Unprecedented historic event in Tunisia towards the closure of 2010 radically reshaped the political and security environment of the Arab region, precipitating the Arab Revolution of 2011. As the consequence, the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ of Tunisia, the ‘January 25 Revolution’ of Egypt and the ‘February 17 Revolution’ of Libya ended the rule of Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi respectively. Libyan people, however, have not ensured changes they were looking for even today after a half a decade. The inability to handle the overall conditions of transition after Gaddafi transferred the state into long lasting instability which is still unsolved. Libya failed into worsening social, economic, security and political situation that is characterized by statelessness, lawlessness, chaos and civil war. State security has fractured and the border of the state is open, and has become feasible place to terrorists and illicit traffickers. Arms and drugs trafficking, human smuggling and oil Counterfeits and Contraband carried out by local traffickers and terrorist groups in the region centered in Libya. Mainly, terrorists are using this new base to recruit, train, and plan attacks. Economic activities, basically trade and investment, are in danger. The absence of strong central government caused people pour to neighboring countries and Europe to escape the endless chaos. This crisis and civil war triggered grave consequences on both the state or civilians and the broader regions of North Africa and Sahel. The notion of this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of security, social, economic and political consequences of post-2011 Libyan crisis on the nation (Libya and civilians) and the broader region.

Keywords: Civil war, Civilians, Ideology, Illicit-traffickers, Jihadists, Revolution, Terrorist, Arab Revolution of 2011

birth place of Tunisia, the revolution spread to Egypt, Libya and later engulfed the MENA region due to the existence of related decades of long political, economic, and social problems in the region.

In spreading the news to an observing world, and enabling the flames of discontent to be fanned the social media websites such as Face book, Twitter and You Tube played an important role. So, the revolutions of 2011 was the result of factors such as the spread of modern Information and Communication Technologies (hereinafter ICT) and social media networks, globalization of democratic values and the emergence of globally-orientated and digital-savvy youth as primary agents of change.

Up on its completion the revolution had toppled three authoritarian rulers in North Africa in 2011. To elaborate, the Tunisian ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ which began on 17thDecember 2010, ultimately resulted in the end of the 23 year long rule of President Ben Ali on January 14th 2011. Secondly, the Egyptian ‘January 25 Revolution’ came to an end on 11 February 2011 ending President Hosni Mubarak’s 30 years rule. Lastly, the Libyan ‘February 17 Revolution,’ which, unlike the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, saw a full-scale civil war, the intervention of NATO and the violent death of a dictator, ended ending 42-years rule of Muammar Gaddafi on 20 October 2011.

Despite initial signs that shows Libya might move toward stability, the country has teetered on the brink of failure with the total collapse of the transition after Gaddafi. Post-revolution Libya saw a particular worsening of the economic, security and political situation, leading to further entrenchment by rival forces and the beginning of a civil war.

The overthrown of Gaddafi left behind a security vacuum. Rather than a national police force, army, powerful regional militias have taken over management of their own territories and the security of the people residing there (Kirkpatrick, 2014). People are full equipped with the weapon proliferated throughout the country from Gaddafi’s weapon store. Since then, “[c] conflicts are occurring at the local, national, and even regional levels” (Engel, 2014:1). Fissures have emerged along ethnic, tribal, geographic, and ideological lines against the backdrop of a hardening Islamist versus non-Islamist narrative. The state became a hub of terrorist groups and illicit traffickers in the region. Different groups exercise power over the state. This crisis and civil war had grave consequences for both the country and civilians and the region. With the increasingly proliferation of illegal acts as well as terrorist groups in the country, states of the region and international community are giving concern to Libya. So, it is critically important to investigate its major impacts on the state, civilians and on the broader regions, North Africa.

**OBJECTIVE**

The general objective of this paper is assessing the security, social, political and economic consequences of the post-Gaddafi Libyan instability on the nation and the broader regions of North Africa and the Sahel.

**METHODOLOGY**

Methodologically, an author employs qualitative method. Because, this approach is best suited for the detailed analysis of the collected data as well as helps to identify problems that cannot easily be quantified like the impacts of post-2011 crisis in Libya. With regard to the source of data, the data items relevant to this particular study are collected from both primary and secondary sources. Finally, the paper is more of descriptive and it helps to describe the post-revolution developments in Libya. At the same time, it is employed to analyze and explain the outcome of post-revolution relapse of Libya to instability.

**SCOPE**

The scope of the paper is limited to the analysis of developments in Libya, which is full of instability, from the end of “February 17 Revolution of 2011” to 30th of March 2016, the time when the government of Feyaz Serraj, the prime minister of the new UN-backed Libyan, entered Tripoli.

**REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

There are also some authors who have written regarding the condition in Libya after the death of Gaddafi on the post-revolution crisis in the country.

Combazin the report entitled, “Political economy of Libya after the Gaddafi” mentioned that the political economy of Libya after the Gaddafi regime characterized by poor Security (lack of effective army or police); absence of stable, unified and inclusive state, fragmentation based on different interests, identities and loyalties; state working for patronage; an economy relying on oil; and poor economic governance (2014).

Chivvis and Martini on their work ‘Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future’ illuminates that Libya has teetered on the brink of a relapse into civil war on more than one occasion in the past year. In the absence of a functioning state, jihadist groups and others who took part in illicit trade of arms, drugs, human and oil have made inroads. Terrorists, who are using it as a safe haven has made it the center to train, recruit and plan attack. This condition is destabilizing the region. Different minorities in the state are acting autonomously (2014).

Another author, Engel, in his work entitled, “Libya as a
Failed State: causes, consequences, Options” concluded that the present or post 2011 revolution’s instability in Libya has numerous economic, social and security impact not only on the state itself, but the region at large (2014).

OVERVIEW OF LIBYA AFTER GADDAFI

The ‘February 17 Revolution’ in Libya, which unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, escalated to a full scale civil war for eight months and intervened by North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ended when Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed by Misratan militia-men outside the city of Sirte on October 20, 2011.

Despite initial signs like the 2011 election, on which the secular Alliance of National Forces led by former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril won, that shows Libya might move toward stability, the country has teetered on the brink of failure with the total collapse of the transition after Gaddafi. Post-revolution Libya saw a particular worsening of the economic, security and political situation, leading to further entrenchment by rival forces and the beginning of a civil war.

Post 2011 revolution developments in Libya created fertile ground for terrorists to blossom. Though Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/ Levant (ISIS/L) grabbed the headlines, Libya also became a home to a wide array of other jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda in Maghreb Region(AQIM), Ansar Al-Sheria in Libya and their affiliates (Gartenstein-Ross et al, 2015). These groups in different parts of Libya generally have focused on establishing camps for training, recruiting and planning attack.

What further deteriorated Libyan security was General National Congress (hereinafter GNCs) adoption of Political Isolation Law (hereinafter PIL) in 2013. PIL is an act that bans former Qaddafi officials from holding public office or serving in high-level positions in Libyan state institutions for ten years. This law followed by the formation of two rival groups (Secular, Operation Dignity and Islamist, Operation Down) that has been fighting since mid-2014.

Following peoples call, another election was held in June 2014. When secularists won the election the Islamists who dominated the GNC refused to deliver power. Since then, Libya has two- warring camps (Federalist and secular ‘Operation Dignity’ (Karama) and Islamist ‘Operation Dawn’ (Fajr), two parliaments (the HoR operating from the eastern city of Tobruk and the GNC based in the western city of Tripoli) and two governments (led, respectively, by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and Prime Minister Omar al-Hasi, who was replaced by Khalifa al-Ghaweilin March 2015) and two armies ( Libyan National Army and armed groups from Misrata, Tripoli and other areas) (Wehrey, 2014).

Including the UN, countries like France, Britain, United States, Italy, and Germany has recognized HoR as legitimate Libyan government. At regional level it was supported by regional states like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Chad and Niger while unrecognized GNC backed by Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan. "While this Islamist versus non- Islamist, HOR versus GNC, division may appear neat on paper, Libya's divisions on the ground are far more complicated" (Engel, 2014:2).

Teetering of Libya to collapse made different international and regional origins to see the condition more closely so as to end the crisis peacefully. Best instances are AU and UN. The role played by UN, rather than providing humanitarian assistance, on bringing different factions fighting in Libya together to dialogue so as to end differences peacefully has been commendable. On 17th December 2015 different political factions signed the Political Agreement in Skhirat, Morocco on which the Government of National Accord (hereinafter GNA) was formed. This UN backed New Libyan government formed under Fayez Serraj (Blanchard, 2016). Despite opposition and warnings from different bodies under this dire situation the councils of the government and its head entered Tripoli from their former base of Tunis, Tunisia on 30 March 2016. Nonetheless, the crisis is resuming.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE POST-GADDAFI CRISIS

With no central authority, a heavily armed populace, and a stalled disarmament, mobilization and reintegration process, conflict began to proliferate nationwide after the end of the revolution. As a result, with no real central government to speak of, Libya has become hospitable to a wide variety of violent non-state actors. The fragmentation of political and military power added with the absence of capable state institutions for the last nearly five years put the future survival of Libya as a united states under question.

In addition to the state and civilians, post-2011 Libyan crisis has affected the security as well as politics and economy of the region, especially what are commonly called North Africa (states found in the Northern part of Africa) and Sahel region (which is a hot, dry land between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, and extends from Senegal on the west coast of Africa to Chad in the east of the continent). This grave consequence of Libya’s crisis and civil war for both the country and the region can be grouped into national and regional as follows:

National

The current crisis of Libya has its own impacts on the survival of the state and civilians. While some left their
country, the remaining civilians are leading a miserable life.

**State: National Identity and Economy**

Libya has no long period of history as a united State. A unity that Libyans showed within such a short time of togetherness during the revolution to topple Gaddafi, caught the mind of the world by surprise. Since the end of the revolution, however, the country is moving towards multiple complex divisions which are difficult to clearly mention. Enduring violence took multiple forms like conflicts on occupation of territory, controlling trade routes, old age tribal enmity, treatment from the late regime, the role during the revolution, issue of citizenship, power, and resources. There are some towns and tribes fighting for more than one reason. For instance, Misrata and Zintani are fighting each other as pro-Dawn and pro-Dignity simply for power; Misratans blame the Zintanis as being the most favored tribe during the reign of Gaddafi; and Zintanis allegiance to Gaddafi during the civil war is another cause for conflict (Pusztai, 2014).

There are also different such local wars in the state. Even in the post-2014 developments, immediately after Operation Dawn forces seized Tripoli, individuals from or affiliated with Zintan were targeted in reprisal attacks, or were reported to have disappeared at checkpoints manned by pro-Dawn forces. The same was true for Operation Dignity forces which had been singled out and praised by their northwestern allies along tribal lines in the northwest. Both forces detained individuals from rival towns and tribes. After expanding its sphere of influence to Sirte and localities, ISIS has been supporting and provoking an areas and tribes connected and favored by Gaddafi and marginalized in the post-revolution years. The former Pro-Dignity Prime Minister Al-Thini observed that Libyans were increasingly identifying themselves with town and tribe over a shared notion of Libyan citizenry and he point on 7th August 2014 suggesting that Libya could be rendered “into small emirates of no value” (Thini, 2014).

Libya’s economy is almost entirely dependent on its energy industry; it accounts for roughly 72 percent of its GDP and 95 percent of export earnings (Bell & Witter, 2011). While foot soldiers do battle in the streets throughout the country, Libyan politicians and bureaucrats are waging a war over the country’s oil reserves. Libya’s political and security crises have crippled the country’s economy. Oil production has fallen. Initially, as revolution ended the economy seems good with resumption of hydrocarbon production and exports, but it did not last long.

...the economy witnessed a downturn in the second half of 2013 mainly due to the mounting protests at major oilfields and export terminals. In 2013, oil production declined to well below its average 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) average, reaching a low of 200,000-300,000 bpd in October....this has constituted a substantial budgetary pressure, costing the economy over USD 10 billion in 2013 alone. GDP is estimated to have declined by around 12% in 2013, with an estimated fiscal deficit of 9.3%. In March 2014, oil production levels reached a further low of 250,000 bpd. As a result, the budget is likely display a very significant deficit in 2014, threatening fiscal sustainability and putting pressure on the government’s social and economic expenditures (African Development Bank, 2014: 6).

The deterioration continued. “As of late March 2015, oil production had plummeted to just over 300,000 barrels per day out of an overall capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day” (Blanchard, 2015:7). The lowering of global oil prices is also another problem that affected Libya’s oil production. Currently HoR is in control of much of the oil. However, on frequent occasions an unknown group stormed Libya’s oil fields. ISIS has been also targeting oil industries. Such targeting of the hydrocarbon industry could bring about an environmental catastrophe, undermine the economy, and end the government’s ability to provide subsidies. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) has attempted to remain neutral in the confrontation between the revived GNC and HOR so far. Libya’s renewed conflict and the resuming crisis has been the death knell for Libya’s small, emerging formal private sector. Consequently, private sector activity remains limited due to the volatile political environment, weak regulatory and institutional environment, lack of access to finance, and a weak banking system. Youth unemployment in Libya was estimated to be as high as 50 percent in 2014. Libya’s booming black market in both licit and illicit goods has also hindered the formal economy’s growth.

**Civilians: Anarchy, Exodus, Displacement, and Human and Material Destoructions**

The justice system remained paralyzed by violence and lawlessness, hampering investigations into abuses. As the revolution ended, armed groups continued to detain thousands accused of being linked to the former regime. “By September 2013, the total number of conflict-related detainees in Libya was generally estimated to be around 8,000” (UNSMIL, 2013: 5). Abductions of civilians, hostage-taking, torture and other ill-treatment and killings of captured fighters and abducted civilians are rife. All sides appear to have launched indiscriminate attacks...
from and into civilian areas, leading to the destruction and damage of civilian objects and infrastructure and the killing and injury of hundreds of civilians. As far as the freedom of expression, association and assembly is concerned, nothing has practically improved since the fall of the previous regime. As the GNC assumed power they tightened restrictions on freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Its decrees clearly show this; for example, Decree 5/2014, adopted by the GNC in January, banned satellite television stations from broadcasting views deemed “hostile to the 17th February Revolution” (Amnesty International Report, 2015).

The continued instability, indiscriminate shelling and use of air assaults against targets in heavily populated areas is a major driving force behind the migration and displacement as civilians are forced to flee due to fear of, or as a result of, explosive weapon attacks. The exact number with regard to Libyan migrants and refugees is still unclear, due to the fact that the migration was circular in which some of individuals kept coming back to Libya. However, SCARPS speculated that it was agreed that, “there are two million Libyans abroad” (SCARPS, 2015: 6). These are those people who fled the fighting since 2011 mostly to other states. Tunisia has been the largest recipient of migrants fleeing Libya due to its proximity to Tripoli and other major Libyan cities, accounting for 43 per cent of the total number. Again SCARPS speculates that the “Estimates put the number of Libyans in Tunisia at 500,000–800,000” (ibid, 2015:6). Neighboring countries Algeria and Egypt also hosted many. There are some Libyans who crossed Mediterranean Sea to Europe. Unlike the numbers concerning Libyan migrants and refugees which are still unclear, there are more precise estimates of internally displaced persons (hereinafter IDPs): in an interagency assessment, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that in September 2015 there were 435,000 IDPs in various regions of Libya. To elaborate, “[b]y region, 231,956 were from Western Libya, 158,182 from Eastern Libya and 44,731 from Southern Libya” (ibid, 2015:1). “Approximately 290,400 children were affected” (UNICEF, 2015:1). Out of these IDPs, “360,000 were displaced as a result of the fighting that began in July 2014” (UNSMIL, 2015:5). Humanitarian organizations are facing serious difficulties to reach communities and vulnerable IDP families affected by the ongoing violence in the country due to the ongoing violence, destruction of roads and closure of airports.

With some exceptions, militias, army units and armed groups showed complete disregard for civilian life, objects and infrastructure and failed to take the necessary precautions to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and damage. Within eight months from mid-2014 to February 2015 through the spread of intensified fighting accompanied by aerial bombardment anywhere from 1000-2500 Libyans lost their lives (ICG, 2015).

Furthermore, “Data collected by AOAV indicates that between January 2011 and June 2015, civilians comprised about 79 per cent of all reported casualties (people killed or physically injured) from explosive weapon attacks in populated areas in Libya”(Elhaj and Tonkin,2015: 27). In addition to the significant loss of civilian life, the crisis, especially the use of explosive weapons in Libyan cities, towns, and villages has damaged or destroyed civilian homes and infrastructure, as well as interrupted essential services and destroyed livelihoods.

Regional

Gartenstein-Ross et al. (2015:90) concluded developments in Libya after Gaddafi and its implication for the region:

Since the Arab Spring protests of 2011, the political environment in North Africa has been characterized by insecurity and volatility…Meanwhile, Libya’s post-revolution implosion has served as a cautionary tale. The civil conflict now ravaging Libya has left the country deeply fragmented and insecure…The transnational terrorist threat emanating from North Africa has increased dramatically, due in large part to the deterioration of security in Libya. State weakness in Libya has also created a fertile environment for drug traffickers and human smugglers, who are now sending unprecedented numbers of irregular migrants on dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. It is increasingly apparent that instability in North Africa will pose long-term challenges.

The crisis has socio-economic, security and political impact on the broader regions of the North Africa and the Sahel.

Economy: Loss of Remittance and Unemployment, Investment and Trade

Libya’s instability and civil war is placing considerable strain on the regional state’s economy. Libya had been a main country of immigration, close to the largest European receiving states in terms of immigrants’ share of the total population, which was 12% (Migration Policy Centre, 2013). Immigration flows into Libya began in the 1960s just after the discovery of oil and hydrocarbons. Besides the discovery of oil, ambitious economic and social programs following the discovery of oil, lack of sufficient indigenous manpower in the country as well as geographically, to elaborate Libya’s West coast is
extremely close (just 350 km) to Europe’s southernmost outposts of Malta and the Italian island of Lampedusa were all pulling factors that made Libya traditionally a spot for migration from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Libya’s relative wealth as compared to the rest of the continent and Gaddafi’s pan-African ideology, a policy of open doors and visa waivers was implemented for most of Libya’s African neighbors starting in the 1990s, were additional factors caused Libya to be the homeland of immigrants. As far as the number is concerned, “[p] prior to the conflict there were an estimated two million Egyptian migrants and 300,000 Tunisian migrants in Libya” (Bakrania, 2014: 9). However, the number of those who are from the West Africa is not even estimated. These workers living in Libya reduced the number of unemployed persons in the country and their remittances were an important source of revenue to those countries. However, with the beginning of revolution which turned in to civil war, and post-revolution crisis neighboring countries have seen an influx of refugees and economic migrants returning home or fleeing from Libya. “By January 2012, IOM, in cooperation with the border authorities...recorded 173,873 Egyptians crossing the Libyan–Egyptian border....In total, from the beginning of the crisis until January 2012, almost 137,000...Tunisians fled Libya through the Tunisian border” (Aghazarm et al, 2012:12). Algeria would seem to be the neighboring country least touched by these movements – having received ‘only’ 13,962 (Of which only 12 percent (1675) were Algerians) migrants since the beginning of the crisis (ibid).

Sub-Saharan Africans are one of the largest groups of migrant workers affected by the Libya crisis. “According to the report of the UN fact-finding mission, the total number of Sub-Saharan returnees, including unregistered cases, in countries neighboring Libya was 420,000 (200,000 in Niger, 150,000 in Chad, 30,000 in Mali and 40,000 in Mauritania...”(United Nations Official Records, 2012: 5-6). As of 31st January 2012 the number of returnees to other countries in the region was: Ghana 11,386, Nigeria 3,391, Burkina Faso 1,661, Guinea 680, Togo 369, Senegal 406 and other countries in the region Fewer than 200 (IOM Daily Statistical Report, 2012). The majority of these were returned by direct border crossings from Libya into Chad and Niger, while others were with IOM assistance. This number was of who has returned only in the first wave in the first two years of the crisis. The numbers of returnees in the second phase, with the outbreak of the 2014 civil war, exceed the first phase by far. The workers' returning home has translated into lost remittances, increasing unemployment, and higher demands for housing and welfare services. It was because these countries lose significant remittance outflows from Libya, which was nearly USD 1 billion in pre-crisis (WB, 2011). 93.7 per cent Egyptians and 91 per cent of Malians returnees as surveyed by IOM sent remittances home (Aghazarm et al, 2012). The same was nearly true for the rest. “A survey carried out by IOM of over 1,200 returning Egyptian migrants who had been living in Libya... reveals the following personal profile of Egyptian migrants: 99 per cent were male and were mainly between 20 and 30 years of age (the average age was 26.2 years old)....”(ibid 2012:12). Most of other states have the same or related data.

Libya’s turmoil has a significant impact on the investment and trade in the region. By the goal of making rulers all over Africa his own political friends, from 1997 onwards, Gaddafi of Libya has made generous contributions to developmental investments. “The Financial Times speculates that the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) has invested around $65 billion in Africa since its establishment in 2006” (Hansen, 2013:17). This investment highly centered on Chad, Niger, Mali and other sub-saharan states. Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt were also beneficial from it. For instance, “Tunisian investments in Libya exceed two billion dinars (almost$1.5 billion)” (Santi et al, 2011: 9). However, Libya after Gaddafi was not strong enough to continue as they had before. This resulted in the reduction of foreign direct investment in the host countries of the region and foreign investment in Libya. The Algerian oil company Sonatrach operates in the Ghadames Basin southwest of Tripoli, other neighbor states company operating in Libya stopped their work as a result of the crisis. Bilateral trade between Libya and neighboring trade partners is also affected. Libya is a particularly important export market for Egypt and Tunisia. Tunisian agro-processing industry (dairy products, pasta and tomato paste) and construction material industry (cement) were reaping huge profits exporting to Libya. In addition to oil which accounts for 92 percent of the export, significant consumer goods imported from Libya through informal trade and sold in Tunisian markets at cheap prices. However, post-2014 civil war made trade unthinkable in the region with Libya.

Security: Terrorism and Trafficking

The overthrow of Gaddafi and the subsequent absence of strong enough government to control Libyan territory have been destabilizing the region. Different security measures were taken by different states in the region as well as outsiders like France and America. The 2012 coup in Mali has direct relation with Libyan violence.

Transnational Terrorism

Nobody has a clear picture of the networks operating across North Africa and the Sahel due to their constantly split and reconfigurations, the lack of state control, and
secrecy of an organization. They are using this new base to recruit, train, and plan attacks.

In the post-revolution, besides many others, there are three prominent terrorist groups in Libya. These are AQIM, ISIS/L and Ansar al-Sheria in Libya (hereinafter AASL).

**AQIM**

One of the most significant groups operating in Libya and the region is the AQIM. It has been around in North Africa since 1998 by the name of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. AQIM was renamed and re-structured in Algeria in 2007 with the aim to create an Islamic state in the region and to establish Sharia (Islamic Law). It is one of Al-Qaeda’s three affiliates named Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and AQIM. It is a source of much insecurity, tension and conflict for all states, including powerful international actors (Chivvies and Martini, 2014). AQIM has considerable resources in cash. When it suits their purposes, the group can facilitate the movement of migrants across the desert and condone and profit from drug trafficking, which is an important source of revenue for them.

AQIM has outside and inside Libya jihadist affiliates. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (hereinafter MOJWA), the Ansar Dine and Al-Mourabitoun are its affiliates from outside. MOJWA and the Ansar Dine joined the fight against Malian forces beginning in February 2012, alongside the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (hereinafter by its French acronym MNLA). MNLA is group formed in late 2011 and fighting for an internationally recognized independent state of ‘Azawad’ (the Tuareg name for the three regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal in northern Mali) (Aning et al., 2012). Due to ideological difference the two groups are believed to have driven the MNLA out of the northern regions soon after the latter declared an independent state of Azawad in April, and control Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. But they were finally cleared out of Mali by the French Operation Serval in northern Mali from 2012-2014 (GIATOC, 2015). These groups escaped to south western Libya.

Al-Mourabitoun(‘The Sentinels’), which was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar enjoyed freedom of movement in parts of Mali and southern Algeria, but the group maintained its center of gravity in Libya (GIATOC, 2015). The June 2015 airstrike in eastern Libya targeted Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who led the group responsible for the January 2013 attack on the natural gas facility at In Amenas, Algeria, in which three Americans were killed (Blanchard, 2015).

From among Libyan jihadists, Ansar Al-Sheria of Benghazi and Abu Salim Martyrs are believed to be affiliates of AQIM. Ansar al Sharia (which means defenders of Shari’a) of Benghazi are Sunni Islamists established in 2012 by Muhammed Ali al-Zawahi, in Libya. It attacked the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, killing four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens in 2012, alongside other Islamist militant groups. America has labeled it a terrorist group.

Abu Salim Martyrs is a militant Islamist group which struggled against the Qaddafi regime for two decades prior to his overthrow under their leader Salim Derbi. Established and currently located in the Eastern part of the country, this group attempted to proclaim Shari’a in Derna in 2012 after having reportedly assassinated Muhammed al-Hasi, the man in charge of internal security in Derna for the national government (Chivvies and Martini, 2014).

**ISIS/L**

ISIS has grown from what used to be Al-Qaeda in Iraq (hereinafter AQI), a Sunni insurgent group that fought against US and Iraqi government forces and carried out attacks against Shi'ite targets after the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was its leader at the time (Barrett, 2014). AQI became known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006 after Al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by a US air strike. From 2006 to 2010, the ISI’s policy was establishing an Islamic state after toppling the Iraqi government. But it was apparently undone when Iraqi and US military attacks led to the killing or capture of some 80% of ISI’s leaders (Hashim, 2014). The killings opened the way for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi, to be a leader.

From 2010 to 2013 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi spent a lot of effort on reforming ISI’s organizational structure and strengthening its military capabilities in which Iraqis assumed key posts from the former foreigners. Factors like the increasing dysfunction of the Iraqi state, the apparent fading away of core al-Qaeda under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war supported the group (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information centre, 2016). In 2013, ISI announced a merger with Jabhat al-Nusrah, forming the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS or ISIL). Al-Sham is the Levant, the land at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, hence the name ISIL. Some anti-ISIS Arabic-speakers prefer to call the group Daesh. Al-Nusrah appears never to have accepted the merger and, after a struggle and a period of confusion, al-Qaeda’s central leadership cut ties with ISIS and al-Baghdadi in February 2014, calling for ISIS to withdraw from Syria. Jabhat al-Nusrah that focuses on bringing down the Assad government in Syria, and ISIS that concentrated on conquering territory, have fought in 2014, leading to thousands of deaths (Barrett, 2014). Out of the war ISIS...
became stronger.

According to Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information centre (2016: 15), factors attract ISIS to come to Libya from its basis of Iraq and Syria includes:

...its geographical location ...; the disintegration of Libya's political, governmental and societal systems; it already had a jihadist infrastructure rooted in the veterans of the fighting in Syria and Iraq; the oil and gas fields...; the large stockpiles of weapons remaining after the fall of the Qaddafi regime enable ISIS to arm itself and sell arms to friendly Salafist-jihadist organizations; Libya's proximity to Italy makes it easy to export terrorism and subversion to Italy and from there to western Europe in general.

Different authors write different analysis on the ISIS road to Libya. One widely accepted analysis argues that a group of Libyans travelled to fight in Syria in 2011. Majority of them are from Derna. The group established an armed group calling itself the Battar Brigade (ibid). During the first half of 2014 about 300 members of the Battar Brigade returned to Libya and Derna and established the jihadist organization called IYSC. They included not only Libyan operatives, but also foreign fighters from Arab and African countries. The group soon declared loyalty to al-Baghdadi of ISIS. As such, ISIS operatives returning from Syria established a stronghold in Derna (Barqa Province).

After a year, in June 2015, ISIS was expelled from Derna and the towns surrounding it by a coalition of the Tobruk government and a local Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist organization called the Shura Mujahideen Council. Today ISIS operatives are still entrenched to the south of Derna and so far have resisted pressure to drive them out. Governmental vacuum in Sirte after Gaddafi was quickly filled by Ansar al-Sharia. In 2014 the group allied with ISIS. Through time, Ansar al-Sharia's operatives in Sirte and other locations joined the ranks of ISIS and helped take over Sirte and other towns and cities in western Libya. Incorporating 105,000 people of surrounding rural area with 60,000 (under Gaddafi 140,000) inhabitants of Sirte, ISIS formed Islamic State's 'Tripoli Province' (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, 2016).

ISIS in Libya, which locally calls itself Wilayat Tarabulus, is particularly worrisome because it is a new formation directly controlled by ISIS leadership, not a pre-existing terror group that had sworn fealty to ISIS (Foreign Policy Initiative Bulletin, 2016). An ISIS leader has been concealed so far. However, three personalities -Abu Habib al-Jazrawi (Saudi), Abu Baraa al-Azadi (Yemeni), and Wissam al-Zubaydi (Abu Nabil al-Anbari)(Iraqi), who was killed on November 10, 2015 U.S. air strike, have highest power (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information centre, 2016).

Though new to the region, ISIS which has a force of 6,500, has won the allegiance of several extreme Islamists in the region including Ansar al-Sharia in Derna, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) and Boko Haram.

Ansar al-Sharia in Derna is a violent Sunni Islamist founded in 2012 in Libya by Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu, who was an inmate at the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay. Bin Qumu made Derna a magnet for jihadists from Libya and elsewhere. He is widely reported to be running a training camp for approximately 200 jihadists in the forest outside of town (Chivvies and Martini, 2014). It has facilitated ISIS entrance and control of Sirte.

ABM is one of Egypt's most important radical Islamist groups that mainly operate in the north of Egypt's troubled Sinai Peninsula, attacking Israeli, Egyptian security forces, oil and gas infrastructure and personnel and, on one occasion, tourists. The relatively unstable condition in Egypt following the 2011 revolution weakened the Egyptian state's security presence in the Sinai and this in turn allowed ABM the opportunity to expand its operations. The attack which left 26 Egyptian soldiers dead in Sinai in January 2015 is one indication of the strength of this ISIS affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula (Smith, 2015).

Boko Haram ('Western education is forbidden') was founded in Nigeria, in 2009 by Mohammed Yusuf with the goal to establish an Islamic state in the region governed according to Islamic law (the Sharia). In the same year its leader was arrested and executed and his deputy Abubakar Shekau replaced him. The group collaborated and pledged allegiance with ISIS in 2014 as its leader announced in a video in July 2014. Currently the forces of Boko Haram, receives training from ISIS in Libya. Some of them are assisting ISIS in Libya to expand its hold and give effective administration in Libya.

AASL

AASL was formerly founded as Ansar al-Sheria in Derna and Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi in 2012 in Libya by Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu and Mohamed al-Zahawi respectively. Following their attack of the U.S. consulate in Benghazi in 2012, the widespread backlash in Libya and abroad forced Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi to be removed from Benghazi and Ansar al-Sharia in Derna to be disbanded. Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi then underwent a major rebranding effort, changing its name to AASL. It also opened new branches in Derna, Sirte, and Ajdabiya in 2013 (Elbrqawi, 2014). The prominence of the group was challenged by the death of its leader, Mohamed al-Zahawi and Haftar’s attack that reduced its control of Benghazi to less than 10%.
Terrorist Caused Disaster and Measures Taken

Strengthened by several conducive conditions in the region after 2011 like weapons from Libya, an income from illicit trade in the region, a recruiting army from returnees from Libya and using the post-revolutionary ungoverned areas in the southern part of Libya as a safe area to train armies and freely plan attacks; therefore, extremist organizations are committing several atrocities like planned attacks, public beheadings, floggings and other depredations in the region.

Though there were different terrorist attacks like car bombings and guerilla-style attacks on government buildings, for example, in Benghazi the British Ambassador narrowly escaped death when a rocket-propelled grenade fired at his car failed to detonate, the terrorist attack that attracted global attention was the attack on U.S. diplomatic compounds in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens along with three other Americans. The attack was carried out by AQIM affiliate Ansar al-Sharia. As a result USA labels the group with international terrorists (Pedersen, 2013).

Gaddafi had hired and armed many of the fighters to defend him against the NATO-backed rebellion in Libya, and they returned to Mali at the Libyan war’s end to form the strongest Tuareg-led rebel group called MNLA. Joined by the two AQIM affiliates jihadists-MOJWA and the Ansar Dine- MNLA fought against Malian forces beginning in February 2012. During the war the inadequate resourcing of the national army led about 1000 troops to be either killed, taken captive, or deserted. Mali’s army had grown upset with the government for not arming them sufficiently enough to quell the group and staged a mutiny on Wednesday, 21 March 2012 which turned into a coup on Thursday. On 22 March 2012 the coup ousted President Amadou Toumani Toure, and MNLA controlled northern Mali. Due to ideological differences the two jihadists later attacked MNLA itself and controlled the area until France cleared it out of Mali by Operation Serval from 2012-2014. These groups have by no means been eliminated rather they took refuge to ungoverned areas of the South west and continue to be a threat. In February 2014, Niger’s interior minister called on France to expand its mission and for the United States to intervene in southern Libya to eradicate the terrorist threat. In response, France is establishing a base in northern Niger sixty miles from the Libyan border, and the United States is now opening a drone base in Agadez, Niger, some five hundred miles closer to the Libyan border than its first drone base in Niamey (Engel, 2014). Finally, in July 2014, France launched Operation Barkhane, the successor to Operation Serval, not just to continue French operations in Mali, but also to establish an intelligence-gathering architecture and project force across the Sahel, including through bases in Chad, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. The operation is based on an agreement between France and five Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) that allow France to strike targets in those five countries (GIATOC, 2015).

Algeria faced terrorist attacks from AQIM affiliates extremist Al Murabitoun in January 2013. The group attacked Algeria’s In Amenas gas field in which three Americans were killed. The alleged planner of the attack, the leader of the group Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is believed to have travelled to southwest Libya in late 2011 and early 2012 to purchase weapons and establish contact with local extremists (ICG, 2015). Algeria increased its military presence on its border with Libya, with the deployment of infantry brigades, together with increased airborne surveillance. Despite the July 2015 UN-brokered tentative agreement to create a government of national accord the worsening situation in Libya as well as rising security challenges, forced Algeria to change approach. In June 2015, in reaction to news that IS-affiliated factions in Sirte had taken control of the local airport, it raised the alert on its border with Libya to the highest level, reportedly deploying more soldiers to guard it and issuing shoot-to-kill orders against trespassers. America has also conducted airstrikes in eastern Libya in June 2015.

In March 2013 another AQIM’s affiliate suicide bombers strike a barracks in Agadez and a French-run uranium mine in Arlit, both in northwest Niger. It was MOJWA, which emerged in late 2011 as a splinter faction to AQIM that claimed responsibility for the attack. Niger later claimed that the attacks were launched from southern Libya (Bakrania, 2014).

In August 2013, the Tunisian army launched an offensive against suspected al-Qaeda aligned groups like Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, and reported to include Libyans, in the Chaambi Mountains located near the Tunisia-Algeria border. President Moncef Marzouki claimed that local jihadists had ties with terrorist forces in northern Mali, and that Tunisia was becoming a corridor for the trafficking of Libyan weapons to these regions following the discovery of two large arms depots in the southwestern town of Medenine, on the main route to Libya in January 2013. On May 27 AQIM conducted an attack on the Tunisian interior minister’s home. On July 16, Tunisia saw its bloodiest day in fifty years when an AQIM-affiliated battalion killed fourteen soldiers and wounded twenty others in this region. Libyan instability directly translates into Tunisian instability: Tunisian foreign minister Mongi Hamdi warned as much when he said that we consider that [the crisis in] Libya is an internal problem for Tunisia...because our security is part of Libya’s security. As a result the country strengthened its attack on extremists, and inspection and surveillance on its border with Libya was increased. With the exception of Libyans
other states citizens were blocked from entering Tunisia.

On July 19, 2104 gunmen from Libya killed twenty-one troops of Egypt at a checkpoint in Farafra (El Deeb, 2014). This phenomenon has pushed Haftar and Egypt into closer cooperation. “This reality is indeed unfolding: an Egyptian security official claimed on September 5 that coordination is occurring between Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in the Sinai, ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and “the militants in Libya””(Engel, 2014:11).

In January 2015 ABM attacked police and military targets in the capital of the North Sinai provincial capital, Al-Arish. This surprisingly well-coordinated attack left 26 soldiers dead at an army checkpoint while three more died in shooting incidents in the town. A month later Libyan IS affiliate released a new video that showed the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. This slaughter of Egyptian Christians followed by Egyptian fighter jets’ strikes against alleged Islamic State positions in Derna in retaliation after one day.

IS attacks occurred several times in Libya including the January 27th strike of the country’s most prominent hotel, the Corinthia Hotel, killing nine; the beheading or shooting of 28 Ethiopians; attack on Algerian and Iranian embassies in Tripoli, and suicide attacks in the town of Qubba that killed at least forty and others. Last year also ISIS claimed responsibility for attacks on the Bardo museum in Tunis and a popular resort hotel that killed 59 tourists in total, as well as the suicide bombing that killed the presidential guards. This year very recently AQIM caused incident in Cote Diovare has resulted in the death of 19 civilians in March 2016.

These terrorists caused atrocities are leading states in the region to tighten their control of the border. With the aim to “create an environment inhospitable to terrorist and trafficking operations and to address youth vulnerability to violent extremism and recruitment by terrorism networks” the first Pan-Sahel Initiative that launched in 2004 and replaced by Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2008 is awakening now. Its members include the Maghreb countries, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal; and they are very worried about international jihad taking root and causing atrocities next door. Also included in the program America offers a mixture of counterterrorism training for the security forces.

**Illegal Trafficking**

Cross-border ethnic and tribal relations, nomadic nature of the people, porous state borders and lack of security infrastructure are other factors encouraging massive cross-border movement. Arms and drugs trafficking, human smuggling and oil Counterfeits and Contraband are examples of the illegal trafficking carried out by local traffickers and terrorist groups in the region.

**Arms**

Unsecured weapons storage facilities that were previously guarded by the Libyan government are the main source of the outflow of arms. Out of Gaddafi’s 250,000-700,000 firearms 75 percent are assault rifles. These arsenals have in many cases fallen prey to armed groups and traffickers.

Arms trafficking routes originating in Libya extend to the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Syria and other conflict zones. Italian mafia groups and other criminal networks in Europe also reportedly have received arms shipments through Libyan ports.

Following an inflow of weapons, ammunition, and armed fighters from Libya into northern Mali, a dormant Tuareg rebellion was revived and later saw a military coup. Though most arms purchased in order to arm militant groups in Libya and the Sahel (including Mali, Niger, and Chad) some smugglers are reaping profits (GIATOC, 2015). As of GIATOC, (2015:3-4):

*The value of the arms trade in Libya estimated at US$4-15 million annually for light arms. Including ammunition, the full value of the Libyan arms trade is likely to be in the range of US$15-30 million….The regime’s firepower has also had significant impact on countries beyond Libya’s borders….Gaddafi-era Libya possessed 22,000 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), of which at least 17,000 are unaccounted for and 400 are known to have been trafficked. An estimated 10,000-20,000 firearm from Libya has reached Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan”.

**Drugs**

With the relative weakness of security Libya has become a hub of traffickers. An incipient domestic market for cocaine and heroin has also emerged in Tripoli. Cocaine, heroin, and cannabis are the major drugs in the region. Cocaine and heroin, originated in South America Colombia, enter Africa by traffickers via Guinea-Bissau. Then transferred to Libya and then shared to Egypt, from where it is smuggled into Europe. Cannabis, produced in Morocco and move south to Mauritania and Mali, then across northern Mali and Niger it is taken to Egypt or the Gulf states through Chad and Sudan. Traffickers in Libya also involved in moving narcotics or drugs directly from Libya’s western ports to Europe. The western port of Zuwarah, located near the Tunisian border, and the surrounding towns of Sebratah and Zawiya are believed to be hubs of migrant smuggling and drug trafficking to
Europe. “An estimated 18 tons of cocaine per year transit through the West African coastal countries...worth US$1.25 billion wholesale in Europe...Earnings are likely as low as US$15-20 million in Libya, Tunisia and Algeria” (GIATOC, 2015:3).

Oil, Counterfeits and Contraband

The government’s subsidization of oil for domestic consumers has contributed to the emergence of illicit oil smuggling networks which is carried out mainly by criminal enterprises in Libya and other groups. The oil is bought cheaply in Libya, and then sent to Malta, Italy, or Tunisia, where it can be sold for a higher price. Zuwarah in particular has become a hub for oil smuggling networks.

Cigarettes, cars, alcohol, medicines, and construction or farming equipment are the main items being illicitly sold. Cigarettes are mostly moved by legal traders from free trade zones such as Dubai, and can be seen as a strategy to avoid taxes. “The Maghreb states of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia smoke 44 percent of Africa’s cigarettes and the illicit trade in tobacco is said to be worth US$1 billion per year, with Mali being a major distribution hub thanks to the networks established by Mokhtar Belmokhtar...“(ibid, 2015:3).

Libya has also become a destination for contraband goods smuggled from Europe. There is a thriving, and almost entirely unregulated trade in used (and sometimes stolen) cars shipped from Europe. Trade in medicines and illicit pharmaceuticals have flourished so as to reap profit from trade. Alcohol from and sometimes to Tunisia as well as sell of militia groups that of materials looted from government sites for construction or farming equipment has dominated illicit trade unprecedentedly.

Human Trafficking

Libya has traditionally been an important spot for migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. This is mainly due to geographical proximity of Libya’s west coast to Europe’s southernmost outposts of Malta and the Italian island of Lampedusa and furthermore growth of the country after the discovery of oil, and a hope of migrants that they would be saved by the Italian navy made more migrants and more smugglers use the Mediterranean from Libya, the so-called Central Mediterranean Route. The route makes up roughly 60% of all illegal migrants to Europe.

The outbreak of the 2014 civil war brought radical change in migration. “The most spectacular and visible change is obviously in the numbers: whereas the number of migrants taking to the Mediterranean from Libya was mostly below 40,000 per year since the early 2000s, this figure skyrocketed in 2014 when 120,000 arrived in Sicily mostly from Libya (as compared to 37,000 the year before)” (Toaldo, 2015 : 4). Out of these, the number of Libyans is actually very limited. The two main routes to Libya are through Sudan in the East or Niger in the South.

The East Africa route is followed by Sudanese, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali migrants and asylum seekers. Somalis and Somalilanders make their way to Addis Ababa where they join Ethiopian migrants and also Eritrean migrants who come via Asmara or Massawa. From Addis, the migrants move to Khartoum where they change smugglers and make the final leg of the journey to Kufra, Libya. This route is currently a major one.

Refugees from West, Central and Southern Africa most likely follow the route through Niger to Southern Libya then to the coast. Changing smugglers for each leg is common.

Before 2013, Syrian refugee route was via Egypt or Sudan countries that do not require visas for Syrian citizens. However, with the change of government in Egypt from Morsi to the current government, which have hardened attitude towards the growing Syrian population, Syrian migrant routes changed to south into the Sinai, where government control is relatively weak. There are also some Syrians who enter Libya through Lebanon. Syria and Eritrea are the main origin of migrant in 2014.

The smuggling of human beings is usually a business where Libyan members of organized gangs co-operate with middlemen, who have the same nationality of the migrants in order to provide for cultural and linguistic mediation. Smuggling of migrants recently took a new dimension with the active involvement of jihadists in the business. Particularly in recent years the line between jihadism, organized crime and smuggling has increasingly become blurred. AASL had some degree of control over the smuggling route between Sebha in Libya’s south and Sirte (ibid). ISIS is also taking part in this activity, particularly on Syrians who move to Libya via Lebanon. “Attacks by IS on refugee camps in western Syria may have been deliberately intended to increase the flow of refugees along smuggling routes that the organization controls, in order to provide additional revenues” (GIATOC, 2015 :8). This flood sometimes used by terrorists to implement their goal of attacking target states as was seen in France, Paris when ISIS killed many civilians sending its people mixed with migrants.

Many migrants transiting Libya are subject to difficult living conditions, their right is frequently violated, and they remain vulnerable to violence at the hands of armed groups, smugglers, and interim authorities. The journey also makes them pay the highest price of their live as was seen in 2014, the deadliest year in the Mediterranean record, in which 3,419 migrants drowned and lost their lives (Toaldo, 2015).
The majority of the returnees originate from the most impoverished and underdeveloped communities in the region. Their return has placed an additional strain on impoverished host communities. The host states of Libyan refugees face a challenge falling under the domination of migrant culture, language and lifestyle. This can be translated as the loss of identity.

The proliferation of weapons and the subsequent increase in the number as well as the power of terrorists in the region has posed psychological threat on the community of the region. Peace in some states of the region is ‘Negative Peace’ since they scare the unstable nature of the region after 2011. The absence of positive peace caused not only by the illicit trade, continuous conflict, spread of arms and the ever increasing presence of jihadists in the region, but also the porous borders and the deteriorating security situation and the relatively weak nature of governments.

Most of the returnees lost their savings and possessions and left Libya under extremely difficult circumstances. In some cases, they were victims of extortion and human rights violations during their journey. In addition to psychosocial trauma, feelings of shame and embarrassment relating to loss of their ability to earn and provide for their families further impeded their reintegration and socio-economic stabilization. Re-establishing these hundreds of thousands of returnees requires a lot to be done. Those who rely on the support of these returnees also fall into problems.

CONCLUSION

Libya is a nation which is still in despair. The security vacuum following the death of Gaddafi paved the way for different actors to act independently with the absence of a strong central government. The state was divided along ethnic, tribal, geographic, and ideological lines. Conflicts are still occurring at the local, national, and even regional levels. The state has become the hub for terrorist groups like AQIM, ISIS/LL, Ansar Al-Sheria and their affiliates, and also the center of illegal arms, drug, and human trafficking. The occupation of different powers in different regions of the state in addition to the total absence of central power made the state to be considered as another failed state or “Somalia” in North Africa.

The crisis highly affected the survival of the country as the state. It has also affected the economy. Civilians are facing indiscriminate attacks, executions, and other unlawful killings, in addition to arbitrary deprivations of liberty, torture, and other inhuman and degrading treatment. Continuing civil war and crisis forced hundreds of thousands of Libyans to flee their homes and became migrants or internally displaced peoples. The Post-revolution Libyan crisis and civil war has also had a grave socio-economic and security consequences in the region, mainly in the North African and Sahel region states. Above and beyond the interruption of trade and investment, these neighboring states are affected by a loss of remittances and increasing unemployment as a result of the return of millions of people who had been working and living in Libya to their homes in these neighboring nations. Some of these returnees who lost their jobs at home ended up joining the terrorist organizations, which are already using Libya as safe area to recruit and train armies and freely plan attacks on the region states and elsewhere in the world. There are also some returnees who joined those groups who take part in illegal activities such as organized crime and trafficking of arms, humans, and drugs. The network established among these jihadist and trafficker groups has been destabilizing the region. The proliferation of weapons from the unsecured weapon storage facilities of Gaddafi added with the porous nature of the borders and the active participation of terrorists in illegal trafficking has made solving the security problem in the region more difficult. Some neighbor states change their policy from deploying their armies and enforcing strict control over their borders with Libya to inviting foreign power to freely hunt terrorists in the state. Neighboring states societies are in difficulty as many Libyans.

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