Review


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The Gulf of Guinea is Nigeria’s most strategic environment and security interest. It is an area that impinges on several vital aspects of Nigeria’s national security because it is open to hostile incursion by sea particularly on the high seas beyond its territorial waters. Most of Nigeria’s oil resources which account for over 90 percent of its national earnings are exploited offshore. It is vital artery to Nigeria’s trade with the world and its Nigeria’s key to the enormous resources of the ocean bordering its territory which is also contiguous with central African states. Nigeria’s strategic interest in the Gulf of Guinea is informed by the major regional insecurity issues and the smaller territorial disputes that involve significant competing claims to areas rich in energy resources and cross border / piracy matters. Maritime security is the major pressing regional issue for Nigeria particularly in relation to weapon infiltration, oil bunkering and vandalization of oil installations. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and its impacts on national maritime security constitute the crux of Nigeria’s strategic interest in the Gulf of Guinea. This paper identifies challenges like instability due to poor governance, oil theft and illegal artisanal refining in the Niger Delta, vast expanse of water with weak surveillance and unco-ordinated security patrols, piracy and inadequate legal framework for prosecuting criminals when intercepted. It therefore recommends attractive options to criminal activities for young men such as the rebuilding of industries, information and intelligence sharing, adequate training and funding for security forces, regional institutional efforts through inter-regional coordination center for maritime security. This paper adopts regional security complex theory as its theoretical framework to restore the collective security and guarantee regional stability.

Keywords: Energy Security, Maritime Security, Sea Piracy, Sea Power, Territorial Waters.

INTRODUCTION

The Gulf of Guinea constitutes a hub for virtually Nigeria’s immediate security paradox-installation of oil and gas infrastructures, ports that facilitate import and export business, the discovery of huge offshore oil and gas reserves as well as other marine resources. Protecting this vital artery for socio-economic and political development constitutes immediate challenge for Nigeria considering the volatile nature of the region (Umara, 2014:143). Of these various bodies, the Gulf of Guinea commission (GGC) has the largest mandate for dealing specifically with maritime issues. It was established in 2001 as a permanent framework for collective action with a view to ensuring peace, security and stability conductive to economic development in the region on 29th November, 2012, the countries affected signed the Luanda Declaration on peace and security in the Gulf of Guinea region (Chatham House, 2013:5).

Nigeria’s geo-strategic location also play a role in defining the nation’s security focus, situated in a region of comparatively much smaller and weaker states in term of size, human and material resources. Nigeria’s security attention could be said to have been pre-determine. Successive Nigerian leaders have come to accept that the nation has to bear with the political instability within some of the neighboring countries like Chad, Benin Republic, Niger, Togo and increasingly in the Gulf of Guinea (Alli, 2012:9). The region’s geo-strategic and maritime potential are quite attractive. The Gulf of Guinea is endowed with enormous mineral and marine resources such as oil, diamond, gold among fishes and others. In particular, it is home to huge hydrocarbon deposits. Nearly 70 percent of Africa’s oil production is concentrated in the West African coast of Gulf of Guinea (Onuoha, 2012:4).

Among the major oil-producing countries in the region are Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo and Gabon. In December, 2010, Ghana joined the league of oil producers when it commenced the production of oil from its jubilee field located some 60km offshore. It covers 6,000 kilometers coastal arc which stretches from Senegal in the west Africa through Cameroon in central Africa to Angola in the Southern Africa, embodies its value as an area of global geo-maritime importance as well as its vulnerable security (Onuoha, 2012:5).

The Gulf of Guinea stretches about two hundred nautical miles economic exclusive zones (EEZ) containing numerous boundaries and over one million square nautical miles of open sea. Numerous tributaries flow into the gulf and some like the River Niger are navigable for commercial shipping well inland. There are over 200 ports serving deep draft vessels and unlike the Gulf of Aden, or the Malacca strait, the Gulf of Guinea has no maritime checkpoint. The region is rich in natural resources, with abundant reserves of oil, natural gas and minerals, to include bauxite, gold and iron. In total, the Gulf of Guinea countries produce over five million barrels of oil per day as well as more than three quarters of the world’s supply of cocoa. West Africa is largely dependent on the Gulf of Guinea to transport these natural resources with international export concentrated around four of its principal port facilities: Lagos in Nigeria. Abidjan in Cote D’Ivore, Dakar in Senegal and Douala in Cameroon (Sullivan, 2012:2-3).

Maritime security is an emerging issue in the Gulf of Guinea region. Energy security and trade depend to a large extent on a sea-based transport, and the region is currently the source of around 5.4 million barrels of oil per day. Maritime security is essential for maintaining the flow of revenues from oil and gas which have the potential to contribute significantly to development in the livelihoods of many African people. Maritimes security is important for exploiting maritime resources, securing livelihoods and development. Ensuring the security of the Gulf of Guinea is beyond the capacity of any existing regional organizations alone. A number of regional organization share interest in maritime security, these include Economic community of West African State (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African states (ECCAS), the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), International Maritime Bureau (IMB), International Maritime organization (IMO), and the Gulf of Guinea commission (GGC). (Chatham House 2013:7)

Maritime security includes the protection of maritime trade resources, utilization, environmental protection and the jurisdiction of accountable authorities. The need for maritime security and development in Africa has grown over the past decade, particularly due to increasing pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden, attacks on oil installations and vessels in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as refugees and migration flows across the Mediterranean. Security and development of the African coast are primarily an African responsibility, but the challenges are global in scope and therefore requires international engagement (Smed, nd: 2)

The politics of oil has always been of strategic interest to both producers and consumers. Some major countries have become wary of the reliability and security of their traditional sources of oil and natural gas, because of unstable political and security situations in regions where these resources are abundant. The Gulf of Guinea sub-regional oil fields are increasingly attractive to oil companies because they deliver higher profits per barrel than oil from most other parts of the world (Onwumere, 2008: 2).

External interests in the sub-region have grown as competition for influence in the sub-region has taken on new dimensions. Against the backdrop of ongoing competition for crude oil resources between the United States and European countries, China, India and Japan
have swiftly enlarged their interests both positive and negative results. The presence of these external interest have resulted in huge investments and increased shipping activities. Multinational companies in the energy sector compete for oil explorations license and currently spend billions of dollars and euros to erect drilling platforms, pipeline and transport hub (Onwumere, 2008: 3). For oil rich regions in the south, the drive to achieve energy security by the core powers has an impact upon the human security of local communities, while oil wealth often insulates leaders from the wider population, with consequences for nations of regime security and development. The degree of energy security experienced by each political community is measured by the reliable and state supply of enough energy demands of the present and into the near future (Raphael and stokes, 2007:380).

The Gulf of human is a sub-region of Africa with a growing strategic importance due to global resources needs. Since the last decade of the 19th century, international attention has been drawn to this rich area of the continent primarily due to the intensified global competition for increasingly scarce energy resources (Idahosa 2011:1). It has emerged as one of the key supplier for the accelerating demands in global energy consumption and source of vital financial resources to countries in the region. The strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea as alternative source of energy to industrial countries and primary provider of scarce foreign exchange to the GCC members resides in its proven vast reserve of hydrocarbon deposit (Bassey, 2010:271).

Relevant to this study are the concepts and discussion on the following: (i) delimitation of the relevant areas, internal waters and territorial sea, and the contiguous zone, bays harbor works and roadsteads, international strait and waterway. The high seas, the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the seabed and sub-oil beyond national jurisdiction (ii) the principle of the freedom of the seas, ordinary and extra-ordinary rights of jurisdiction in time of peace, special reference to piracy etc. uses of high seas and the seabed navigation, fisheries, exploitation of other resources, scientific research experiments, disposal of radio-active waste, pipeline cables, mechanical installation and other uses (iii) jurisdiction over maritime areas adjacent to the coast, the resume of ports, the right of hot pursuit, ships in distress (iv) fishing rights in the seas, and scientific research pollution regulations (AAU, 2014:213).

Until recently, countries in the Gulf of Guinea focused on land-based threats to security while the maritime dimensions, were hardly considered in the design, implementation of security and defense options and strategies. What is in place currently does not seem to effectively defer criminal elements and violent social movements whose activities now threaten security and stability in the region. The military response of some of the states as well as international actors which have interest in energy resources in the region appears to have worsened the security situation mainly by increasing the risks of weapons proliferation and deepening human right abuses. This creates a policy dilemma for governments and other stakeholders who justifiably feel compelled to clamp down on crimes and violence with legitimate force (Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, 2013:11).

The extant maritime security framework in the Gulf of Guinea is premised on the delineation of the Gulf Guinea into maritime zones designated A, B, D, E, F, and G respectively as presented below:

Zone A, comprising Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo
Zone B, comprising Angola (extensive coastline), Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon.
Zone D, which groups together Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and principe
Zone E, comprising Nigeria, Niger, Benin and Togo
Zone F, comprising Burkina Faso, Cote D’ivore, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Ione
Zone G, which groups together Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Senegal (Zeoba, 2015:61).

The Gulf of Guinea has been spotlighted as a major international maritime security concern. Maritime traffic in this region has significantly increased with the advent of new finding of huge oil and gas deposits offshore (Nana ofsu Boaleng, 2017:1)

Conceptual Framework / Clarification

Maritime Security

It is the process of maintaining stability in the international system on, over, under and from the sea. It is also identify the basic principle which govern the use of oceans. The maritime enforcement operations especially those that involve its current security pre-occupation with countering terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Chris, 2008:3). Maritime security is the combination of preventive and responsive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats and international unlawful acts. It involves security of seas lines of communications, security protection from crimes at sea, resource security, and access to resources at sea and to the seabed, environmental protection and security of all seafarers and fisherman (Feldt et al, 2013:5). It entails preserving the freedom of the seas, facilitating and defending commerce and maintain good governance at sea (Feldt et al, 2013:5).

Maritime security involves the development and application of naval power, incorporating military power
projection and homeland defence at sea, as well as the use of warships to protect maritime trade routes and commerce through functions including deterrence, surveillance and interdiction. It includes maritime environment (marine pollution), vessels safety and regulation, maritime search and rescue, impact climate change and human security (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017:4). It is the state wherein the country’s marine assets, maritime practices, territorial integrity and coastal peace and order are protected, conserved and enhanced through internal or a combination with external mechanisms (Eluwa: 2011:24).

**Energy Security**

Energy security exists when there are security resources large enough to meet the needs of the political community (the energy demands), which include all military, economic and societal activities. Those sources must be able to deliver such qualities of energy in a reliable and stable manner and for the foreseeable future. The existence of reliable supplies of energy underpins economic activities, and can be seen as a prerequisite for any significant degree of economic security (Raphael and stokes, 2007: 380. It entails the availability of energy resources that are diverse, sustainable in quantities, affordable in prices, supports economic growth, assist in poverty alleviation measures, does not harm the environment and that takes note of shocks and disruptions. It also the continuous availability of energy in varied forms in sufficient qualities at reasonable prices. (Borok. et al, 2013:1).

**Territorial Waters**

Territorial waters can be referred to as marginal sea or littoral waters. It evolved from the idea that the sovereignty of a coastal state extends to an adjacent belt of water beyond the internal waters and land territory.

Territorial waters or a territorial sea, as defined by the 1982 United Nations convention on the law of the sea as:

A belt coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical mile from the baseline (usually the mean low-waters mark) of a coastal state. Territorial waters differs from the high seas, which are common to all nations and are governed by the principle of freedom of the seas. The high seas are not principle of freedom of the seas. The seas are not subject to appropriation by persons or states but are available to everyone for navigation, exploitation of resources, and other lawful uses. The legal status of territorial waters also extends to the seabed and to the airspace above them (coastal waters).

Internal waters are deemed to be such parts of the seas are not either the high seas or relevant zone or the territorial sea, and are accordingly classed as appertaining to the land territory of the coastal state. Internal waters, whether harbours, lakes or rivers, are such waters are to be found on the land war side of the baseline from which the width of the territorial and other zones is measured and are assimilated with the territory of the state (Shaw, 1997: 393).

**Sea Power**

Sea power encompasses the control of international maritime trade, the operation of navies in war, and the use of navies to achieve political influence during peacetime. It is seen as a nation-state’s use of naval forces to send armies and commerce to its allies across seas and oceans, and to territories where access in needed for war (sea control) and to prevent enemies from doing the same. It is applicable to the security concerns of a globalizing world economy. The ultimate goal of sea power is unrestricted access to the world’s common transportation routes as well as access to markets and materials. Naval presence encourages stability and security and set the stage for diplomatic and political cooperation (Onwumere, 2008:10; Joseph, 2013:7).

As Mahan stated cited in (Gick, 1998) that:

It is the controlling of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means, predominant influence in the world... (and) is the chief among the merely material element in the power and prosperity of nations (Gick, 1998:2).

**Sea Privacy**

According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) privacy can be defined as the act of boarding any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime and with intent or capacity to use force in (maritime connector, nd: 2) Furtherance of that act, in simple words, piracy is an act of robbery or criminal violence at sea through illegal use of force by non-state agents, popularly known as pirates (Maritime connecter, nd: 4). Equally, Randrianantenania (2013) defines piracy:

as any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any acts of depredation, committed for pirate ands by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or properly on board such ship. (Randrianantenania, 2013: 3).

Sea piracy includes a range of criminal activities at sea
including illegal fishing, marine pollution, trafficking, smuggling, unauthorized entry into territorial waters, armed robbery at sea, theft hijacking, kidnapping and piracy itself. It is crime that occurs on the high seas, and territorial waters (Otto, 2016: 4; Baer, 2004:8).

**Location, Institutional Formation and Architecture of the Gulf of Guinea Commission.**

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) is defined as the thirteen West African nations mostly fronting the Atlantic Ocean from Angola in the southeast to Cote D’ivoire in the west. Other countries within this area include Ghana, Togo, Republic of Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Democratic republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo and Chad. Chad is the only land looked country among the Gulf of Guinea states. These countries have different colonial ties and spoke many languages like English, French, Spanish and Portuguese. The sub-region has a coastline of about 3,4000 miles (5,500km) with an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical mules, the sub-region has a maritime domain of about 680,000 square miles (mm), exercising effective and sustained security over this vast maritime domain (Onwumere 2008:13)

![Map of Gulf of Guinea](image)

Gulf of Guinea Commission was established by the treaty signed in Libreville, Gabon 3rd July 2001 by Angola, Congo, Gabon, Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe. Membership of the commission shall be sovereign states with these objectives:

i. To strengthen ties of cooperation and solidarity existing among member states

ii. To create conditions of mutual confidence, peace, and security conducive to the harmonious development of states;

iii. To promote close consultation in the exploitation of the natural resource of the Gulf, with a view to ensuring the economic development of member states and the well-being of their peoples;

iv. To promote sectorial co-operation within the framework of the treaty establishing the African union and thereby contribute to the development of the continent.

v. To harmonize the respective policies of states regarding matters of common interest, particularly concerning the exploitation of natural resources;

vi. To protect, preserve and improve the natural environment of the Gulf of Guinea and cooperate in the event of natural disaster;

vii. To formulate a concerted immigration policy and find appropriate solutions to the problem which might arise there from;

viii. To strengthen cooperation in the area of communications, maritime especially with a view to facilitating ties and trade among member states and people; and

ix. To develop a united communications network and ensure the undertrain of transport networks, bordering the Gulf of Guinea and parties to the present treaty.

The commission shall contribute a framework of consultation among the countries of Gulf of Guinea for cooperation and development, as well as for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts that
may arise from the delimitation of borders, the economic and commercial exploitation of natural resources within the territorial boundaries particularly in the developing exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of our states (GGC, 2001:5)

Existing Gulf of Guinea Regional Institutions.

A. MARITIME ORGANIZATION OF WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN

Maritime organization of west and central African (MOWCA) is a partnership created in 1975 primarily focused on the safety of ships, passengers and goods for vessels operating in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2006, its coastal and 5 land locked members began drafting a plan to develop an integrated coast guard network, which can also be viewed as the initial step in developing a regional maritime security strategy, (Sullivan, 2012:10)

MOWCA unites 25 countries on the West and Central African shipping range (inclusive of five landlocked countries). These countries of 20 coastal states bordering the north and south Atlantic ocean, and inter-facing countries, and provide the seaborne trade of those that are landlocked. The members are Angola, the Gambia, Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Guinea, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritame Republic of Congo, Democrat, Republic of Congo, Liberia, Gabon, Mozambique and landlocked states-(Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso and central African Republic) (MOWCA, 2008:2).

B. NIGERIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY (NIMASA)

It was established on 1st August 2006, from the merger of National Maritime Authority and joint Maritime Labour Industrial Council. It core functions are listed below:

i. Pursue the development of shipping and regulatory matters relating to merchant shipping and sea farers.
ii. Administration, regulation of shipping license
iii. Administration, regulation and certification of sea-farers
iv. Establishment of maritime training and safety standards
v. Regulation of safety of shipping as regards the construction of ships and navigation.
v. Provision of maritime search and rescue services
vii. Provides direction and ensure compliance with vessels security measures.
viii. Carryout air coastal surveillance
ix. Control and prevent maritime pollution
x. Develop and implement polices and programmes which will facilitate the growth of local capacity in ownership, meaning and construction of ships and other maritime infrastructure.
xi. Enhance the procedure for the implementation of conventions of the international Maritime Organization (IMO), and the international labour organization (ILO), and other international conventions to which the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a party on maritime labour, commercial shipping and for the implementation of codes resolutions and circulars arising there from. (NIMASA, 2006:4)

C. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)

It was created in 1975 to promote trade, national cooperation and economic development throughout West Africa. It is made up of 15 states, to include Nigeria, situated on and around the north western half of the Gulf of Guinea. ECOWAS has a maritime structure with heads of states meeting annually, a council of ministers responsible for community development, a tribunal for settling treaty disputes between the members, a court of justice to address non-compliant members, and a parliament with membership coming from the members state's national parliaments. In addition, ECOWAS has a mutual defense protocol aimed at settling conflict among the members, which includes a non-standing armed force-the economic community of west African states monitoring group (ECOMOG) (African Union, 2012:2)

D. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO)

International maritime organization is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. It was formed in 1948 as early known as Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. It has 173 member states and 3 associate members with its headquarter in London. Its roles include to develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, maritime security and efficiency of shipping. The organization has recently forged an alliance to provide technical assistance to 26 Gulf of Guinea ports, to promote compliance with the IMO’s international ship and port facility security (ISPS) code. It is a systematic risk assessment management mechanism enabling the collection and sharing of security information in maritime areas in an international framework (IMO, 1982:3).
E. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (ECCAS)

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was created in 1983 to promote cooperation, economic growth and established a central African common market. It is made up of central African states situated on and around the southern eastern half of the Gulf of Guinea. ECCAS also has a mature structure, which parallels ECOWAS. (African union, 2012:6). Moreover, in 2009, ECCAS, adopted a maritime security strategy with mechanisms to implement information sharing, community surveillance and asset management, the strengthening of national loyal frameworks, common training and cost sharing. To date, ECCAS has built a regional center for maritime security, divided its maritime into three zones, instituted a small number of joint patrols and created a revenue generating tax (Sullivan, 2012:5).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study adopted regional security complex theory at its theoretical framework. A regional security complex theory has been defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently and closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. The security complexes of states depend primarily on the pressures deriving from geographic proximity, and the interplay between the system structure and how balances of power play out in the system. The central idea of the theory is that since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally into regionally based clusters security complexes-process of securitization and the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and outside of it (UK. Essays, 2017:5).


The idea of security complexes as a tool of regional security analysis can be further developed to explore and identify the elements of, and approaches to, stability and cooperation within them. Regional security arrangements (motivation and patterns) based on the following:

i. Intra-regional conflict-control
ii. Regime maintenance
iii. Balancing regional hegemony
iv. Extra-regional intervention and self-reliance and

Relevance/Linkage of the Theory to the Study

A security complex combines both the physical and ideal characteristics of international Relations to determine the interplay of power relations and the spheres of security cooperation and non-cooperation (Adams and Hossain, 2016:6). The linkage states the relationship between the theory and maritime (energy) security in the Gulf of Guinea with respect to regional challenges like piracy, accident at sea and other threats to the Gulf. It exhibits the correlation between regional security architecture of various states and energy security activities. It allows analysts to confront common conceptions and discuss security concerns between members of a given security complex. It demonstrates how energy has become securitized within a given geographical area.

WEAKNESS OF THE THEORY

Constraint in attempts to generate stability and collaboration with security complex in the third world. It relates to motivation of the regional actors and the sources of polarization and cleavages derived from divergent national interest. The inferior position of the actors (the third world states) the international distribution of power undermines their efforts to maximize autonomy through collaboration (Acharya, 2004:35). The members have pledged to rely solely on peaceful processes when resolving intraregional differences and treating their security as fundamentally linked to one another. Despite the presence of this, critics note that the underlying security complex still compels states to adopt power balancing and deterrence strategic. The integration, transfer of knowledge and the power of technology, energy security are not confined solely within regional complexes (Beeson, 2014:3).

CHALLENGES (ISSUES) FACING NIGERIA’S MARITIME AND ENERGY SECURITY FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA.

Following the decline of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden, attention slowly began shifting towards African’s other hotspot for maritime crime-the Gulf of Guinea, an area historically troubled by maritime insecurity on land in
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region has extended into the sea, gradually spilling over into neighboring countries maritime zones, which are now considered among the world’s dangerous waters (Otto 2006:5). The protracted conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta area in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea harbours complex implications for security in the region. At the centre of the conflict is the agitation by the mainly Ijaw and Ogoni ethnic nationalities for mineral resources control, national self-determination and more robust constitutional integration of extant degradation. They have sabotaged oil installations, taken foreign oil worker hostage and carried out lethal car bombings. Report relates that Shell Nigeria’s annual reports released in late August 2006, estimated illegal bunkering losses at 20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day in 2005, down from 40,000 to 60,000 in 2004 (Adams and Hossain, 2016:7).

Oil theft and illegal artisanal refining in the Nigeria Delta are increasing problems, causing significant environmental and economic devastation. These activities are not new, but since the end of militant crisis in 2009 their scale has grown beyond recognition as thousands of demobilized militants have turned to crime as a source of income (Chartham House, 2013:7).

Piracy attacks have been on the increase in recent times. The reason for this astronomical rise was the outbreak of piracy off coast of Somalia and Gulf of Aden (Onucha, 2012:8). Below are tables of piracy attacks on ship across the world between 2013 and 2017.

**PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS**

<table>
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<th>Location</th>
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<th>2015</th>
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<td>(i) Indonesia</td>
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<td>(ii) Malacca straits</td>
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<td>(iv) Philippines</td>
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<td>(v) Singapore straits</td>
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Source: 1CC 1MB piracy and Armed robbery against ships-2017 Annual report p.6.

Figure 2

The following five locations recorded around 67% attacks from a total of 180 reported attacks for the period under review across the world.

Source: 1. CC 1MB piracy and robbery against ship 2017

Figure 3.
Direct Effect of Piracy

Ramsbotham (2011) cited in Nana Ofosu-Boateng (2018) listed the following as some of the direct effects of piracy:

- Cargo fraud using so called phantom ships
- Penalties because of damaged or delayed goods.
- Paying ransom money
- Investigative reports and their cost
- Entire ship loss
- Ship and cargo damage due to an attack
- Ship cargo loss (Nana ofosu-Boateng, 2018)

Corruption and Weak Governance

Poor governance and lack of effective leadership at all levels of governance are central in attempting to explain the problem. It is evident that most of the keys government institutions are weak, enabling corruption to thrive with impunity, lack of good governance, defects in criminal justice are challenges facing members with respect to deficient in education, health, employment, food shelter, and cross borders trafficking in arms, drugs human and maritime insurgency in the Gulf of Guinea (Dambazau, 2014:16).

Energy Matters (Oil and Gas Exploration)

Since energy security and trade in general depend largely on seabed transport, maritime security threats are alarming for the Gulf of Guinea region (Dambazau, 2014:17). Energy security concerns are a key driving force of energy policy. These concerns relate to the robustness (sufficiency of resource, reliability of infrastructure, stable and affordable prices), sovereignty (protection from potential threats from external agents) and resilience (the ability to withstand diverse disruptions) of energy security issues (system). Disruptions of oil supplies may result in catastrophic effects on such vital functions of modern states as food production, medical care, and internal security (Cherp, 2012:2). On the economic front, it leads to loss of oil revenue to illegal local/international cartel. There is threats to commerce as 90% of the external trade depends on shipping in Nigeria. (Peterside, 2018:2)

DOMESTIC AND SUB-REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE

A related vulnerability stems from most member states weak internal security forces that are undertrained, poorly equipped and incapable of effectively policing their internal waters and maritime boundaries. These negative influences lead to increase in maritime boundary disputes, piracy, illegal bunkering, and disruption of oil terminals, and flow stations operation of oil pipelines, poaching, and terrorism gun-running and environmental degradation. Associated vulnerabilities include limited maritime domain awareness, weak infrastructures and poor legislative and judicial arrangements. The inability of member states to mount collective, sustained and effective security control over the maritime domain makes it difficult for Gulf of Guinea states to enjoy the full benefits of the sub-regional exclusive economic zone's (EEZ) significant fishery resources (Onwumere 2008:5).

- Attacks on the Energy industries onshore and offshore infrastructures.
- Conflict and wars resulting into (i) the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (ii) failed and rouge states.
- Disregard for the rule of law, nepotism, ethnic sentiments and marginalization
- Poor management resources,, economic inequality and poverty.
- Environmental challenges like climate change, marine pollution, environmental degradation, poor environmental management control ability natural disasters.
- National demographic (population exploitation) poor delineation of maritime space-difficult to enforce total sea control.
- Poor maritime culture and sea blindness
- Lack of political will to domesticate extant international laws, protocol and conventions.

Nigeria’s strategic interest in the Gulf of Guinea is however beset by challenges at both major levels at which Nigeria interact in Africa-regional and continental. It collides with established western interest. So many attempts to exert influence over the region and the continent which it is closet in terms of global exchange. In this regard, France and United States of America constitute to be too formidable in relation to Nigeria’s interest in the region.

Nigeria is apparently quite willing to take on the lead for Gulf of Guinea security cooperation, the enthusiasm is ironically detrimental to the concept at large. Most members do not trust Nigeria’s intentions, nor do they want Nigeria to be the spear-head and dominant partner for any regional maritime organization.
Poaching – inability to exercise control over their maritime domain has made it difficult for Gulf of Guinea states to enjoy full benefits of the significant fishery resources in their EEZ.

Finally, disputed boundaries- enduring disagreements over maritime boundaries could precipitate armed conflict environmental degradation-pollution and environmental degradation are relatively unchecked in the Gulf of Guinea (Gilpin, 2007: 6).

Prospects

- Maritime industry to grow by 2.5-5% in two years. According to Dr. Dakuku Peterside DG, NIMASA, cited in the Nation by Dauda (2018) that:
  
  Total fleet size is to grow by 4.4% in 2019. Oil tanker fleet will decrease by 2.23% in 2018 and increase by 1.7 in 2009. The non-oil tanker fleet size is projected to increase by 8.15% in 2018 and 8.72% in 2009. Oil ring count is projected to increase by 27.67% in 2018 and 0% in 2019. A number of factors have contributed to the gradual growth that we have recorded, such as the receding crime in the Niger Delta region; the blue scale up to our maritime security architecture is addressing the immediate challenges in this area and is aimed at suppressing the emerging threats on our waters (The Nation, 28th February, 2018).

- Regional maritime security initiative is to develop partnership of willing regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws. This collective effort will empower each participating nation with the timely information and capabilities it needs to act against maritime threats in its own territorial seas (Global security organization, 2013:2).

- Information sharing well also contribute to the security of international seas, creating an environmental hostile to terrorism and other criminal activities (Global Security Organisation, 2013:4).

- Proliferation security initiative is a global effort to stem the proliferation by any means, of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

- Policy makers should legally define the range of maritime crimes in their waters, and subsequently require the criminalization of these incidents through the development of appropriate national organization.

- A more detailed template for reporting should be adopted by the IMB/IMO and reporting bodies at regional and national levels. This will improve capacity for generating data that is accurate and statistically significant, in turn allowing for evidence-based policy making.

- To strengthen defense aids which involves light intensity and sound intensively devices. A physical protection which includes the installation of safe havens or called citadel under-water detector, above-water detector. Provide radar targets and builds tracks of target movement over time. Examine tracks for behaviour. Provide alarm data to ship crew.

- Robust mechanism for asset mapping, gathering and sharing of information and data coordination of regional efforts on law enforcement, joint patrol by national navies. States should set aside money/resources to build local capacity.

- Looking beyond military and policing matters would open up a whole new discourse that explores the ways that coastal communities could benefit from (or pose a threat to) maritime safety and security.

- The Gulf of Guinea commission also has military wing that collectively secure the region from hostile vessels as well as to detect and interdict shipments of weapons and deny illegal fishing and movements of militants across the region’s territorial waters. They could be achieved through the Gulf of Guinea Guard Force (GGGF) whose contingents could be drawn from all member countries of Gulf. The coast Guard as well control and guard the gulf of guinea waters ascertaining legal and illicit explorations of fishing and can track and attack those that violate deep into territories of member states. Such sanity is expected to stabilize the region and thus the massive capital investment.

- Nigeria should advocate for and the support efforts to incorporate MOWCA integrated coast guard network initiative into regional security strategy.

- Nigeria should advocate for and support ECOWAS’ efforts to partner with and expand the ECCAS maritime security initiative to West Africa. Nigeria should advocate for ECOWAS’ efforts to adopt a comprehensive maritime strategy for West Africa.

- Private maritime security companies (PMSC) can be involved. With the successes recorded in the Gulf of Aden, by floating armories already deployed. It is already used for gathering intelligence that is then communicated to member states (governments).

- Operational devices, like integration, intelligence
gathering and sharing creation of strong maritime domain awareness. Surveillance policing (search and rescue) exercises and operations. Coordinated efforts to police and defend the entire sub-region.

- Maritime security framework must be anchored on the fundamental principles of collective security mechanism for the Gulf of Guinea sub-region. The security instrument should be driven by the Global Maritime Security Partnership initiative (GMP) based on the pillars of collaboration and cooperation encompassing national, regional and global security architecture.
- Funding constraints, conflicting interests of member states and burden sharing.
- Defence diplomacy and flag showing visits to be put in place by required states.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria’s interest being a regional power stem from peaceful resolution of disputes among member states (Nigeria and Cameroon, Niger with the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon etc) constitute flash points particularly when it comes to exploration of crude oil, and the institutionalization of regional cooperation that would guarantee peace, security integration and stability in the region. The current security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and its efforts on the economy of the region reinforces the need to forge regional and global maritime partnership to deal with extant maritime threats which are transitional in nature and also address related capacity inadequacies.

REFERENCES