This study aimed at shed a light on the current Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement implication for peace building, stability and its roles for the regional economic integration in the Horn of Africa. To put in to the context of understanding about the current Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement implication for the stability of the Horn of Africa, qualitative research approach has employed. The study comprehensively relied on secondary source of data as a means of collecting relevant and required information. On top of this, to achieved the stated objectives of the study the data collected purposively from published and unpublished martial like books, articles, journals, conference papers, peace agreement and reports. The study in this place indicates that the peace agreement efforts going on to overcome the decades hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea can bring massive outcome in the process of ensuring peace, stability and integrity between the Horn of African countries. In the first place the persist peace agreement between the two hostile countries can bring to an end the threatened acts of the destabilization, border skirmish and proxy warfare policy that have regional dimension, which undermined the peace and security of the wider Horn of Africa. Therefore, the peace agreement brings an end to this circumstance and maintained peace and stability in the Horn of Africa Region. The other far reaching revitalization of Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement implication is the opening of harmony relations between Eritrea-Djibouti and Eritrea-Somalia government to reconcile and resume their diplomatic associations. Thereafter, the recent peace agreement pursued by the Ethiopian and Eritrea also bring an end the deadlocked between the two countries. It also widens opportunities for regional economic integration, strengthen decisive regional cooperation, and support the mobilization of trade and the connection of infrastructure between the countries in the Horn of Africa.

Key Words: Revitalization, Peace Agreement, Implication, Stability


INTRODUCTION

Background of the study

In a narrow geographic sense, the Horn of Africa is the north-eastern part of the African continent which faces the Red Sea to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south-east and the Nile Basin to the west. Likewise, the region conventionally comprises the key states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti, and also includes the adjoining states of Sudan and Kenya (Berouk, 2013). However, the Horn of Africa has rightly been termed as one of Africa’s hotspots politically unstable, dynamic, and volatile as well as mostly challenged peace and security
of the region, correspondingly; the region is a well-known in African politics of being a hostile and poor place due to numerous conflicts, wars, and colonization’s (Witt, 2014).

Mostly the region has repeatedly witnessed direct violent conflicts and proxy wars which is the dominant transnational/regional character and yet, none of the conflicts is isolated from one another. Also, the Horn of Africa is the most conflict-ridden region in the world with conflicts, exacerbated by external interference and accompanied by widespread human rights violations, raging within and between states (Healy, 2011). Although, the Horn of Africa is a region in which neighboring countries have been uncomfortable with each other, basically based on the validity of each other’s boundaries which established by the former colonial powers. Indeed, since its independence Eritrea has used military force against Yemen, Djibouti, and Ethiopia following unresolved border claims. Therefore, war which powers. Indeed, since its independence Eritrea has used military force against Yemen, Djibouti, and Ethiopia following unresolved border claims. Therefore, war which

The Horn of Africa is usually understood as a region well known in Africa politics of begin a volatile, hostile and poor place due to frequent conflicts, war, colonization and others. It has been argued that the Horn of African countries are linked by history, over lapping peoples and cultures which mean that conflicts in one country are likely to directly impact on their neighbors. In fact, the Horn of Africa is one of the most fragile crisis regions in the world which often portrayed as the most turbulent region and certainly, the most militarized and conflict-ridden region on the African continent (Medhane, 2004). As many evidence showed that, for many decades, armed conflicts have raged within states, between states, and among proxies whether at the centers or the peripheries of the region. Accordingly, among these conflicts are a failed state in Somalia, the continued border skirmish between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the unresolved border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea, persistent tension between Sudan and South Sudan were the evidence of recent decade (Kidist, 2014).

Noticeably, conflict in the Horn of Africa is intractable and closely interconnected in the sense that unfolding of conflict in one country can easily spill over in to the neighboring area of the region of the Horn and also proxy war and the spread of conflicts are common in the Horn of Africa which destabilizes the region for two decades. For instance, during the Ethio-Eritrean war, the issue of proxy war was started when Eritrean government began financing and arming major insurgent groups like the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front to infiltrate Ethiopia through Somalia in order to undermining their security. Moreover, Eritrean military occupied Djibouti’s Northern territories in 2008 with the objective of putting pressure on Ethiopia which almost totally depending on the port of Djibouti for its import and export. Through this practice neighboring countries of the Horn region are often locked in vicious circle of mutual interventions by proxy has been used by Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea which destabilized the region of the Horn of Africa for more than a decade (Redie, 2013).

Therefore, the Ethio-Eritrean conflict has been one of the major reasons for instability in the Horn of Africa, and the effects of their hostility have been felt across the region. The proxy warfare policy which triggered by Ethiopian and Eritrea as an actor for last two decades have pursued beyond the boundary issue in each other’s territory and in far-flung areas of the Horn has contributed to regional instability. Moreover, the region has experienced considerable challenges: civil war, support for armed proxies, mass displacements, and, conflict.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

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Owing to humanitarian crises in the region for a long time. In their recent declaration, the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders have included an agreement on ensuring regional peace, development and cooperation. Whilst recently Ethiopia and Eritrea governments signed peace agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which bring an end to the period of ‘No, peace No, war’ deadlock circumstance between the two state which cycling direct and proxy war in the Horn of Africa for a long period of time. Thus, this study tried to investigate and make an effort to fill the gap by considering the revitalization of the Ethiopian and Eritrean recent relations as well as its profound effect in stabilizing the region as in the past two decades both countries were used proxy war to undermine each other which was spread to destabilize the Horn of African region.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

General Objectives

The overall objective of this study is to assess the revitalization of Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement implication for regional stability in the Horn of Africa.

Specific objectives of the Study

This study has the following specific objectives:-

- To assess the significance of Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement contribution for peace building in the Horn of Africa.
- To investigate the role of Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement for the regional stability in the horn of African.
- To evaluate the Ethio-Eritrean revitalization implication for regional economic integration in the horn of Africa.

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Fundamentally, there are two types of research methodologies in any researches. However, in order to attain the intended objectives of this particular study, qualitative method was employed. In fact, as (Creswell, 2009), articulated that, qualitative method is a typical research approach which enables us to come up with data that cannot easily shaped by statistical procedures or any other means of quantification but the data are usually described in the form of words. Therefore, the methodology of this study was qualitative in nature which the result is not numerically expressed but described in the forms of words. On top of this, books, articles, journals, conference papers, analysis of Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement and reports has been used. Thus qualitative methodology was the best one to describe the revitalization of Ethio-Eritrean peace Agreement implication for stability in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, due to constraint of time and finance the study was more of inclined to the library or desktop study. Hence, to address the stated objective the data was collected purposively from the scholarly written articles, Journals, online materials, reports and others which are accessed through the internet.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The overview of Ethio-Eritrean Relations post-Independence

According to historical explanations, before Eritrea declared as an independent state in 1993, it was an integral part of Ethiopia (Zeray, 2018). However, between 1889 and 1941, Eritrea remained an Italian colony until Italy joined the Axis power during World War II which caused British force to attack Italian forces and take control of Eritrea in 1941, then after Eritrea was under British military administration until 1952. In 1950, the United Nations resolved to establish Eritrea as an autonomous entity federated with Ethiopia as a compromise between Ethiopia claim of sovereignty and Eritrean aspirations for independence. Hence on September, 11, 1952 with the ratification of the federal act by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia the Eritrean constitution entered in to force and federation was established (Tadesse, 2018).

However, the federation did not last long, as it was abrogated and Eritrea was fully integrated into Ethiopia in 1962. After the 1960s, ‘the boundary between the two entities assumed a character of administrative division rather than an internationally recognized boundary. This action of Ethiopian government infuriated Eritreans and began an armed struggle against the two successive Ethiopian governments for three decades (Kidist, 2011).After all, the alliance of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and a coalition of Ethiopian resistance movements eventually defeated the forces of Dreg regime in 1991 and two years later, a referendum was held in which Eritreans voted almost unanimously in favor of independence (Tadesse, 2018),which finally lead Eritrean formally secedes from Ethiopia after a popular referendum has been fully conducted and appointed Isaias Afwerki as the first president of independent state of Eritrea.

After Eritrea became independent and the Tigray people liberation Front (TPLF) assumed power in Ethiopia in 1991, the two countries established a close relationship in the economic, security, political and social areas. They formally began a state-to-state interaction
after the 1993 referendum by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 13 July 1993. Accordingly, a number of agreements and protocols were signed between the two governments to harmonize their economies and apparently maintain peace and stability in the Horn of Africa (Kidist, 2011). Besides the two countries discussed about Economic cooperation, trade liberalization, investment and port usage were the dominant issues. However, the two countries reached an understanding to trade freely, exempt taxes on each country’s products, facilitate Ethiopia’s use of the ports of Assab and Massawa and they also further reached an agreement to use the Ethiopian birr as their common currency and at the same time to strengthen their relations (Ibid).

Furthermore, in 1993 the two countries were concluded bilateral accords on cultural and technical exchanges; immigration; the use of trans-boundary Rivers, and security defense cooperation. Also Eritrea continued to use the Ethiopian Birr as its currency, yet in October 1997, Ethiopia provoked the Eritrean Government by issuing currency on which a map was printed that showed areas claimed by Eritrea to be part of Ethiopia. All these incidents occurred in an overall context of deteriorated relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia post Eritrean independence, due to political, economic and military competition. Therefore, in November 1997, Eritrea abandoned the uses of Ethiopian Birr and adopted its own currency, the Nakfa, a decision which contributed further to political tensions between the two countries. Likewise, the failure to delimit state boundaries was to have serious consequences on the relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia where their shared border had never been demarcated, which meant that sovereignty over areas along the 1,000-kilometer frontier between the two countries remained unclear (selam and Martin, 2019).

Then after two years of skirmish and tension over trade and other various issues, in 1998 clashes broke out along the border over ownership of the disputed town of Badme, which lead the two countries evolving into a full-scale war. Thus, the two countries found themselves in one of the most world’s conflict prone neighborhood. Nevertheless, after two years of full hostility, in July 2000 the two countries agreed to permanently terminate military aggression and established a neutral boundary commission that will have full authority to delimit and demarcate the boundaries. Also the peace treaty which was signed by the international community as guarantors authorized the commission to issues a final and binding decision. Therefore, the Algiers agreement that was mediated by the international community consisting of UN, OAU, EU and USA who also constituted guarantors was final and binding. Formerly, the Eritrea-Ethiopian border commission announced its decision; however, Ethiopia rejected it because it handed over Badme to Eritrea. Nonetheless, the witnesses and guarantors failed to exert pressure on Ethiopia and the state of No-Peace No-war had been continued.

The Recommence of Ethio-Eritrean Relations and Its Significance

Following the failure of Algiers peace agreement, the two states were continued in animosity aiment for the last two decades. However, the long revile hostility between the two countries, managed to break the deadlock between them without seeking any third party interventions with the new reform happened to appointed new prime-minister in Ethiopia. Although, the political pressures and the endless street protest to against the repressive nature of administration in Ethiopia will have appointed the Former army officer Abiy Ahmed as prime minister on April 2, 2018. This situation was a defining moment to resume the Ethiopian and Eritrean relation after the fall of Algiers peace agreement between the two states. In the same circumstance instantly with appointment of Doctor Abiy Ahmed as a prime-minister of Ethiopia, promised to pursue peace with Eritrea to culminate the deadlock situation between the two neighboring states for the last two decades persistently. Consequently, in June, he has announced that Ethiopia would honor the provisions of the 2000 peace deal and the boundary commission ruling to renew the Ethio-Eritrean Relations Again. Then after, on June 5th, Ethiopia declared to fully implementing the Algiers Peace Treaty signed between the two countries in 2000. The two leaders signed a joint Declaration of Peace agreement to restart the Ethiopian and Eritrean relations and began the next chapter for the formal relations between the two former enemy states in the Horn of African region.

Thus, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a historic declaration of peace in July, 2018, bringing an end to 20 years of war and stalemate between the two countries. A new era of friendship is rapidly being ushered in, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki visiting each other’s countries and reestablishing diplomatic relations. Normalization is expected to include re-opening of the border for movement and trade, as well as restoration of Ethiopia’s access to Eritrea’s two ports. These developments have been lauded by the people of both countries and by regional and international partners (Chatham House, 2018). Hence, the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between the two states represents the jewel in the crown of these significant developments. It puts an end to the state of war between the two countries and commits them to forge close political, social, cultural and security cooperation; resume transport, communication and trade links and diplomatic ties; implement the decision on the boundary; and endeavor to ensure regional peace, development and
cooperation (Joint declaration and Friendship, 2018). Therefore, the resumption of Ethiopian and Eritrean relations has the potential to bring considerable opportunities for social and trade relations as well as stabilize the formal societal relation from both sides.

Another improvement of the relation after peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia implies, since the July 2018 peace agreement, thousands have streamed across the largely open border, reuniting with families and conducting cross-border business for the first time in two decades. Embassies were reopened and formal diplomatic relations were re-established. On the other hand, commercial flights between the two capitals restarted and Ethiopian commercial ships began docking at the Eritrean port, a critical step for landlocked Ethiopia, which had sent almost all its foreign trade through the Djiboutian ports since Eritrean independence. Even telephone lines between the two countries were re-established. They had previously been cut due to the ongoing conflict and the completely closed and repressive Eritrean society (Lyons, 2018). Therefore, the beginning of the renaissance of Ethiopian and Eritrean was optimistic steps for protection of sustainable peace between the two neighboring countries and the event of the regeneration was explained by many as it was dramatic and unbelievable bilateral relations from protected bitter hostility in to state of overenthusiastic peace and friendship as well as resume the social relations ceased between the two people for the last two decades.

Thus as a result of Peace agreement, Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to work towards economic cooperation built on a framework that will be beneficial for both countries in the medium and long-term. Beside Peace is poised to deliver significant economic gains for both Eritrea and Ethiopia. While it embodies the spirit of both countries, peace also signals progress in the region. In terms of economy, it promises great investment and trade opportunities, as well as the possibility to boost physical infrastructure. Therefore; the hard work starts now, as both governments look forward towards economic cooperation and development (TesfaNews, 2018). So, the peace agreement between the two neighbor countries integrated them economically. Additionally, the peace agreement ends up the conflict and inspired political, social, cultural cooperation and the development of trade communication and contributed for the resumption of relation between the two states.

Moreover, significantly the implication of the peace agreement and the revitalization primarily helped Eritrean in renewing the relationship and paves the way for the steps to lift the sanction against Eritrea to not participate in regional organization and international one. However, after peace agreement Eritrea was readmitted in to intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) to play its own role as member state and also would encouraged to begin its reintegration in to wider global separations for the last consecutive years. Additionally, the significance of the revitalization of the Ethiopian and Eritrean peace agreement for Eritrean particularly was followed by revelation of the removal of UN sanctioned which was imposed by United Nations Security Council on 2009 due to Eritrean government skirmish with Djibouti on the border issues and support Al-Shabaab terrorist groups in Somalia. On the other hand the peace agreement will give Ethiopian an opportunity to have an outlet flows through out red sea. As it is obviously known Ethiopia has relied on the ports of neighboring Djibouti to transit all of its goods and services including huge cargos for exports as well as imports since the beginning of the country became landlocked with the loss of ports related to the independence of Eritrea in 1993. To this end peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia give an opportunity for landlocked Ethiopia to have an access to ports of Massawa and Assab. Besides the opening of these ports could simultaneously benefit the two states economically and likewise renew the formal relations between them.

The Role of Ethio-Eritrean Agreement for Peace Building

Peace building can be understood as a supplement to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking processes, conflict resolutions and peacemaking operations. It also encompasses measures in the context of emerging, current or post conflict situations for the explicit purpose of preventing violent conflict and promoting lasting and sustainable peace. Likewise, peace building covers a broad range of measures implemented in the context of emerging, current or post-conflict situations and which are explicitly guide and motivated by a primary commitment to the prevention of violence conflict and promotion of lasting and sustainable peace (OECD, 2005).

Peace is not lottery price that you win by gambling and is not something we can buy or barter to get. Also is not something that is handed as a gift as well as it is a decision, a commitment for tranquil, quiet life free from disturbance, therefore, it is a decision a commitment to life-free from hostilities, wars, and violence (TesfaNews, 2018). In fact Peace, security and stability are inseparable; however, the situation in the Horn of Africa is to the reverse that, it is one of the most conflict- ridden and unstable sub-regions of Africa in particular and the World in general. These conditions make the region to be difficult to building peace and security. In similar vein one of the most characteristics features of conflict in the Horn of Africa is its dynamism. This feature makes the development of peace and security mechanisms more critical and difficult than in other regions of Africa. Once conflict and insecurity happened in certain country in the region it has the capability to spill over in to the
neighboring countries of the Horn of Africa.

The same is true that Ethiopia and Eritrea fought bloody and devastating war between 1998 and 2000 following Eritrea independent from Ethiopia in 1993. The war beginning in 1998 stemmed from the failure to formally resolve the dispute over the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and multiple border committees and mediation failing to create a resolved demarcation. Since the formal end to the fighting in June 2000, which concluded with the never previously implemented peace deal, there had been continuous tension and intermittent skirmishes between the two neighbors as they coexisted in an in-between status of not formally at war and not at peace for almost two decades. While the implementation of the Algiers peace agreement has been rejected by Ethiopia as it was verdict the flashpoint Badme to Eritrea. Consequently, there have also been continued tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara over the delimitation and demarcation of the common border and the situations was created no peace no war deadlock between the two states for the last two decades (Lyons, 2018).

Obviously the hostilities as well as the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been one of the major reasons for the absence of peace in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, the proxy warfare policy they have pursued beyond the boundary issue both in each other’s territory and in far-flung areas of the Horn has contributed to regional insecurity (Omer and Meressa, 2018). In their recent declaration, the leaders have included an agreement on ensuring regional peace, development and cooperation. Rebel movements based in both countries under the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ principle have sprung up over the years. Incidents involving armed groups trying to cross into Ethiopia from Eritrea with authorities accusing the Eritrean government of supporting them have contributed to tensions between the two countries in particular and to the region of the Horn of Africa in general (Ibid).

In fact proxy is an old tactic used by large and small powers correspondingly. Basically it entails getting someone else to fight for you, where to against a temporary allegiance against common enemy. The Cold war, situations where states in conflict with each other but are not seeking direct confrontation, easily lend themselves to the utilization of proxies. The African continent suffered tremendously under such policy as the superpower became involved in local political struggle ostensibly stoking an increase in intensity and prolongation of hostilities (Omar, 2011). As it is clearly know that proxy wars have a long history in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, the Sudanese-Ethiopian relations before the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991, there was Ethiopian support for the South Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), while the Sudan government in turn was involved with providing facilities and supply lines to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF and later EPLF) fighting against the Ethiopian government. In the late 1970s and 1980s, President Siyad Barre of Somalia supported the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, whereas Ethiopia later supported the northern Somalis in what is now Somaliland against Siyad Barre regime of the time (Abbbink, 2003).

The same scenario had been continued when Ethiopia and Eritrea were in hostility for the last two decades. Yet the influence of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia was not only limited to the people of the two countries. Rather, it had a dire consequence to the whole region of the Horn of African in large. The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict was described as the Elephant in the room in the Horn of Africa. Due to hostilities between them, the accustomed proxy war policy in the Horn region has been employed. For Example, Ethiopia supports Eritrean opposition groups albeit weak and fractured ones against the government and Eritrea also supports a variety of longstanding Ethiopian armed opposition groups, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), against the Ethiopian government. Likewise in Somalia, Eritrea has trained, armed, and financed militias opposed to the Ethiopian allied Transitional Federal Government. Furthermore, Ethiopian reliance on the port of Djibouti is one reason why Eritrea and Djibouti engaged in a war of words over their common border in 1996. Yet again the friction increased in 2008 when Eritrea began digging trenches on Ras Doumeira Mountain on Djibouti’s side of the border. On June 10, 2008, Eritrean forces clashed with Djiboutian troops while apparently in pursuit of military deserters (Human Right watch, 2009). Therefore, the tenacious proxy war policy which its epicenter on the Ethiopian and Eritrea conflict was destabilized the Horn of Africa region and at the same time makes the region to be difficult for peace building among the countries in the Horn of Africa region.

However, the above mentioned situations have been changed and significant political developments have taken root in the Horn. The developments not only promise to transform the peace and security outlook of the Horn but have also reignited hope and optimism for solidarity and peace building in the region (Tana forum, 2018). Among these are the election of a new Prime Minister in Ethiopia on April 2, 2018, there the election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has initiated groundbreaking reforms in Ethiopia in particular and the entire horn of Africa in general. Subsequently Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Atwerki signed a historic agreement on July 9, 2018, in Asmara, Eritrea, ending over two decades of open hostilities and war. Furthermore, the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between the two countries marks a fundamental change for the Horn of Africa, with the
reconciliation possibly altering the economic and political dynamics of the Horn of African region. Therefore, resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was a major footstep in addressing the widespread conflicts in the region. Furthermore, it spread all over the crises-ridden region of the Horn of Africa. Eritrea settled the longstanding dispute with Somalia. Djibouti and Eritrea decided to settle the border issue. Ethiopia urged Eritrean opposition groups to not work from Ethiopian territory against Eritrea no more. Eritrea herself broke peace agreements with Ethiopian opposition groups and their military wings (Ulrich Stauffer, 2018).

Indeed the official end of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea has the chance of ushering in a new era of peace and prosperity for what has up until this point been one of the tensest and most impoverished parts of Africa. The fast-moving of Ethiopian-Eritrean peace agreement to culminated the animosity and signing of a joint peace agreement to end to their countries’ twenty-year-long state of war, the implications of which are literally game-changing for the entire Horn of Africa (Andrew, 2018). Besides the peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea helped motivate attempts by other states, specifically Somalia and Djibouti, to revitalize their relations with Eritrea and in the same line Eritrea’s ties with both of these countries have turned over the past decade skirmish among them. Also with Djibouti, relations became embittered due to a border dispute over the Dumeira region that began in 2008. Again, in late July 2018, Eritrean President Afwerki and Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed met in Asmara, leading to the restoration of their relations. Ever since this restitution of ties, the Ethiopian and Somali governments have attempted to mediate talks between Djibouti and Eritrea. With Somalia, relations soured over Eritrea’s alleged support of militant groups in the Somali Civil War (Benjamin, 2018). Therefore, the Peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea encouraged the resolution of other longstanding regional insecurity for a long period of time. The subsequent collaboration treaty signed in Djibouti between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia and the agreement to revitalize ties between Djibouti and Eritrea, marked a new way towards regional relationship and could expected to building peace in the Horn of African region.

The Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement Contribution for the Regional Stability

According to (Bruton, 2016), the Horn of Africa has been long recognized as one of the world’s most unstable regions which is heavily impacted by war and conflict and likewise wearisomely recognized as the world most unstable region in the African continent. Furthermore, the region is closely linked to the states of the Great Lakes region which mostly faced theater of civil war and political instability (International Peace Academy, 2002). However, the Horn of Africa region is one of the most politically unstable regions in Africa and lived in a state of a constant conflict on the border and other issues.

Furthermore, the Horn of Africa is an area of great diversity. Due to its diversities, the problems of the region are inextricably intertwined what happens in one country can have a profound impact on the others, and the problem of one can often only be solved with the involvement of the others. There is hence a reason to dealing with the region as a whole that inter-state rivalry, often over disputed borders, use of water resources or as a result of force movements of people, also risks breaking into conflict between states as well as within them. The frozen border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea has particular significance as it has influenced politics, social and economy of the region for the last two decade. For instance, Eritrea’s tensions with Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, and its international isolation, largely derived from the dispute of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Consequently the War between the States in the region of the Horn of Africa by the means of substitution war, the persistent poverty, often the result of conflict, destroys the stability on which economic growth and investment depend, has denied many of the people of the region the hope of the better future that they would like to deserve (Council of the European Union, 2011).

Moreover, the Horn of Africa can be characterized by the challenges it presents both to those within the region and beyond. Fragile peace agreements, ongoing protracted conflicts, social unrest, localized instability in isolated areas, struggle over control of natural resources, where disenfranchisement provides a shelter for rebel groups, terrorist organizations and international criminality which has spawned high profile piracy attacks in the seas around the Horn. Also a significant number of conflicts are active on the brink of emergence in the region and generate major humanitarian crisis undermining the development of specific areas within the region. In a similar manner Terrorists and rebel groups have often turned the region in to violence and instability. Yet again the Horn of Africa has been called one of the most armed regions in the world, at the same time can also be articulated by large numbers of refugees and internal displaced persons (IDPs) plus the region is one where instability has led to forced migration (Regional strategy for the horn of Africa, 2011-2015).

The Horn of Africa is the most conflict-ridden region in the world, raging sometimes simultaneously within and between states. In fact, the major manifestations of the conflicts in the region are expressed in devastating intra- and inter-state wars, state failure and the proliferation of the flow of small arms and human trafficking, among others. Moreover, the arbitrary nature of the drawing of
boundaries during the colonial era resulted in fragmentation of ethno-cultural formations and other trans-border ethnic identities, thereby blurring the distinction between intra- and inter-state conflicts in the region (Redie, 2013).

The movement of people is limited due to a tense relationship between the horns of African countries as they are always at confrontation with each other on the border issues. Here between Sudan and Uganda, there is no free movement of people because of the rivalry between the two, resulting in the closure of the border since the 1998 war. Similarly, there is no movement of the people peacefully on the borders of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the same scenario the Sudan-South Sudan border does not entertain free movement of people because of territorial claim and the unresolved issues. The Kenya-Somalia border is not that much suitable for the free movement of people because of the threat of terrorist attacks (Binyam and Tsoaledi, 2017). These situation indicates that the movement of the people for any other activities either for social or economic conditions could not be encouraged due to the presence of border skirmish among the states in the Horn of African region. Therefore, the presence of such disagreement among them make the region instable and discourage the political, economic, social movement and even do not help them to come to discuss on the issues easily to communicate for the formal end of the circumstance of border conflicts.

The other headache features of conflicts which boldly lead for the instableness of the region of the horn of African here are the complications of cross-border connections of conflict. This is to mean that the Horn of African regional system is links a set of States whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other and whose national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Also it has been customized that the states in the last time in the Regional systems often are held together not by positive influences of shared interests, but by shared rivalries with one another (UNCCA, 2016). The fact that several state-building projects Ethiopian, Eritrean, Northern Sudanese, Southern Sudanese, Somali, and Somali landers tend to rival each other and work at cross purposes is the main catalyst in the chemistry of the conflict. Likewise both inter and intrastate conflicts in the Horn have strong and international dimensions and repercussions, all of which have had a negative impact on stability of the horn region. In nearly all cases of conflict, rebel movements in one state have drawn heavily on support from ethnic kinsmen in an adjacent state. For example, the civil war in Ethiopia involved insurgent movements that mobilized ethnic support from within Somalia, the Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti. Somali support was crucial to the so-called shifta war in Kenya. Nuer in Ethiopia supported the Sudan people Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan and at the same time Somali insurgents in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia can always retreat across the border into Somalia and return to fight another day which has heavy power for the destabilization of the Horn Region (Ibid). This kind of cross-border ethnic support is directly sustaining a general climate of hostility among states. In the same way there is unique conflicting habit in the Horn region which can be expressed in the commonly saying, ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ this practice prolongs conflicts and inhibits their resolution because insurgent movements can survive across the border indefinitely, even when they no longer have a presence inside their own country. This calculation would have profound impact to the atmosphere of stability in the region of the Horn of Africa.

As it was clearly known, since 1998, the relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia is arguably the most important and volatile and continues to serve as the main source of regional instability in the Horn of Africa (Sigatu, 2019). Nevertheless, the new Era appeared for the reconciliation of hostility between Ethiopian and Eritrea. The two nation hostility has significant contribution for the instability of the horn region for the last two decades. Presumably this circumstance came to an end when Ethiopia government publicly announced that it has accepted the Algiers Peace Agreement without any preconditions and expressed its readiness to implement it. Therefore, recognizing the deal is a huge step forward in bringing about a peaceful decision to the political fight that has upset on for decades. Rightly, days after Ethiopia’s announcement, Eritrea’s government accepted it positively and announced to send a delegation to discussion for the formal end of the animosity between the two brothers which has the lion share for the instability of the region for more than decades. Hence, the peace agreement and formal end to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was a surprising development after decades of open hostility, and it has the ability to influence greater stability in the Horn of Africa. It was obviously known that the hostilities between the two states had previously impacted region stability implicitly or explicitly. During they were hostile with each other the horn of African region states were experienced an alliance which had resulted in continuous tension between states for the last decades (Zeray, 2018).

However, next to the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in September 2018, a tripartite cooperation agreement was signed between Ethiopian Prime minister Abiy Ahmed, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Armijo following a meeting in Ethiopia. On February 20, 2019, Ahmed met Muse Bihi Abdi, leader of the breakaway northern Somalia territory of Somaliland, in Addis Ababa to strengthen bilateral ties, discuss regional security issues and try to mediate in its dispute with the central government in Mogadishu. In the same way on
March 4, Abiy met Afwerki and South Sudan's President Salva Kiir in Juba to further the Intergovernmental Authority for Development-led peace process in the country. The tripartite cooperation agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, for instance, has spawned new concerns among neighboring countries about Ethiopia's plans for the regional stability. Similarly Somaliland took Ethiopia's undertaking to respect the territorial integrity of Somalia fully as indicative of a change of Ethiopia's policy that might not be in Somaliland's interests. Furthermore, Ethiopia's renewed diplomatic ties with Eritrea and Somalia caused its traditional allies, Sudan and Djibouti to feel sidelined. Historical animosities, security threats within and beyond borders as well as deep-rooted suspicions among state officials about the motives of neighboring states increase the trust deficit. Moreover, Border disputes between South Sudan and Sudan over the future of Abyei, and between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the control of towns such as Badme still persist. Kenya and Somalia are locked in a dispute over their maritime border in the Indian Ocean, and Kenya and Uganda are still competing over the tiny Mignigo Island in Lake Victoria (Al Jazeera News, 2019). Therefore, whatever the cases are among the states the revitalizations of Ethiopia and Eritrea step up to resolve the border issues and the shuttle diplomacy of Ethiopian prime-minister curiosity for the regional stability shows the beginning of negotiation for the formal end of the hostility on the borders issues and has significant contribution for the stability of the Horn of African region.

Yet again Eritrea and Somalia have not had diplomatic ties for nearly 15 years but the visit by the Horn region leaders after the revitalization of Ethiopia with Eritrea expected to open the doors for diplomatic relations and new cooperation between the two nations. Furthermore, it is logically clear that Farmajo’s visit comes after longtime rivals, Eritrea and Ethiopia restored diplomatic ties, and the two nations have a long and complicated history, which has had a destabilizing the Horn of Africa for the long period of time. Additionally, the revitalization of Ethiopian and Eritrea would have stabilizing impact across the horn of African as it is reasonably known that the region has experienced considerable challenges like civil war, supported for the armed proxies, mass displacement and humanitarian crisis and at the same time hosts more UN Peacekeeping mission than any other region in the world, therefore the revitalization of the Ethiopian and Eritrean is not only significant for the stability of the horn of Africa region but also could have a positive reverberates across the Red sea were Eritrean contributes a strategic port resources to Yemen(Stigant and Knopf, 2018). As Ethiopia and Eritrea were the Epicenter of the stability in the horn of African region, achieving sustainable peace between the two countries is important for the cooperative relations, respective development and mutual prosperity as well as maintenance of peace, security and stability in the Horn of Africa region.

The Significance of the Agreement for Regional Economic Integration

Economic integration refers to the formation of an intergovernmental organization (IGO) by countries to create a larger and more open economy expected to benefit member states (Biswaro, 2013), yet the question of Africa’s regional integration has preoccupied many African leaders since the early years of independence. Various have viewed it as a tool for promoting economic growth and sustainable development and improving the living standards of the African people. The overall strategic objective of regrouping African countries was to fight the impact of colonialism and build a united Africa. In similar ways regional integration remains the key strategy that will enable African governments to accelerate the renovation of their fragmented small economies, expand their markets, widen the region’s economic space, and reap the benefits of economies of scale for production and trade, thereby maximizing the welfare of their nations (ECA, 2010).

However, the idea of integrating Africa appeared during the colonial era when Pan-African activists aspired to unite Africa against colonialists. The real attempt to establish regional economic integration systems began immediately after the decolonization process. Regional economic integration schemes play a significant role in accelerating economic development and improving living standards by providing access to wider markets and creating a more competitive economic environment for producers and consumers (Markos, 2011). Nevertheless, as many literature viewed that regional integration encompasses the coming together of more than one state to establishes an institution, signing an agreement for the purpose of promoting Economic, social and political activities and other related objectives among the member states. In the same scenario there are sub-regional organization formed by member states agreed to cooperate and work closely together to achieve peace, stability and promoting economic cooperation in the region. In the same way the attempt to regional economic integration in the Horn of Africa is associated with this ideation.

As it is obviously known, currently there are many regional Economic integration schemes (REIS) in Africa, which are at different levels of integration. However, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is one of the regional integration arrangements in Eastern Africa which came in to existence in 1996 replacing the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986 with
the aim of establishing a regional cooperation arrangement and enhancing the economic and social development of the region of the Horn of Africa (Ali and Edris, 2013). The member states now consist of the countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. Eritrea suspended its membership in 2007, due to its objection to Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia, in December 2006 (Adetula et al., 2016). However, initially the state of Eritrea was not a member of (IGDD), when it was formed in 1986 but admitted as the seventh member of the Authority at the 4th Summit of Heads of States and Governments in Addis Ababa in September 1993 (Ali and Edris, 2013). The motivation of intergovernmental authority for development (IGAD) as a sub-regional integration has been to encourage both economic and political integration in the region of the Horn of Africa. Besides as the member states of the IGAD geographically interlinked, their integration enhance Economies to create large market opportunity for the increments of growth and has contribution to peace and reduce conflict among member states. But the Region of the Horn of Africa is peculiar for its political instability, internal conflict, continuous famine, environmental disasters, food insecurity, massive displacement and border conflict among the member states can be an obstacle to the objective achievement of the regional economic integration in the Horn region. Therefore, the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflicts, rivalries, alliances and anti-alliances (‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’) proxy war policy has a great contribution to discourage the achievement of the regional Economic integration in the horn of Africa for the last two decades.

Regional economic integration requires the progressive formal state-to-state interaction based on formal agreement. However, states behavior in the Horn of Africa is marked by intense occurrence of interstate wars, high level of extra regional actors’ penetration within regional security agenda, intense polarization, small capacity of interaction between the countries of the region itself (F. Cardoso, 2016). Correspondingly, some degree of stability is required within the integrating units themselves, but instability has deep roots in the region. For instance, Ethiopia and Somalia were at war in the 1970s and violent civil wars took place in Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Somalia in the 1980s. The rebel groups in every case play their role and benefited from the backing of neighboring states. Likewise regional instability again continued into the 1990s with state collapse in Somalia, civil war in Sudan, new civil conflicts in Uganda and the Ethiopia–Eritrea war of 1998–2000. Therefore, the regional foreign policy of the Horn states can be characterized by proxy forces as part of the normal pattern of relations (Healy, 2011). Obviously the Horn region of African regional economic integration suffer from the rage of overlapping membership problem up to war, conflict, instability, which the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflict has the upper hand for its unrealistic commitment to achieve the intended goals for the last two decades. In fact regional economic integration has the potential to increase trade benefits and enhance security and political cooperation between the states, thus the Horn region of African countries isolated from the benefits of economic, political cooperation and trade integration to tackle their usual problem like poverty, environmental disasters, and border conflicts.

As (Adetula, et al., 2016), indicated that IGAD region suffers from multiple interconnected pathologies that include intra-state insurgencies in Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Somalia; inter-state conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia, Sudan-Ethiopia, Sudan-Uganda, Sudan-south Sudan, Eritrea-Ethiopia and Eritrea-Djibouti; and environmental degradation, drought and famine, international intervention and underdevelopment. This vicious cycle animosity and natural disasters become the bottleneck for regional economic integration in the horn of Africa region so far. Therefore, the main goal of the economic integration is to improve the standard of living of the population through increased competitiveness, value-added production, trade and investment (Byiers, 2017), and at the same time many postulate that greater prosperity and increased interdependence through economic integration will contribute to better regional security (Healy, 2011). As it is clearly known that, regional economic integration intended to promote sustainable development agenda and foster a prosperous as well as has the tendency to make international competitive, security, stability and political united in the regional schemes. However, in the case of the Horn of Africa the communal hostility among the state, border skirmish, intra-state and inter-state conflict deep-rooted, and played a central role to congest the successful achievement of the regional economic integrations agenda.

Having the above mentioned ideas in the mind, the powerful wind of hope blowing across the Horn of Africa, the UN News, 2018 cited in (Redie, 2018), which expected to be the winds of peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea across the region of the Horn of African following the appointment of Prime Minister Doctor Abiy in Ethiopia. As soon the prime-minister come to the power, he announced Ethiopia’s acceptance of the Algiers peace agreement on 6 June 2018 and led to the revitalization between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Consequently, the Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement was soon followed by the tripartite agreement of Ethiopia-Eritrea-Somalia and the Eritrea-Djibouti peace reconciliation, which were in constant animosity followed by the Ethio Eritrea war for the last two decades. Therefore, the revitalization of Ethiopian and Eritrean peace agreement strongly influenced and has contribution for the regional economic integration in the
Horn of Africa. Evidently as (Abdeta, 2019) indicate that, the bilateral rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was further expanded the intention to bring the Somalia Federal Government on board as a partner in trilateral cooperation to initiate a new framework for regional integration. This is to mean that Somalia government was initiated to integrate with the rest of the Horn region countries politically and economically to prohibit civil war, chaos and conflict in Somalia in particular and the horn of Africa in general. In the case when we think of the Ethiopian and Eritrean prospect of peace agreement, it has positive effect and transfer the region in to economic inspiration.

The peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea helped motivate attempts by other states, specifically Somalia and Djibouti, to rekindle their relations with Eritrea. Also, Eritrea's ties with both of these countries have soured over the past decade (Benjamin, 2018). However, after the revitalization of peace agreement between Ethiopian and Eritrea has been conducted, the leaders of Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea are tirelessly pushing a new regional economic integration imitative with the aim of boosting trade and economic ties between the landlocked nation and the two costal states. The regional economic integration agenda has been the theme of a series of high-level meetings between the leaders (SONNA, 2019).

Besides economic integration has the potential to increase trade benefits, create job opportunities and facilitates the transfers of skills among the citizens of the region. Furthermore, it would importantly, enhance security and political cooperation between the nations in the Horn region.

Moreover, following Ethiopian and Eritrean Joint declarations the Horn of African countries aspired to achieve economic integration through joint infrastructural projects, civil conflicts and conflicts between states including that of Ethiopia and Eritrea have been restraining progress. In fact, the absence of peace and security in the region has overshadowed the efforts to pursue economic integration. And the recent peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea will have significant positive impact in containing conflicts and ensuring sustainable peace and stability in the Horn region (Ethiopian Herald News, 2018). Thus, after the revitalization of Ethiopian and Eritrean peace agreement, the experts of the eastern Africa courtiers (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Rwanda, Seychelles and Somalia) have gathered in Asmara. Eritrea to discuss regional economic integration of the courtiers in the region. And also for over a decade Eritrea has not been active in most of the activities of regional blocs, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) following the war with its neighbor Ethiopia. Since the two countries have decided to end the hostility, Eritrea is returning to the regional and international forums, especially after the end of UN sanctions to the country, which came after restoring peace with Ethiopia (TRTWORLDNEWS, 2019). This indicates the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was a point of reference of the problem for the Economic integration in the horn of Africa, but their peace agreement stimulated the countries of the Horn to discuss the limited integration due to the hostility between the two countries in the last two decades.

In the same context the coming to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia seems to have accompanied new approach toward Eritrea and the region; one that is of hope, synergy, and integration. Since taking the promises of office in April 2018, Prime Minister Abiy extended the olive branch to Eritrea, and travelled to Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan, speaking consistently for regional integration and all along implementing groundbreaking domestic measures at breakneck speed (Tana forum, 2019). Ultimately the regional efforts to integrate economically have already started with the governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti's leading the charge, which was the result of the outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the continuous instability and conflict in Somalia limited fateful of Ethiopia to not engaging in international maritime trade. And also the regional economic integration to be strengthen Prime Minister Abiy has reached an agreement with Kenya to partner on port development projects. The premier has also signed port development and economic agreement with Somaliland. Similar agreements have been reached with Somalia. In the same vein, Eritrea also has an opportunity to rehabilitate its economy by reviving its ties with Ethiopia (yohannes, 2018). The peace pact signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea in July, ending the two decades of animosity following a dispute over their border, is having a positive effect throughout the Horn of Africa.

Additionally, another implication of Ethiopian and Eritrean revitalization for the economic integration in the horn of Africa region is, the leaders of Ethiopia, South Sudan and Eritrea have agreed to fast-track economic integration in the Horn of Africa region by executing common projects. The agreement was reached in Juba on Monday March 4th by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir following closed-door deliberations on regional peace, economic ties and infrastructure development. The three leaders focused on the need to advance the cause of regional integration and to that end agreed to task their foreign ministers and their relevant government agencies in the three countries to work out the common projects that will facilitate the attainment of the goal of regional economic integration in the region of the horn of Africa (7Dnew London, 2019). As it was clearly known that the failure of the Algiers peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea poses the
grates difficulty for the economic integration in the Horn region. Beside the civil war in Somalia and southern Sudan, the Eritrea-Djibouti border conflict was contributing the upper hand for the unsuccessful of economic integration in the horn region. However, the peace agreement made between Ethiopian and Eritrea seems to change the condition and highly resumed the region economic integration in the region.

CONCLUSION

The Horn of Africa can be portrayed by the complex set of political, social, economic, and territorial factors that lead to created tensions within and between the countries. The Horn of Africa is also the most volatile region in the world. The volatile nature of the region is related with different social, political, economic and environmental problems. On the other hand the region can be characterized by proxy war, intra and inter-state conflict, border conflict and civil war are the most defining features of the region. However, the Ethio- Eritrean war between 1998-2000 and the continued deadlock for the last two decades can be identified as the major reason for the absence of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa; specifically the proxy warfare policy they have used in each other in wider areas of the Horn of Africa was the most common point for the regional insecurity for the last two decades.

Most importantly, in 2018 the powerful wind of change was blowing across the Horn of Africa which was the Turing point for the reconciliation of divergent state; Ethiopia and Eritrea who were in animosity for the last two decades. Moreover, the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea encouraged the resolution of longstanding insecurity, end up the proxy warfare policy, resolve the border skirmish; encourage collaboration and Economic integration between the Horn of African countries. One of the most, Significant peace agreement and rapprochement between Ethiopian and Eritrea, helped Eritrea lift united nation sanction, to participate in reginal and international organization to play its own role freely; and also give an opportunity for Ethiopia to have an access to Massewa and Assab ports. Similarly, the collaboration treaty signed in Djibouti between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia and the agreement to tie relations between Djibouti and Eritrea marked a new ways towards regional relationship, encourage regional stability, economic integration and peace building in the Horn of Africa.

Generally, the apparent peace agreement and the revitalization between the two enemies, Ethiopia and Eritrea can significantly reduce unanticipated outcomes to the security and development of the Horn of Africa; contribute the reconciliation of Djibouti-Eritrea, Eritrea-Somalia and Sudan with South Sudan. Another point which is the implication of Ethiopia and Eritrea peace agreement for the economic integration in the Horn of Africa, the leadership of Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Eritrea agreed to fast track economic integration in the Horn of Africa by executing common project. So, the peace agreement knowingly paves the way for the opening of economic cooperation and integration in road, transportation, trade, airline and other infrastructure between the countries in the Horn of Africa. The peace agreement and rapprochement likewise, reduce proxies, destabilization, skirmishes, militarization and violence. The Ethio-Eritrea peace agreement and Rapprochement encourage political certainty, harmonization, solidarity and interdependent in Economic, political, social and cultural relationship among the Horn of African countries.

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