, and values. Furthermore, there has been a blossoming interest regarding the study of cross cultural communication and Conflict Resolution and Preventions over the past two decades (Cai & Fink, 2002). For example, intercultural researchers have examined cross cultural Conflict Resolution and Preventions between Americans and Arabs (Elsayed Elkhouly and Buda, 1996), Americans and Mexicans (Gabrielidis, Stephan, Ybarra, Pearson, & Villareal 1997), Americans and Japanese (Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994), and Jordanians and Turkish (Kozan, 1990).

OPERATIONALIZING INTRACTABLE/ENDURING CONFLICTS

The concept of enduring conflict has been given considerable attention in recent studies (Diehl, 1985; Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Wayman, 1982; Geller, 1993). The concept denotes a competitive relationship between two states over one or more issues, where the relationship is occasionally punctuated by the actual use or threat of force. The temporal dimension is quite significant here, for enduring conflicts convey the notion of a long term phenomenon (usually a minimum of 15 years) during which hostile interactions are interwoven with peaceful periods and Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts. Military confrontations and efforts to establish peaceful relations occur as concrete events punctuating the life cycle of the conflict.

An operational definition of an enduring conflict must, if it is to allow us to develop a universe of cases for empirical research, specify the number of actors, minimum duration, and level of hostility. Although some discrepancy may be discerned amongst the operational definitions now extant in the literature, they all stipulate temporal boundaries, continuity, dispute activity and a dyadic participation. Some like Wayman (1982) confine an enduring conflict to a ten year period and two or more militarized disputes; others like Huth and Russett 1993, suggest twenty years and at least five militarized disputes as the benchmark for an enduring rivalry. In line with these, we define an enduring rivalry as a conflictual relationship that lasts at least twenty years and manifests five or more militarized disputes, from the beginning to
the end of a rivalry (Goertz & Diehl, 1993). Using this definition we identify 14 enduring conflicts in our data set of 268 international conflicts in the 1945-1990 periods. The conflicts, and the overall number of Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts in each are identified below in Table 1.

Our concern with these conflicts has significant implications for the question of how to terminate or manage them. States in an enduring conflict find themselves in a sustained, competitive and often hostile interaction in which the likelihood of escalation is fairly high. Such interaction patterns produce a negative interdependence of perceptions and behavior whereby more issues are staked together on the agenda, concrete issues become infused with intangible significance, the parameters of conflict expanded, perceptions become stereotypical, and rational cost-benefit calculations are replaced by a uniform desire to hurt the opponent and avoid any position or reputational losses (Levy, 1992). In such an atmosphere the resort to violence can often be seen as the only way of dealing with the conflict. Enduring or intractable conflicts are clearly different from other conflicts. They are not unlike malignant social processes which enmesh states in a web of threats and escalating maneuvers that cannot be easily brought to an end. Enduring conflicts parallel many of the characteristics of a zero-sum game. They may be likened to a prolonged process of entrapment. Whichever way we look at them, they clearly pose the greatest danger to the international system. Protracted or enduring conflicts also provide numerous opportunities for Conflict Resolution and Preventions. A proliferation of actors, ranging from private individuals to numerous international organizations has an interest in settling or helping to de-escalate intractable conflicts.

**FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PREVENTIONS**

The implications of an enduring rivalry for the study of Conflict Resolution and Preventions are potentially numerous, though we have little systematic evidence that identifies trends or the effectiveness of different Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts. Conflict Resolution and Preventions is widely understood to be an attempt by actors involved in conflict to reduce the level of hostility and generate some order in their relations. Successful Conflict Resolution and Preventions may lead to (a) a complete resolution of the issues in conflict (a change in behavior and attitudes), or as is more common in international relations, to (b) an acceptable settlement, ceasefire or partial agreement. Either way, Conflict Resolution and Preventions connotes a mechanism that is concerned with defining (a) a conflict as ended (at least temporarily), and (b) deciding on the distribution of values and resources. To that extent Conflict Resolution and Preventions is a rational and conscious decisional process whereby parties to a conflict, with or without the aid of outsiders, take steps to transform, deescalate or terminate a conflict in a mutually acceptable way. This is the case with intractable or other conflicts. The full range of methods and instruments that constitute Conflict Resolution and Preventions is quite wide (see Fogg, 1985). It varies from coercive measures, through legal processes to third party intervention and multilateral conferences. For analytical purposes it is useful to divide all these methods to (a) unilateral methods (e.g. one-party threats), (b) bilateral methods (e.g. bargaining and negotiation, deterrence), and (c) multilateral methods (e.g. third party intervention). Of particular interest would be the role of factors that affect the choice of a response, or an approach, to conflict, and how in particular certain conditions, such as being in an enduring conflict, and all that it implies, impact on the choice of Conflict Resolution and Preventions method or its outcome.

Factors affecting the course of a conflict or the manner of its management are numerous. They involve the manner of interdependence, type of actors, and kinds of issues. For our purposes these factors are best conceptualized as (a) contextual factors, and (b) behavioral factors. Let us examine each set in brief. Contextual factors that affect international Conflict Resolution and Preventions include i) the character of the international system, ii) the nature of a conflict, and iii) the internal characteristics of the states involved. The character of the international system affects the expectations of states, and the strategies they may use to break out of a conflict (Miller, 1995). Features such as polarity of the international system, patterns of alignments, and distribution of power capabilities are all associated with different approaches to conflict (see Gochman, 1993). A bipolar international environment, for instance, is likely to be more stable than a multi polar system (Waltz, 1979) in encouraging a balance between caution and resolve in responding to conflicts. The termination of intractable conflicts can be explicitly linked to the nature of the international environment in which they occur (e.g. Goertz and Diehl, 1995).

The nature of a conflict or the characteristics of the issues that are its focus, are clearly crucial in determining how it is managed (Diehl, 1992). Certain issues such as beliefs, core values and territorial integrity have a high saliency, and are apt to encourage decision makers to accept higher levels of costs. This makes it much more difficult to manage such conflicts through traditional diplomatic methods (Snyder and Diesing, 1977). Conflicts over salient issues are likely to be long-lasting and to entail the use of coercive methods as a way of reaching an outcome. Other aspects such as the number of issues in conflict, the rigidity with which they are perceived, whether they relate to tangible interests (e.g.
resource conflict) or intangible ones (e.g. conflict over values) may also affect both the duration as well as method of termination (Deutsch, 1994). The third contextual dimension that affects Conflict Resolution and Preventions is that of the internal characteristics of the actors involved. This refers to how certain structural properties of states affect their predisposition to engage in coercive or other forms of Conflict Resolution and Preventions. The nature of the polity has attracted the most attention recently (Maoz and Russett, 1992; Ember, Ember and Russett, 1992; Dixon, 1993). Here the argument is that democratic states are more inclined to use peaceful methods of Conflict Resolution and Preventions (because of internal norms, liberal experience or electoral constraints), whereas non-democratic states are more likely to utilize coercive methods of management.

Another factor here relates to the power capabilities of states. Although there is not much empirical evidence to suggest a strong relationship, power capabilities can be linked to different Conflict Resolution and Preventions behavior (e.g. a conflict between two equally strong countries may be prolonged because both have the material and human resources to carry on, and the willingness to tolerate high costs). All these contextual factors affect directly the disposition to engage in different forms of Conflict Resolution and Preventions, and how a conflict will terminate. The effects of some contextual factors on the origin, character and evolution of a conflict has been documented quite extensively (see Stoll, 1993 for a review). Some studies have examined more specifically their effect on Conflict Resolution and Preventions. A number of propositions linking for instance the duration, intensity, fatalities and issue prominence to effective mediations (Bercovitch, 1989; Bercovitch & Langley, 1993) received considerable theoretical and empirical support. Other studies linked the parties’ internal characteristics (Gregory, 1994) or power capabilities between them (Bercovitch, 1985) to different forms of Conflict Resolution and Preventions by third parties.

But what of the effect on Conflict Resolution and Preventions of the second dimension, that comprising behavioral elements? What is the relevance of past interactions and how does previous behavior affect current Conflict Resolution and Preventions? It is equally plausible to argue that experience conflict experience may dampen, or heighten, parties’ disposition to rely on a particular method of Conflict Resolution and Preventions. When heavy losses had been experienced during previous conflict behavior, lessons may be drawn by each state regarding the efficacy of different forms of coercive or other methods of management. Does prolonged experience of conflict elicit a preference for a particular method of Conflict Resolution and Preventions, or does this experience produce so much ‘distortion’, stress and cognitive rigidity, that the states involved learn little from their past experience, and use the same old methods, repeated over time, unproductively? This is the pattern of relationship that we wish to examine.

The literature on the termination or management of

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**Table 1**

Enduring Conflicts and Number of Conflict Resolution and Preventions Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rivalry</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Resolution and Preventions Efforts (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China-USA</td>
<td>1949-1969</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece-Turkey</td>
<td>1955-1988</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-Iran</td>
<td>1953-1992</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-India</td>
<td>1950-1992</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan</td>
<td>1949-1992</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt-Israel</td>
<td>1948-1979</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina-Chile</td>
<td>1952-1984</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru-Ecuador</td>
<td>1951-1986</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan-Israel</td>
<td>1948-1986</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria-Israel</td>
<td>1948-1992</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan</td>
<td>1947-1992</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR-USA</td>
<td>1945-1986</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-USSR</td>
<td>1963-1988</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia-Ethiopia</td>
<td>1960-1988</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts</td>
<td>575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of enduring conflicts adapted from Geller (1993) and Huth and Russett (1993)
enduring conflict is largely notable for its brevity and indirectness. Deutsch (1993; 1994) claims that states involved in a negative interdependence, as states in an enduring conflict undoubtedly are, tend to use coercion to manage their conflicts. Leng (1983) demonstrated empirically that states in repeated conflicts develop a power orientation and use increasingly more coercive methods of dealing with their conflict with each successive flare up. Neither the attitudes, nor the Conflict Resolution and Preventions behavior of enduring states are presumed to change much. Enduring conflicts appear to take a life of their own. Another body of literature, however, suggests that not only do states learn, but under certain conditions they can forget their earlier hostile interactions and embrace a cooperative orientation (Mor & Maoz, 1996).

What is the impact of continued interaction as opponents on Conflict Resolution and Preventions? Does intractability cause states to rely mostly on coercive strategies that reinforce existing interactions and beliefs, or is there some kind of learning that encourages even the most violent prone nations to use a variety of instruments to settle their conflicts? It is certainly worth exploring how the experience of being in an intractable conflict affects peace-making efforts at the global level. To investigate this question we present a framework (see Figure 1 below) that incorporates the contextual and behavioral factors discussed above. These factors affect the nature of Conflict Resolution and Preventions - interpersonally or internationally. We divide Conflict Resolution and Preventions activities into two broad categories; violent (i.e. force, coercion) and non-violent (e.g. negotiation, mediation). Initially we treat Conflict Resolution and Preventions as the dependent variable to examine how often states in intractable and non-intractable conflicts use management strategies. Then, we measure the short-term consequences of Conflict Resolution and Preventions, and here our dependent variable is Conflict Resolution and Preventions outcomes, and our concern is with determining whether or not there is a relationship between kinds of conflicts and outcomes. These can be of two kinds; success or failure. Success is conceptualized as Conflict Resolution and Preventions that reduces the level of violence and hostility (at least in the short term), and failure is defined as Conflict Resolution and Preventions activity that has had no effect on the basic level of conflict. Figure 1

For purposes of conceptual clarity we wish to specify three hypotheses that stipulate plausible relationships between the intractability of a conflict and the outcome of Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts;

H(1) Conflict Resolution and Preventions will be less successful the more intractable the conflict. Intractable conflicts produce over-reliance on negative acts; these in turn increase hostility and reduce the chances of a successful outcome.

H(2) When controlling for the intractability of conflict, the most effective strategy by a third party or mediator is a directive strategy. A strong, active mediation strategy can have more of an impact on the rivals involved than less directive strategies.

H(3) Once a successful outcome has been achieved in an intractable conflict, there is a higher likelihood that the parties involved will adhere to its provisions for a long period. The difficulties of achieving such outcomes are such that once achieved, the parties may experience war-weariness and be too well aware of the costs of their conflict, to renege on their agreement.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test the hypotheses outlined above we use original data on Conflict Resolution and Preventions activities in the post World War II period. These data consists of nearly 1900 cases of distinct Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempts in international disputes since 1945 (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993). The emphasis of the data is on attributes of Conflict Resolution and Preventions, and as such they detail, amongst others, the method and strategy undertaken to resolve disputes, the type of outcome reached, if any, and the durability of successful outcomes. For analytical purposes we created a subcategory within this data set that identifies those disputants which are part of an enduring or intractable conflict (Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Huth and Russett, 1993; Geller, 1993).

Our testing procedures involved a two-pronged approach. First we use two separate logit models to test for the effect of characteristics of a conflict and the parties on the successful management of the conflict. Of central concern here is the effect of the historical dimension on the probability of successful Conflict Resolution and Preventions. The first model examines the effects of contextual and behavioral variables on the settlement of disputes under different strategies of Conflict Resolution and Preventions; the second narrows the focus somewhat and looks at the effects of these attributes on outcomes when mediation is the chosen form of Conflict Resolution and Preventions. Based on our theoretical argument we posit that the historical context is a significant factor affecting the success of Conflict Resolution and Preventions. Parties in enduring conflicts are less likely to settle their disputes successfully than parties involved in a conflict without such a violent history. As a second step we isolated those instances of successful Conflict Resolution and Preventions and tested the null hypothesis; -- that the
existence of a rivalry has no impact on the durability of the outcome. Almost by definition it seems that parties to enduring conflicts are unable to achieve and implement long term negotiated settlements. However, should they reach such a settlement; there is good reason to believe it will last for quite a while.

A critical issue, at this juncture, is just what we mean by “successful outcomes”, “settlements”, and the “resolution of conflicts”. Operationally we define a successful outcome as one in which the observed behavior following a Conflict Resolution and Preventions effort resulted in a ceasefire, a partial, or a full settlement of the dispute. Conflict resolution implies that the underlying issues, attitudes and perceptions have been addressed so that the parties are no longer in a conflictual relationship. Our data cannot measure perceptual changes, nor do we believe that individual Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts are likely to resolve intractable conflicts. Settlement, on the other hand, pertains to the successful management of hostilities in a specific dispute (Burton, 1990). Conceived of in this manner it is neither ‘a given’ nor tautological to argue that enduring rivals will be less successful at utilizing single Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts to settle disputes than non-rivals. In fact, because of the interactive nature of the relationship between rivals, some might suggest that under certain conditions short term settlements could be more common among participants in intractable conflicts (Axelrod, 1984). As outlined in our theoretical discussion we frame the Conflict Resolution and Preventions process in terms of contextual and behavioral factors; in this empirical component we control for these various factors as follows: a) behavioral variables include the existence of a rivalry, the strategy of intervention, and the intensity of the conflict; and b) contextual variables incorporate the power relationship between actors, and the tangibility of the issues involved. Operational criteria can be found in Bercovitch and Langley (1993), but briefly:

1. An enduring rivalry is coded dichotomously and operationalized in terms of the criteria outlined by Goertz and Diehl (1993) and developed under the auspices of the Correlates of War Project. An enduring rivalry involves two states that have had at least 5 militarized disputes over a 20 year period without more than a 10 year gap between any two disputes. The cases that meet these criteria are consistent with those identified by Geller (1993) when constrained by our limit of a 1945 start date.

2. Power relationship is operationalized in terms of the disparity in power between actors A and B. An indicator of power is constructed using the Cox-Jacobsen scaling procedure (1973). Five indicators of state “power” -- GNP, military spending, per capita GNP, territorial size, and population -- were computed to form a power index of each state. The disparity in power between actors is the absolute value of the difference between their national scores on the power index.
3. Tangibility of issues at stake is coded dichotomously and derived from the six scale nominal indicator developed by Bercovitch. Of the six types of issues in conflict -- territory, ideology, security, independence, resources, and "others" -- territory, security and resources were coded as tangible, the other issues as intangible.

4. Intensity of the conflict is operationalized here as a continuous variable that measures the number of fatalities per month.

5. The conflict management method reflects the form adopted by the disputants in their efforts to settle the dispute. Two methods were identified and systematically coded by us; mediation and negotiation. A dummy variable was created for the existence of either method.

6. When mediation was adopted as the method for managing the conflict, three different strategies were identified and coded: communicative/facilitation, procedural, and directive. Conceptually a directive strategy is the most intrusive approach by the mediator; communicative the least. A dummy variable was created for the existence of each specific mediation strategy.

The results of our analysis point to a number of interesting patterns evident in the management of enduring and non-enduring conflicts. Two of these results allow us to draw descriptive inferences from the data; others have greater implications for understanding causal processes. In general what we find quite conclusively is that states involved in a protracted conflict do manage their disputes differently than other conflictual dyads. The success of any Conflict Resolution and Preventions efforts appears to be substantially influenced by the historical patterns of persistent conflictual interactions. This lends considerable support to the notion that enduring rivals constitute a distinct category of actors in our understanding of international conflict and Conflict Resolution and Preventions. We break down the discussion of our analysis into two distinct components.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

In the descriptive realm we find first that the maximum number of individual Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempts within enduring conflicts is 98; the minimum is seven. The distribution of these data is such that the mean number of Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempts is 52 with a standard deviation of 28. Among non-enduring dyads there is a maximum of 108 cases and a minimum of one; the mean however is just over 27 cases, with a standard deviation of 28. In the former category there are 575 cases; in the latter 1314. From these data we can see that on average enduring rivals use nearly twice as many Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempts -- as we hypothesized. We can also see that dyads that are not engaged in an enduring conflict also seem to require numerous attempts to manage their own conflicts. Table 2

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

To test for the effect of the history of the conflict within a broader context that can control for factors that have been linked to the outcome of mediation, we have specified two multivariate logit models of the conditions contributing to mediation successes. Success for these purposes was operationalized in terms of the outcome of mediation efforts in which at minimum a ceasefire was secured, or at the other end of the scale, a full or partial settlement of the dispute was achieved. We specify two models from which these tests are performed. The first accounts for the conditions associated with successful Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempts; the second disaggregates a specific type of Conflict Resolution and Preventions -- mediation -- into the different approaches adopted by mediators. The functional forms of the models are as follows:

\[ Y_1 = a + X_1 + X_2 + X_3 + X_4 + X_5 + e \]

and

\[ Y_1 = a + X_1 + X_2 + X_3 + X_4 + X_6 + X_7 + e \]

where

\[ Y_1 = \text{Success of Management (0,1)} \]
\[ X_1 = \text{Enduring Rivalry (1 if part of enduring dyad; zero otherwise)} \]
\[ X_2 = \text{Power Disparity (absolute value of disparity between power of actor A minus power of actor B; range 0-34)} \]
\[ X_3 = \text{Tangibility of Issue (1 if tangible; zero otherwise)} \]
\[ X_4 = \text{Intensity of Conflict (fatalities/month)} \]
\[ X_5 = \text{Management Type (1=mediation; zero=negotiation)} \]
\[ X_6 = \text{Directive Strategy (dummy, 1 if directive; zero otherwise)} \]
\[ X_7 = \text{Procedural Strategy (dummy, 1 if procedural; zero otherwise)} \]

These two models reflect concerns over the conditions most conducive to successful Conflict Resolution and Preventions, with Model 1 emphasizing, inter alia, the effect of different approaches to Conflict Resolution and Preventions and Model 2 the different strategies that are adopted by mediators.

FINDINGS

Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the results of our logit analyses and the transformation of these parameter estimates into
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics on Conflict Resolution and Preventions Attempts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enduring Rival</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Rivals</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempts</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
Results for Logit Regression on the Success or Failure of Management Attempt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enduring</td>
<td>-.47*</td>
<td>-.68*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Disparity</td>
<td>-.05*</td>
<td>-.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Tangibility</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Intensity</td>
<td>-.0003*</td>
<td>-.0008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive Strategy</td>
<td>.49*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Strategy</td>
<td>.74*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model 1: Log-Likelihood Function = -1033.9
Model 2: Log-Likelihood Function = -663.0

Likelihood Ratio Test = 48.4; 5 d.f.  Likelihood Ratio Test = 72.8; 6 d.f.

*p < .05; numbers in () are standard errors

estimates of the probability of a successful outcome, holding all other contributing factors constant. Because of the dichotomous nature of the outcome variable, the interpretation of the parameters associated with the logit, however, is not quite straightforward. The parameter estimates are transformed into estimates of probability that a given Conflict Resolution and Preventions effort will be successful. A hypothetical "base conflict" is usual as a benchmark from which the independent effects of the explanatory variables can be assessed. In each instance the components of our theoretical argument are generally supported by the data, an exception being the role played by issue tangibility. All are statistically robust and substantively meaningful, again with the exception of issue tangibility. The contextual variables of the power disparity between combatants and the protracted nature of the conflict are associated with a decreasing probability of a successful outcome in Conflict Resolution and Preventions. Behavioral variables, likewise, also bear a strong relationship to the outcome of management efforts. The more intense the conflict, for example, the less likely it is that any specific Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempt will succeed.

The particular approach to Conflict Resolution and Preventions appears to influence the likely outcome of the management effort. When controlling for other factors, direct negotiation will increase the probability of a successful settlement over mediation efforts. Moreover, when a mediation strategy is adopted, the particular mediation strategy affects the likely outcome, with a procedural strategy having the greatest probability of success, followed by a directive and then a
Table 4
Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Conflict Resolution and Preventions On the Probability of Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Prob. of Success</th>
<th>Change of Prob. Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Enduring Mediation Low intensity No power disparity From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: Enduring Conflict*</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: Negotiation*</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: High intensity</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: Tangible</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: High Disparity*</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05

Table 5
Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Conflict Resolution and Preventions On the Probability of Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Prob. of Success</th>
<th>Change of Prob. Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Enduring Intangible Issues Low intensity No power disparity Communication From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: Enduring Conflict*</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: High intensity</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: Tangible Issues</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: High Power Disparity</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: Directive Strategy</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From: Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To: Procedural Strategy</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05

communicative strategy. As mentioned earlier, however, a direct interpretation of these coefficients is difficult without transforming them into an expression of the change in the probability of moving to a successful settlement given a change in the independent variables. Table 4 presents these transformations, using as the baseline a conflict: a) not associated with an enduring rival, b) one waged over intangible issues (such as ideology), c) between relatively equally capable actors, and d) involved in a low intensity conflict. The type of management strategy for the base in Model 1 is mediation, while in Model 2 the base for the mediation strategy is communication-facilitation.

Here we see, for example, the probability of a successful settlement under the base conditions in Model 1 is 50%, but the existence of an enduring rivalry, holding all else constant at the base conditions, reduces the probability of success of the mediation attempt by 12% (Table 4). In Model 2, where we control for the specific approach to mediation, the existence of an enduring
conflict decreases the probability of a successful settlement by 17% to 33% (Table 5). Both of these results are consistent with our argument regarding the negative effect of intractability on Conflict Resolution and Preventions. Interestingly, and counter to our intuitive thoughts, negotiation has a significantly higher probability of success than mediation within enduring rivalries. Very intense conflicts and those with a large disparity in capabilities between actors have quite low prospects for the successful settlement of disputes (Model 1: 8% and 16%, respectively; and in Model 2: nil and 16%).

When looking at those cases in which mediation only was employed, the particular strategy has a strong impact on the likely success of this form of Conflict Resolution and Preventions. At the base conditions, where a communicative strategy is used, there is again a 50% likelihood of a successful settlement. A directive strategy increases the odds of a successful outcome by 12% to 62%, while a procedural approach has a 69% chance of success. But even that strategy has only a 51% chance of success when a conflict is intractable between enduring rivals.

Since one of our central concerns here is the effects of enduring conflicts on Conflict Resolution and Preventions outcomes, we push the analysis one step further. Table 6 presents the results of a bivariate exploration of the durability of a settlement under conditions associated with rivalries and non-rivalries. The intuitive perception would be that rivalries are rivalries because the antagonists can neither settle disputes nor abide by the terms of settlements if and when these are achieved. However, once a successful outcome has been achieved, the likelihood of that settlement holding for an extended period of time increases when the parties are part of an enduring conflict. Table 6 breaks down the durability of all successful management efforts into periods of less than one month, up to one month but less than two months, and two months or longer. The distributions of these data are such that it becomes clear that enduring rivals are considerably more likely to abide by the terms of any agreements than are non-rivals. For example, non-rivals are about equally likely to have an outcome last for less than a month as they are to have one last at least two months (40% vs. 46%), while enduring rivals are four times more likely to have a successful outcome hold for at least two months as they are to have one hold for a very short duration (17% vs. 70%). This is an unexpected result and largely inconsistent with the argument that enduring conflicts generally operate as feedback mechanisms, with negative interactions feeding future hostilities.

At first blush it might seem that a two month settlement is hardly a durable outcome, and that particularly with enduring rivals this should be no surprise. However two points should be raised to address this issue: a) the coding of the data did not permit an open-ended duration for the outcome of mediation efforts, presumably leaving many of the agreements in the “two months or longer” category remaining in force for considerably longer periods of time, and b) the durability we examine refers to the settlement of a specific dispute and set of issues, not the resolution of the conflict itself. A negotiated ceasefire that lasts for two months or more may be quite an achievement for some disputants (e.g. Bosnia comes to mind here). The obvious expectation is that if it can hold for two months then there is a real possibility that it will hold for longer and other issues can then be addressed.

The problem of censored data reflected in the open-ended coding procedure has a corollary in the literature on international conflict. There is some evidence that the longer a conflict has persisted, the longer it can be expected to last (Vuchinich and Teachman, 1993). And although the idea of duration dependence is not without counter-evidence or its critics (Bennett and Stam, 1996), the notion that a settlement which lasts for two months has a reasonable chance of persisting even longer, would seem to be reasonably well grounded. Utility theory, for example, might suggest that until the costs of the status quo or benefits from moving off of this equilibrium are sufficiently large, then the status quo should hold.

Overall what emerges from the analysis is a sense that the management of enduring conflicts is made difficult largely because of the frequency and duration of hostile interactions between the parties. In short, those involved in intractable conflicts not only appear to have a difficult time resolving the underlying issues that fuel their antagonisms, but they also have a more difficult time successfully settling their disputes. This suggests, inter alia, that the negative interactions resulting from the conflict do indeed operate as some sort of a feedback mechanism, which in turn suggests that the disputants are more likely to rely on coercive means to resolve underlying issues. This finding seems consistent with those of Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993; see also Gochman and Maoz, 1984) who demonstrate that enduring rivals account for a considerable amount of the violence within the international system. Given the extent of this international violence, one might counsel policymakers to focus on the strategy with which they try to settle disputes in these long-running conflicts.

These results, however, are richer than the simple inference that under some contextual conditions certain conflicts remain protracted because the parties cannot manage their disputes successfully. Those Conflict Resolution and Preventions attempts that do result in a settlement are considerably more likely to have the agreements upheld when the antagonists have a long history of conflict. This might suggest that the effect of prior hostile relationships is not so straightforward, and in fact, the successful management of a conflict and the likelihood of those management efforts to endure appear to operate by entirely different dynamics. This differing
impact of enduring conflict on the ability to successfully settle a dispute, and ultimately have that outcome hold, may be tied to the learning that must take place through repeated interactions with the same party (Mor & Maoz, 1996; Leng, 1983). The negative effects of previous hostilities make further coercion the dominant strategy for managing the conflict. But coercion is costly and successful Conflict Resolution and Preventions -- as difficult as that may be -- makes evident the virtues of cooperative strategies for Conflict Resolution and Preventions, and hence successful outcomes tend to be more lasting.

CONCLUSION

Much of the literature on international Conflict Resolution and Preventions has been hampered by the search for generic principles, and the assumption that the crises and disputes which characterize a conflict relationship are independent of one another. Here we have sought to work within an approach that distinguishes between conflicts on the basis of their intractability and disputatiousness and identifies a category of conflicts -- enduring or intractable conflicts -- as very different from other conflicts. We push the analysis further by asking whether differences in the historical experience of states will also be expressed in the way such states approach and manage their conflicts. The search for effective Conflict Resolution and Preventions principles should be predicated upon such an examination. Are rivalry characteristics, so crucial in the onset and evolution of conflicts, important in the practice of Conflict Resolution and Preventions? Do enduring conflicts really deserve separate treatment? Do they manage their hostilities differently? This paper represents the first attempt to explore the theoretical and empirical implications of those questions. Having identified the characteristics and consequences of enduring rivalries, the paper treats Conflict Resolution and Preventions as the dependent variable to answer this question. The behavioral attributes of enduring rivals clearly make a change to the practice of Conflict Resolution and Preventions. The data analysis suggests that the existence of intractability decreases the probability of successful Conflict Resolution and Preventions. A conflict punctuated by instances of militarized hostility and cooperation attracts a more varied range of Conflict Resolution and Preventions strategies than other conflicts. Interestingly, enduring rivals do not attract or welcome the diplomatic efforts of outsiders who may wish to mediate. Instead, they prefer to manage their relationship through negotiation. Remarkably, though, we find that when a Conflict Resolution and Preventions method (or strategy) has been successful, the outcome lasts far longer than similar outcomes in other conflicts.

The exploratory analysis undertaken in this paper suggests that a rivalry relationship offers a useful perspective for looking at international conflicts and interpreting some aspects of their management. That relationship, appropriately conceptualized and operationalized, may yet proves an invaluable focus for analyzing the dynamic processes that are embedded in a continuous and conflictual interaction. Reliable rivalry and Conflict Resolution and Preventions data sets have now been constructed. It is surely time their complex interdependence was more fully explored. This study explores a new angle and is among the first to examine intercultural conflict resolution among America, Asia (China, India, Korea, Japan and Malaysia) and Australia. This is the first study which has brought three continents one platform and compared their differing conflict resolution styles in the light of their cultural values. A lot many studies have been done to compare "East West" differences, by comparing U.S. to different Asian countries individually but for the first time U.S. has been
compared to not only Asia but to Australia as well. As such, common limitations are to be noted of limited number of studies in Australian and Indian context. Much studies have not been done of Australian conflict resolution styles since it has always been equated to America and it has been believed that American conflict resolution style is replicated in Australia as well, but that does not stand hundred percent true since few differences lie in culture and values held by Australians.

REFERENCES

Leng R (1983). When Will They Ever Learn Coercive