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Full Length Research

The New Institutional Approach to Understanding Good Governance in Tanzania

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This paper investigates and reflects on the relationship between governance and institutions. Very specifically, the paper explores different theoretical and empirical debates about governance in general and good governance in particular in local political settings. Drawing upon “new institutionalism”, the paper offers a satisfactory analytical framework for understanding the ability of the institutions of governance in Tanzania, from their inception through their development over time, to meet the needs of the local community. This analysis links the present state of institutional arrangements, the originating context or set of circumstances behind the creation of that institution, and the sequence of connecting events—institutional path dependence. I have indicated in this paper that studying local governance in Tanzania brings strongly into focus the nature of the relationship between institutions and the quality of service provision at the local level. This analytical approach not only helps to provide objectives and meaning for governance, but also offers a path to understanding the fundamental shortcomings of the institutions of governance in Tanzania. The paper concludes by arguing that, the problems of governance in Tanzania and likely in other developing countries is not a lack of sound development policies, but rather the institutional mechanisms necessary to translate those policies into desirable results.

Key Words: Governance, Good Governance, New institutionalism, Institutions, Tanzania

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1980s, institutional analysis has been gaining a new popularity within political science, economics and sociology. In these disciplines, institutional scholars refer to this revived focus as “new institutionalism”. Goodin and Klingemann describe this new institutional thinking as “the next revolution” in the

discipline of social science (1996, p. 25). Central to new institutional perspectives is that institutions matter for political outcomes and that the quality of institutions is an important determinant of a well-functioning system of governance. From this perspective, governance is embodied in institutional arrangements, consultative

mechanisms, policy-making processes and the nature of leadership in political systems (World Bank, 2002). As Pierre (1999) pointed out, institutional analysis is a critical component for any understanding of local governance, not least because it highlights systems of values and norms that give meaning, direction, and legitimacy to such governance. This analytical approach not only helps to provide objectives and meaning for governance, but also offers a path to understanding the fundamental shortcomings of the local governance system not only in Tanzania, but also in other developing nations.

In view of this paper, the issues and debates on governance in developing nations can be explored from at least three different perspectives. The first of these is the *political economy dimension*, which focuses on state reforms in response to changes in global forces. The second perspective is that of the *neo-liberal dimension*, as promoted and enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the early 1980s. The third perspective is the *nation-state dimension*, which focuses on a country's own initiatives toward good governance for sustainable local development. While this paper focuses on the nation-state dimension, the impact of both the political economy and neo-liberal dimensions upon nation-state initiatives will also be discussed. Furthermore, in the broad conception of governance and institutions, it is also understood that institutions can create a space between governance or policy intentions and unintended consequences.¹ The new institutional analysis in this paper is used to explain the discrepancies between the visions of governance for Tanzania promulgated by socialist institutions and later capitalism within the country, as well as by foreign neo-liberal institutions (especially via the World Bank and the IMF), and to contrast these visions with their real institutional outcomes. This analysis is guided by the proposition that an effective institutional framework is vital for achieving sustainable good governance in developing nations.

In specific, the paper explores different theoretical and empirical debates about governance in general and good governance in particular. It begins with the historical overview of post-colonial institutions² of governance in Tanzania. Drawing upon historical institutionalism, the paper offers a satisfactory analytical framework for studying the ability of the institutions of governance in Tanzania, from their inception through their development over time, to meet the needs of the local community. This

analysis helps the reader to link the present state of institutional arrangements, the originating context or set of circumstances behind the creation of that institution, and the sequence of connecting events—*institutional path dependence*. Secondly, this paper explores the genealogy of the concept of governance in its various meanings and explains how thinking about governance can contribute to our understanding of political institutions in Tanzania and other developing nations of Africa. Thirdly, this paper discusses a wide variety of governance initiatives in Tanzania, bringing together empirical cases for measuring governance in general and good governance in particular. The paper indicates that studying local governance in developing nations brings strongly into focus the nature of the relationship between institutions and the quality of service provision at the local level.

Theoretical Framework

Since the early 1980s, political science has witnessed two significant changes in scholarly focus. One such paradigmatic shift is the renewed interest in political institutions—new institutionalism—and the second one is the rapidly growing number of studies centred on the concept of *governance* at different analytical and institutional levels (Pierre, 1999). This paper applies a new institutional approach to analyze problems embodied in the local governance system in Tanzania. The paper does not seek comprehensiveness in its coverage of new institutionalism in the social sciences, but focuses selectively on new institutionalism in political science. I have chosen the new institutional approach not because it offers new answers to the traditional questions of politics (*who gets what, when and how*), but because it incorporates other contextual variables, outside of the traditional views of politics,³ that matter for political outcomes.

As new institutional approach underpins the analysis undertaken in this paper, specific attention is paid to the contributions that institutions makes to the understanding of the governance system in Tanzania. It has been indicated in this paper that a new institutional analysis is needed to understand the fundamental institutional problems of the governance system in Tanzania. Such an analysis, I believe, will better describe the arena that is of direct relevance to the problem being examined, the context that frames and affects the arena, the behavioural patterns and the likely outcomes. This paper agrees with Mead (1979)'s argument that there is an

¹ Lee (n.d.) defines unintended consequences as situations where a policy action results in an outcome that does not match what was intended.

² In this paper, institution is defined as a set of structural constraints—institutional design, rule and norm structure—which govern the behavioural relations, interactions and networks among individuals and/or groups. As used in this paper, institution includes, among other things, both informal constraints (such as preferences or interests of the actors, informal networks and interactions and prevailing social conditions) and formal settings (such as actors, laws, mode of governance, policies and strategies).

³ As Meyer and Rowans (2006) have pointed out, traditional perspectives on politics view institutions as objective structures that exist independently of human action. In contrast, the new institutionalism sees man-made rules and other informal procedures as the basic building blocks of institutions as well.

incredible need for institutional analysis, as the issues faced by governments at all levels tended to stem increasingly from administrative structures.

The Historical Overview of Tanzania's Institutions of Governance

Historical institutionalism as one of the methods of analysis in new institutionalism has a view of institutional development that emphasizes "path dependence". Path dependence means that current and future actions or decisions depend on the path of previous actions or decisions (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). Pierson (2000), for instance, argues that an early institutional approach is very important in explaining current institutional developments. Recently, path dependence has become a popular conveyor of the looser ideas that history matters or the past influences the future (Pierson, 2004; Crouch & Farrell, 2004; Mahoney, 2000; Hall & Taylor, 1996). The point is that what happens at an earlier point in time is understood to affect the range of possible outcomes for a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2004). Importantly, Pierson (2004) suggests that early stages in the sequence of an institution's development can place particular aspects of political systems into distinct tracks that are then reinforced through time.

The 1960s was an independence decade for most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Since then, most of these countries have experienced various forms of political governance regimes, ranging from extreme totalitarian states to the liberal democratic tradition (OECD, 2004). Most of the countries in SSA practiced a distinctive political behaviour and created regional institutions designed to protect their newly born states from any external interference. African independence leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana; Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo in Nigeria; Jomo Kenyatta, Thomas Mboya and Jaramogi Odinga in Kenya; Amílcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau; and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania produced development philosophies⁴ which justified their conceptions of where they would want to focus after independence. To them, the major challenge was how to extend traditional African values to the modern nation-state setting. In meeting this challenge, most of these leaders aspired to use the best from their own traditions of governance to oversee social development within their respective countries. By some measures, this was successful. For instance, Moss (2007) has noted that Africa's immediate post-independence period was fairly positive, with income per capita rising about 2.4 per cent per year during the 1960s.

⁴ Or doctrine: a belief (or system of beliefs) accepted as authoritative by some group or school (<http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn>)

In Tanzania, the independence leader, President Julius Nyerere postulated *Ujamaa*⁵—his particular version of socialism—as the answer to the Tanzania's political and socio-economic problems. Nyerere was known not only as an articulate spokesman for African liberation and African unity, but also as an educator and philosopher. Before beginning his political career, Nyerere was a teacher, and as a result of the intimate interaction between his political and educational leadership, he was tenderly and respectfully referred to by the title of *Mwalimu*, or *Teacher*, by Tanzanians.

Soon after independence in 1961, the government declared three "enemies" that threatened independence and national security: poverty, ignorance, and disease (Nyerere, 1966). On the evening of the day he took his oaths as Prime Minister of Tanganyika in May 1961, Nyerere told Tanganyikans:

I have talked to you before about poverty, ignorance, and disease. But in fact, if we defeat poverty, we shall have achieved the means by which we can defeat ignorance and disease. Yet poverty is something that really only you can fight. . . . This is your battle. This is our battle. This is the enemy we all must fight. (Nyerere, 1966, pp. 114-115)

In an effort to eradicate these three enemies, Nyerere pursued social, political and economic policies that redefined the roles and functions of the state. In February 1967, President Nyerere's government adopted a socialist development economy that led to extensive government involvement in all social spheres in addition to centralized public planning and control and delivery of social services. The government of Tanzania attempted to implement a nationwide system of collectivized agriculture, with emphasis on the canon of *socialism* and *self-reliance*. These two guiding principles were channelled through the ruling party under the rubric of the Arusha Declaration.

The Arusha Declaration is a set of principles drafted in Arusha town by the then governing party, TANU,⁶ in February 1967, to serve as a guide toward economic and social development in Tanzania. The essential substance of the Arusha Declaration was a rejection of the concept of national splendor as distinct from the well-being of its

⁵ *Ujamaa* is a famous Swahili word often used to mean socialism. It was first used in a political context by President Nyerere in his chapter "Ujamaa—the Basis of African Socialism" (Nyerere, 1962, pp. 162-171). However, in its original Tanzanian context, *Ujamaa* goes further to mean family-hood, brotherhood or friendship.

⁶ The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), founded by Julius Nyerere in July 1954, was the principal political party in the struggle for sovereignty in Tanganyika (now, Tanzania Mainland). After Tanganyika and Zanzibar united in April 26, 1964, TANU continued to be a ruling party in Mainland Tanzania and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) for Zanzibar until their merger in February 5, 1977 to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (the Revolutionary Party).

citizens, and a rejection of material wealth for its own sake. The declaration emphasized the concept of equal opportunity and the need to reduce social inequities. As stated by President Nyerere:

The objective of socialism in Tanzania is to build a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all can live in peace with their neighbors without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury. (Nyerere, 1968, p. 340)

The Arusha Declaration was a commitment to the belief that there are more important things in life than amassing riches, and that, if the pursuit of wealth clashes with concerns such as human dignity and social equality, then the latter are to be given priority (Nyerere, p. 316). The Arusha Declaration emphasizes the need for mobilizing human resources for self-reliant development rather than relying on capital or material resources, underpinned by the idea that the development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. According to Nyerere, money and the wealth it represents should be the result and not the basis for Tanzania's development (Nyerere, 1968). Hence, the Arusha Declaration identifies four prerequisites for Tanzania's development: (i) land, (ii) people, (iii) good policies, and (iv) good leadership.

The Arusha Declaration states the principle that land is the basis for human life and all Tanzanians should treat it as a valuable investment for future development. Thus, it is a responsibility of the government to see to it that land is used for the benefit of the whole nation and not for the benefit of one individual or just a few people. The Arusha Declaration also states the belief that people are important tools for policy implementation. Hence, the people of Tanzania had to be taught the meaning of self-reliance and how to practice it. The Arusha Declaration states that socialism and self-reliance are the best policies for the development of a young nation like Tanzania. Finally, the Arusha Declaration recognizes the importance of good leadership and the urgency of establishing such: leaders must set a good example to the rest of the people in their lives and in all their activities (see Nyerere, 1967). President Nyerere's goal was to make his poor nation economically and politically independent and to create an equalitarian society. According to Yefru (2000), the Declaration was widely acknowledged by many African countries for its historical significance in development. Yefru notes further that the significance of the Arusha Declaration lies on its idea of development from the grass roots, which no one country in the continent envisioned the same.

In September 1967, Nyerere published his book, *Socialism and Rural Development*, in which he spelled

out three governing principles upheld by socialism and self-reliance: *equality*, *mutual respect* for all families, and *participation* in the collective development. President Nyerere emphasized rural development because about 90 per cent of all Tanzanians lived in rural areas and the majority of them relied on a subsistence agricultural economy. Through his rural development strategy, all Tanzanians were encouraged to form villages based on co-operation and communal work, commonly known as *Ujamaa* villages. Essentially, this implied two things: village autonomy and a directed effort by the state (Hyden, 1980). This development strategy advocated that development beneficiaries actively contribute to their own development whereas the government would provide social services such as roads, schools and hospitals. However, as with many other social experiments of this kind, Nyerere's ambitions failed to meet the objective of eradicating poverty, ignorance, and disease, and Tanzania's economy was ultimately crippled by a combination of *Ujamaa's* policies, natural disasters and a war with Uganda in the late 1970s.

Following the wide array of reforms pioneered by the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1980s, the failure of Tanzanian socialism was accepted as obvious especially for Nyerere and his ruling party – *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM, Revolutionary Party). By 1985, the government was essentially bankrupt and had little choice but to comply with the World Bank and the IMF (Holtom, 2005). While Nyerere admitted that some of his policies were mistakes (for instance, nationalization of the sisal plantations), he nevertheless defended the validity of his policies until his death in October 1999. In his very last interview, with the *New Internationalist Magazine* (NIM) about a year before he died, Nyerere was asked, "Does the Arusha Declaration still stand up today?" He responded:

I still travel around with it. I read it over and over to see what I would change. Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the Declaration is still valid. I would not change a thing. Tanzania had been independent for a short time before we began to see a growing gap between the haves and the have-nots in our country. A privileged group was emerging from the political leaders and bureaucrats who had been poor under colonial rule but were now beginning to use their positions in the Party and the Government to enrich themselves. This kind of development would alienate the leadership from the people. So we articulated a new national objective: we stressed that development is about all our people and not just a small and privileged minority. The Arusha Declaration was what made Tanzania distinctly Tanzania. We stated what we stood for, we laid down a code of

Table 1. Tanzania: Government Expenditure

Fiscal Year	Education (%)	Health (%)
1980/1981	12.55	5.61
1981/1982	12.47	5.38
1982/1983	13.09	5.29
1983/1984	11.85	5.46
1984/1985	7.29	4.98
1985/1986	7.61	4.37
1986/87	6.45	3.66

conduct for our leaders and we made an effort to achieve our goals. This was obvious to all, even if we made mistakes—and when one tries anything new and uncharted there are bound to be mistakes . . . I still think that in the end Tanzania will return to the values and basic principles of the Arusha Declaration. (Bunting, 1999, para. 11, 12, 23)

In 1985, Julius Nyerere voluntarily retired from the presidency, although he remained the chair of the ruling party, CCM, until August 1990. Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, launched the first Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) in 1986, a liberalization program which emphasized the production of cash crops through individual incentive, free market incentives in industrial production, and devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling (Zirker, 1997). Since 1986, Tanzania gradually began the transition to a more market-based or capitalist economy.

The Fall of Washington Consensus and the Rise of Governance as a Development Agenda

Following a period of steady growth in the 1960s and early 1970s (see Table 1), in the 1980s the economic performance of many countries in SSA was disappointing and the majority of the population lived in absolute poverty. The 1980s is often called the "lost decade" for SSA, with average incomes declining by 1.1 per cent per year (Moss, 2007). While this paper does not focus on the whole of SSA, I will give an illustration of two other countries, apart from Tanzania, to demonstrate the 1980s' economic downturn in SSA. If we compare two pairs of countries, Ghana and Nigeria (from SSA) on the one hand and South Korea and Indonesia (from South-east Asia) on the other we will see that, both countries started at very similar levels of income in the early 1960s but have diverged sharply since then. When Ghana achieved its independence in 1957, it was one of the wealthiest nations in SSA, with per capita income almost equal to that of South Korea; that is, US\$490 for Ghana

versus US\$491 for South Korea. However, by the early 1980s, Ghana's annual income per capita had fallen by nearly 20 per cent to US\$400, while South Korea's per capita GDP was, by then, over US\$2,000 (see Werlin, 1991). On the other hand, Nigeria's initial condition in the 1960s was more promising than that of Indonesia (Lewis, 2007). According to official data, the Nigerian economy expanded about five per cent on average in the 1960s with per capital income slightly higher than Indonesia; that is, US\$624 for Nigeria versus US\$600 for Indonesia. However, by the early 1980s, the Nigerian economy declined dramatically compared to that of Indonesia. While Indonesia witnessed more than six per cent average annual economic growth in the 1980s, Nigeria's net economic growth from 1981 through 1990 averaged only 1.33 per cent per annum (Lewis, 2007).

In Tanzania, the extensive government involvement in social service provision was eventually incompatible with the level of economic growth in much of the late 1970s and 1980s. As Ndulu and Mutalemwa (2002) have pointed out, the state had an overwhelming role in resource allocation and an enormous amount of control over the actions of economic agents. By the end of the 1970s, the Tanzanian economy was in a serious financial and production crisis and began to decline rapidly (Lawrence, 2003). Agricultural production fell and food shortages abounded in almost every part of the country. In the early 1980s, the public expenditure framework expanded far beyond what the government could afford; Calderisi (2006) has noted that in the 1980s, 60 per cent of the development budget was funded by foreign aid. The scale of this downturn is demonstrated by the fact that the Tanzanian economy declined dramatically from 1982 to 1990, from the 14th poorest country with a GNP per capita of US\$280, to the second poorest in the world with a GNP per capita of US\$110 (World Bank, 1984; World Bank, 1992). By means of explanation, African governments essentially saw the root cause of their problems in their inequitable economic relations with the developed world. In contrast, however, the World Bank Report of 1981, also known as the "Berg Report," placed the blame for Africa's poor performance on bad domestic




Figure 1. Tanzania: GDP and Population Growth, 1960-1998

economic policies, such as state regulation and intervention in markets. Figure 1

In order to curb the growing socio-economic crisis, Tanzania, like other countries in SSA entered into formal negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank for the implementation of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and Economic Recovery Programs (ERPs), the result of which was the reintroduction of a market-based economic system in 1986. The reform programs pioneered by the IMF and World Bank were aimed at promoting economic growth, reducing poverty and encouraging popular participation and good governance (Mugerwa, 2003). Hence, since the early 1980s, there has been an unprecedented wave of policy changes or reforms that are global in scope and Africa could not isolate itself from this fact (see Miller, 2005). For instance, Senegal adopted these policies earlier in 1979 whereas Kenya and Ghana reached a similar agreement in 1983 (Moss, 2007, p. 106). It is for this reason, as indicated by Ayeni, that some observers have described this wave of reforms as a “global revolution” (2002, p. 1). By the mid-1990s, about 29 African countries had entered into agreements with the IMF and the World Bank (Lawrence, 2003).

However, the beginning of the 1980s marked a very significant shift in development policy in Africa, from state-led to market-led economies. This shift was based on the assumption that free trade is the most effective way to promote growth as it was believed that value generated by trade would ultimately trickle down throughout society. Thomas Friedman was among the more popular authors who championed this neo-liberal

concept. Friedman (2005) has argued that free trade, private property rights and free markets lead to a richer, more innovative, and more tolerant world. This neo-liberal view was promoted and supported not only by global financial institutions, but also by most of the major trading states and multinational corporations (Lamy, 2008).

The neo-liberal policies of the 1980s are often referred to as the “Washington Consensus” a term first used in 1989 by World Bank economist John Williamson in a conference he hosted to draw attention to economic reforms that had been carried out in Latin America over the last decade and to identify areas in need of further reform (Williamson, 1990). The term *Washington Consensus* is used to refer to the complex array of policy reforms proposed by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s as remedial measures for the failing policies in place at the time in the developing world. Williamson’s intention was not to criticize Latin America’s reforms, but he believed that these reforms were so widely recognized as correct that they should constitute the standard reform for developing nations (Williamson, 1990).

The Washington Consensus used, among other instruments, Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) as universal blueprints for development, regardless of the particular exigencies of a given country. The goal of these policies was to put in place a set of mechanisms for achieving development by relying on the market, with minimal state interference. A crucial aspect of these policies was the promise of policy changes by recipient countries in exchange for aid (Moss, 2007). More specifically, SAPs involved the following policies, which

are often referred to as “conditionality”: (i) shrinking the larger budget deficits through fiscal discipline; (ii) reordering public expenditure priorities such as basic health, education and infrastructure; (iii) building a fair and effective tax system through tax reform; (iv) liberalizing interest rates by stopping the state from artificially forcing interest rates; (v) allowing a competitive exchange rate; (vi) trade liberalization through moving toward more open trade; (vii) liberalization of inward investment by encouraging foreign investors; (viii) privatization of state owned industries to allow more profits; (ix) reducing barriers to private business operations through deregulation; and (x) legal security for property rights. These policies came into widespread use in the 1980s and became the basis for determining the development prospects of developing countries.

While SAPs were applied extensively in most of SSA in the 1980s, this part of the continent was still trapped in such a vicious cycle of poverty that few of the countries could exit these programs with successful economies measured by sustained economic growth. Neo-liberal policies failed to deliver distinct improvements in governance and economic performance, let alone the broader and more demanding goals of African development. Even with additional funding from the World Bank, the situation in Africa deteriorated further (Stein, 2008). For example, Howard Stein argues that from 1980 to 1989, real per capita income for SSA fell by 1.2 per cent per annum, while debts increased at an annual compounded rate of 12 per cent. Moreover, the debt-to-exports ratio rose at a rate of 17.7 per cent per annum to a completely unmanageable 360 per cent of gross domestic product (Stein, p. 39). Weisbrot, Baker, and Rosnick, who have analyzed the consequences of neo-liberal policies on developing countries, have noted that “contrary to popular belief, the past 25 years (1980–2005) have seen a sharply slower rate of economic growth and reduced progress on social indicators for the vast majority of low- and middle-income countries compared with the prior two decades” (2005, p. 1).

By the end of the 1980s, anxiety among developing countries had grown, regarding the SAPs’ ability to deliver the promised economic growth as well as the social impact of these policies. Post-development scholars criticize the SAPs as “pernicious discourse, a grand modernizing and colonial narrative reflecting and serving Eurocentric interests” (Craig & Porter, 2006, p. 2). These critiques became prevalent not only among the poorest states, but also within the World Bank and the IMF themselves.

Similar to other post-development scholars, Joseph Stiglitz (2002), who was the World Bank’s chief economist from time to time, has argued that SAPs have served as an intimidation factor used by the West against the poor people of Africa and other developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank imposed conditions such as

drastic cuts in social expenditure, removal of food subsidies, retrenchments, currency devaluations and the introduction of user fees for education and healthcare services. According to Stiglitz, anyone who valued democratic processes would conclude that conditions such as these undermine the national sovereignty of recipient countries. This belief was partly due to lack of opportunity for African countries to borrow from the world capital markets, as well as their dependence on aid that gave donors significant power and influence over domestic affairs in recipient countries. As pointed out by Thomas (2008), Stiglitz has argued further that the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s offers a lesson that inappropriately managed market liberalization is devastating for poor countries. Stiglitz called for change but his message was not well received within the community of international financial institutions (IFIs). Stiglitz ultimately left office in 2000, highly critical of IFI policies (see Thomas, 2008).

The notion that donors should have power and influence over the domestic affairs of recipient countries raised concerns about the “ownership” of reform programs. The experiences of developing states show that reform ownership is an important determinant for policy success. Thomas (2008) notes that to induce better outcomes, reforms have to be country-driven and country-owned rather than imposed by actors outside of the implementing country. However, the reform experience in Africa has been that donor countries or organizations assume ever more extensive powers and influence over the recipient countries. But, as a consequence, Tsikata (2003) argues that any reform initiative in Africa cannot be sustained in the absence of ownership by and commitment from Africans themselves. Tsikata then outlines four contexts in which reform ownership can be demonstrated: (i) at the initiation level; (ii) during the refining process; (iii) through expressible political support; and (iv) by the extent of public support and participation. The implementation of SAPs in the early 1980s in Tanzania was complicated by a lack of broad-based domestic consensus and support (Tsikata, p. 36). This was partly due to the fact that reforms were not home-instituted and partly due to the legacy of socialism under the leadership of Nyerere.

Critiques of SAPs have also centred on the increased unemployment and greater poverty among and within developing states (Lawrence, 2003). In Tanzania, SAPs resulted in a wide economic gap between the business sector and public workers and peasants, with the poor becoming even poorer. Following the introduction of progressively larger and more frequent user fees for social services in the late 1980s, school enrolment and quality of social services declined. As part of Tanzanians who went to high school and college in Tanzania in the late 1980s and early 1990s and both from poor family background, I view SAPs as regressive and particularly

burdensome for the poor, as poor households had limited resources to pay for social services, particularly for education and health services. Consequently, by 1993, gross enrolment in primary education in Tanzania had declined from 100 per cent in 1980 to 82 per cent whereas the illiteracy rate had increased from 10 to 16 per cent between 1986 and 1992 (World Bank, 2002). Meanwhile, six per cent of the better-off had access to secondary school, whereas only one per cent of the poor had this privilege (Klugman et al., 1999).

In addition, although a variety of fees were levied on primary and secondary education (basic education), university education remained free of charge. Consequently, the structure of government educational spending in Tanzania became highly biased; with the highest income earners receiving more than twice the share of the overall public expenditure on education received by the lowest income earners (see World Bank, 2002). According to official data, the share of education in total government spending dropped from 12.55 per cent to 6.45 per cent between 1980 and 1987, and the share of health services declined from 5.61 per cent to 3.66 per cent over the same period (Table 1).

Consequently, key objectives of President Nyerere's development strategy for Tanzania, as reflected in the Arusha Declaration 1967—*ensuring that basic social services be available equitably to all members of society*—had become severely constrained. In his interview with the *New Internationalist Magazine*, Nyerere said:

I was in Washington last year. At the World Bank the first question they asked me was, "How did you fail?" I responded that we took over a country with 85 per cent of its adult population illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were two trained engineers and 12 doctors. This is the country we inherited. When I stepped down there was 91 per cent literacy and nearly every child was in school. We trained thousands of engineers and doctors and teachers. In 1988 Tanzania's per-capita income was US\$280. Now, in 1998, it is US\$140. So I asked the World Bank people what went wrong. Because for the last ten years Tanzania has been signing on the dotted line and doing everything the IMF and the World Bank wanted. Enrolment in school has plummeted to 63 per cent and conditions in health and other social services have deteriorated. I asked them again: "What went wrong?" These people just sat there looking at me. Then they asked what could they do? I told them have some humility. Humility—they are so arrogant! (Bunting, 1999, para. 25-27)

In 1989, a new World Bank report on Africa, *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, was released. Unlike the Berg Report (1981), which was undertaken without any direct input from Africans, this new report demonstrated its commitment to African participation. The World Bank admitted its past mistake of imposing policies which were not friendly to recipient countries and suggested that this new development agenda should now be shaped through local participation and ownership. It is indicated in the report that about 400 Africans from various countries in Africa were interviewed. The report introduced an entirely different set of policies intended to alleviate Africa's poor track record in economic (and social) development. Based on the comments of respondents, the report argues that, in order for African governments to succeed, they need to "address the fundamental questions relating to human capacities, institutions, governance, the environment, population growth and distribution and technology" (World Bank, 1989, p. 1). According to this report, the underlying factor behind the failure of Africa's economies is a crisis of governance—poor governance. As Lawrence has pointed out:

Market liberalization could not deal with these problems which, rather than a "rolling back of the state," require a well-functioning bureaucracy operating through a set of public and private institutions, which combine to create a "developmental state." (2003, p. 53)

Affixing blame for the failure of structural adjustment policies to achieve intended beneficial results in the recipient countries, the "governance" debate began to feature in policy statements toward the end of the 1980s. In *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (1989), the World Bank singled out poor governance as one reason for the failure of SAPs. In many African countries, there was evidence of extensive personalization of power, abuse of human rights, widespread corruption and prevalence of unelected and unaccountable governments (Mhina, 2000). Hence, by the early 1990s, a crisis in governance was generally considered an inevitable consequence should existing policies for Africa's development be continued.

The new idea of focusing on governance was explored further in the April 1991 *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics*. In a section titled "The Role of Governance in Development", the Bank's chief economist, Lawrence H. Summers, argued in his keynote address that "the question of what governments must do, what they can do, and how we can help them do it better leads to the difficult problem of governance" (Summers, 1991, p. 13). The importance of governance was also pointed out at the same conference by Edgardo Boeninger, who was the Minister Secretary General of the Presidency in the Republic of Chile. Boeninger




Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Governance Indicators (1996-2006)

argued that “the question of how governance promotes development cannot be considered in the abstract; the social milieu that provides the setting in which the state operates is crucial” (1991, pp. 269-270). While under the Washington Consensus, external actors (mainly, the IMF and the World Bank) had decided on the universal development blueprint for each recipient country, under this new emphasis on governance, national governments became responsible for owning development strategies and civil society for participating in their formulation (Thomas, 2008). According to Boeninger (1991), a consequence of this new emphasis would be that local actors would be central to sorting out the challenges, constraints, and priorities of political and economic reform.

On coming to power in 1995 as World Bank president, James Wolfensohn promised to make the Bank more sensitive to the needs of developing countries. Wolfensohn tried to recast the Bank’s image as an institution that was not only moving away from structural adjustment, but was also making the elimination of poverty its central mission, along with the promotion of good governance (Bello & Guttal, 2006). Consequently, the quality of governance was recognized as one of the essential ingredients for development prospects in Africa. For instance, since 1996, the World Bank has built worldwide governance indicators that report aggregate and individual governance indicators for developing

countries (see Figure 2). These indicators are compiled from several sources, including polls of experts conducted by commercial risk-rating agencies, and resident surveys conducted by other organizations in a large number of surveys and other cross-country assessments of governance (Alence, 2004). This was done based on the World Bank’s belief that governance matters and that there are strong causal relationships between the quality of local institutions of governance and development outcomes (Kaufmann et al., 1999).

The Definitional Problems with Governance

While the concept of governance is central to the literature in political science and public administration, there has been a long struggle with the understanding of what precisely governance is—and when is it *good*? I made an argument before that “governance in general and good governance in particular, can be confusing phrases that could mean various things to various people” (Mgonja, 2006, p. xi). In fact, the terms often have a different meaning when translated from English to other languages, and clear equivalents do not always exist for the terms *governance* or *good governance* (see Frantzi & Kok, 2009). For instance, in India, the word continues to be used in common parlance to simply mean government (Dethier, 2000), while in Dutch its

approximations, for example *bestuur*, are not quite the same as *governance*, and consequently many Dutch scholars use the English word when writing in Dutch (Frantzi & Kok, 2009). In the Swahili⁷ language, the word has not found a proper translation. The words *utawala* and *utawala bora*, which are frequently used for *governance* and *good governance* respectively, literally mean *administration*, which is not quite the same as *governance*. Hence, in order to make any progress with our discussion about governance in Tanzania, it is important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by this term.

The term *governance* is a rather old term, despite its recent prominence (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). In 1470, Sir John Fortescue, Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in England, published a book called *Governance of England* (Dethier, 2000). In 1989, the World Bank raised the issue of governance in the context of developing nations by defining it as the "exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs" (World Bank, 1989). Since then, the word *governance* has been increasingly used around the world in public policy debates to refer to the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 1992).

Despite the long provenance of the concept of governance, there is as yet no strong consensus around a single definition of governance or good governance. According to the *Oxford Dictionary*, governance means, "The act or manner of governing, of exercising control or authority over the actions of subjects; a system of regulations." Lynn et al (2001) more restrictively define governance as regimes of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government activity, where that activity is broadly defined as the production and delivery of public goods and services. According to Lynn et al, governance involves bargaining and compromise among actors with different interests; it comprises both formal and informal influence, either of which may characterize the relationship between a formal authority and the actual conduct of its government-mandated operations. Following the same trail, Weiss argues that governance then is about government, as well as those agents, mechanisms and institutions that "transcend the formal government apparatus" (2000, p. 800). It comprises all the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights and obligations and mediate their differences (Brillantes Jr., 2005).

Moreover, Ngware argues that governance is the "exercise of social, political, economic and administrative

authority to manage a nation or municipal affairs" (1999, p. 9). Wohlmuth expands on this to refer to governance as the configuration of a social group that forms the basis of the ruling coalition and the policy direction that is produced by the interaction of its political and social elites (1999, p. 195). So, to Wohlmuth, governance is more than an arrangement of political structures and the capacity of government institutions in a country. The *Institute on Governance* (IOG) expands on this definition of governance as comprising "the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern" (Graham et al., 2003). According to the IOG, governance is not only about *where to go*, but also about *who should be involved in deciding*, and in *what capacity*. To the IOG, the process of governance involves not only government but also societies or other organizations that make their own important decisions, determine whom they involve in the process and how they render account. However, even though the many existing definitions of governance cover a broad range of issues, one should not conclude that there is any lack of definitional consensus in this area. This is rather an indication that there is a wide diversity of empirical measures of the various dimensions of governance.

For the purpose of this paper, governance is prescriptively conceptualized in a perspective that is grounded on institutions, networks and outcomes. In this view, I decided to focus on Rhodes' definition of governance: "self-organizing, inter-organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state" (Rhodes, 1997, p. 15). Rhode's use of the term governance does not focus on state actors and institutions as the only relevant participants in the governance system, but also on the use of networks (which could be intergovernmental, inter-organizational, trust and reciprocity crossing the state-society divide, or transnational) in the pursuit of common goals. Again, I have chosen Rhode's definition not because it offers a unique perspective on governance, but because it extends beyond the role and actions of public sector institutions, structures, and processes to refer to the broader ideas of how societies organize to pursue common goals. In this regard, as Kooiman (1993; 2003) has noted, governance can be seen as an inter-organizational phenomenon that involves the totality of the theoretical conception of governing. Kooiman, like Rhodes, sees governance as the pattern that emerges in a socio-political system as a common outcome of the inter-connecting interventions of all involved factors.

Moreover, from an institutional perspective, governance is about affecting the frameworks within which citizens and officials act and politics occurs, and which shape the identities and institutions of civil society (March & Olsen,

⁷ Swahili is a National language in both Tanzania and Kenya and widely spoken in other Eastern and Southern African countries

1995; Kjær, 2004). Pierre and Peters (2000) argue that there are two ways to think about governance: *Governance as Structure* and *Governance as Process*. According to these scholars, thinking about governance in structural terms has emphasized the impact of structures (such as markets, networks and communities) and institutions in solving the socioeconomic problems of a nation. On the other hand, governance as process centres more on processes and outcomes than formal institutional arrangements. This is because governance, with its encompassing and contextual approach to political behaviour, sometimes is less concerned with institutions that with outcome (Peters & Pierre, 2000). However, Peters and Pierre note that institutional arrangements remain important not least because they determine much of what roles the state can actually play in governance.

As Kjær has pointed out, this broad institutional perspective defines governance as “the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules” (2004, p. 10). This sort of institutional perspective also informs the World Bank Report, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?*, which refers to governance as “the institutional capacity of public organizations to provide the public and other good demanded by a country’s citizens or their representatives in an effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable manner, subject to resource constraints” (World Bank, 2000, p. 48).

On the other hand, *good governance* is a more confusing phrase as it is hard to tell *what is good* and *what is bad*, and in *what perspective* this is so. Kjær (2004) argues that good governance was introduced on the development agenda by the World Bank because it needed to explain why a number of countries had failed to develop, despite the fact that they had adopted SAPs. To the World Bank and the IMF, the answer was *bad governance*, understood as self-serving public officials and corruption in the public service. According to the World Bank (1989), good governance means an increased transparency and accountability in the public sector.

Ngware (1999) draws from all of these definitions to explain good governance as the practicing of democratic values, administrative and political accountability, transparent decision-making mechanisms, transparent and incorrupt administration, and respect for the rule of law with the holders of public office being accessible to the people regardless of the latter’s gender, class, ethnicity, income status, education or position in society. To Ngware, good governance assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in the course of decision making and implementation.

However, the World Bank’s model of good governance has faced criticism from developing countries as being

exclusively derived from the Anglo-American states (see also Kjær, 2004). It appears that instead of developing nations being accountable and responsible to their citizens through their elected parliaments, the governments’ responsibility lies towards the donor countries or organizations, a practice label *outward accountability*.

In the context of this study, good governance means the existence of effective institutions of governance which are capable of managing a community’s resources and affairs in a manner that is open, transparent and accountable, with respect for the rule of law. It means a system that is equitable and responsive to local people’s needs. Therefore, while governance and good governance have been defined in a variety of ways with no absolute consensus among scholars, there is a certain common ground which forms the core. In short, that is, “government should be *owned* by citizens at large and be *efficient* and *effective* in meeting the economic, social and political needs of the society” (Mgonja, 2006, p. xi).

Good Governance Initiatives in Tanzania

Though situated in a politically explosive region of the African continent, Tanzania has so far managed to sustain a certain level of political stability, peace and liberty. Since its independence in 1961, Tanzania has witnessed a peaceful transfer of political power involving four presidents. As Mhina (2000) has also observed, Tanzania’s experimentation with both socialism and capitalism provides a very unique experience in Africa. Tanzania has also managed to introduce extensive reform programs as remedial measures for the economic crisis of the late 1970s and the 1980s. The overall purpose of these reform programs was to support the attainment of a high rate of economic growth, as well as good governance to ensure that delivery of quality services within the priority sectors conforms to public expectations for value, satisfaction and relevance (Mgonja, 2005; 2006). In general, good governance has been SSA’s main development strategy since the early 1990s, and the progress that has been made throughout the developing countries has been enormous. In direct contrast to the philosophy behind the SAPs in the 1980s, both the World Bank and the IMF now recognize that the responsibility for governance issues lies first and foremost with national authorities.

In Tanzania, the government has summarized its own governance policy in the National Framework on Good Governance of 1999. This framework emphasizes that good governance is critical to the success of Tanzania’s wider development strategy, and employs such tactics as shifting management responsibilities and production from the state to the private sector; the devolution of power and resources from the central government to local

authorities; re-organizing ministries and other government agencies to make them more efficient and effective; and attacking financial malpractice such as corruption and fraud in the public sector (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999a). More specifically, this national framework addresses the following reform initiatives:

- Public Finance Management Reform, as one of the necessary components of good governance.
- Civil Service Reform, as an important element of good governance, especially with regard to civil service pay.
- Local Government Reform Program, as a remarkable effort to shift the locus of development-fund control to local levels of governance.
- Legal Sector Reform Program, which seeks to address the glaring gaps in applying the rule of law.
- The development of anti-corruption strategies as an important part of government policy since 1996.

This set of complex and far-reaching reform objectives was made in collaboration with development partners and is expected to have a direct impact on increasing accountability and transparency, reducing opportunities for corruption and recruiting public officials who are accountable, efficient, ethical and professional in fulfilling their roles.

The National Framework on Good Governance states that governance comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences, and exercise their rights and obligations. In other words, governance in a Tanzanian perspective is the framework of rules, institutions and practices that sets limits and provides incentives for individuals, organizations and businesses. More specifically, the National Framework on Good Governance outlines the following benchmarks for good governance in Tanzania:

- A constitution that is adhered to, and which ensures both separation of powers and political stability;
- An efficient and effective legislature;
- Safety and security of persons and property;
- Accountability, transparency and integrity in the management of public affairs;
- The rule of law;
- Electoral democracy;
- Protection of human rights and freedoms;
- Efficiency in the delivery of services by public officials;

- Participation of citizens in political, economic and social decision making;
- An informed and skilled society that is aware of, and ready to legitimately defend, its rights and freedoms and to hold its governors accountable;
- Decentralization and bringing of public services closer to the end-user;
- Empowerment of local councils and communities through devolution of powers and functions, public participation and financial decentralization; and
- Promotion of gender equity and equality.

According to the principles of the National Framework, good governance has three major dimensions: political, economic and administrative/managerial. Within these dimensions, different key players exhibit the virtues assumed to foster good governance in the country. However, the national framework also recognizes the interconnectedness of the key players in governance; that there is no single thing that one player does that does not concern the other players (see Figure 3). Therefore, this Framework defines governance as a *network* and *interaction* of public (governmental) and private (non-governmental) bodies that have a role to play in the formulation and implementation of public policy and the delivery of public services (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999a), an understanding of governance that is also included in the *World Development Report 1997*. In other words, good governance should encourage a wider participation in enhancing the design, supply and delivery of public goods and services through partnerships among governments, businesses and civic organizations (World Bank, 1997).

In 1995, the government of Tanzania appointed a group of experts in consultation with the different stakeholders in the country to formulate a policy document which would serve as a blueprint for the country's development efforts. In 2000, this group came up with the Tanzania Development Vision 2025, a framework which aims to guide Tanzania's development efforts into the 21st century and to achieve a certain level of development by 2025. Vision 2025 takes into account expected changes and trends in the years ahead, with an emphasis on the kind of enabling environment that is essential for the nation to flourish economically, socially, politically and culturally. The need to formulate a new economic and social development vision for Tanzania stemmed from the unsuccessful outcomes of earlier economic reforms, especially those pursued in the 1980s. There are six basic goals set forth by Vision 2025: the establishment of a higher quality of life; peace, tranquillity and national unity; good governance; an educated society imbued with an ambition to develop; and an economy which is competitive with sustained growth for the benefit of all people.




Figure 3. Key Players in Good Governance in Tanzania

Vision 2025 spells out two key prerequisites for effective realization of the vision: *good governance* and *competitiveness of the economy*. More specifically Vision 2025 states that:

Governance must be made an instrument for the promotion and realisation of development, equity, unity and peace buttressed by the rule of law and involving public participation in the war against corruption and other vices in society. Good governance must permeate the modalities of social organization, coordination and interaction for development. This can be achieved by an institutional framework which is capable of mobilizing all the capacities in society and coordinating action for development. Good governance must be cultivated by promoting the culture of accountability and by clearly specifying how incentives are provided for and related to performance and how sanctions are imposed. (United Republic of Tanzania, 2000, pp. 22-23)

Furthermore, in February 2005, the government of Tanzania approved the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP; also known as MKUKUTA in Swahili) as a framework for the achievement of growth and reduction of poverty among the population. The NSGRP was informed by the aspirations of Vision 2025. In addition, the NSGRP builds on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Review, the Medium Term Plan for Growth and Poverty Reduction and the Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020 (TMTP2020), which all emphasize growth

momentum in order to fast-track the targets of Vision 2025 (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). Within the goals of the NSGRP, governance has been included as one of the three major areas of focus, centering on economic structures and processes, such as use of public resources (financial, information and natural resources), management systems and participation in decision making (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005). It is stated in the NSGRP that:

The National Governance Framework and specific on-going reforms including: Public Service Reform Program (PSRP), Local Government Reform Program (LGRP), Public Financial Management Reform Program (PFMRP), the Legal Sector Reform Program (LSRP) and Financial Sector Reform and sector specific reforms are among the necessary measures aimed at contributing towards good governance outcomes, improved public service delivery, better economic management, positive cultural change and democratic development. (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005, p. 32)

Both NSGRP and Vision 2025 identify poor leadership, weak administration, and a lack of accountability and transparency as key stumbling blocks to Tanzania's development strategies. Furthermore, both NSGRP and Vision 2025 emphasize the importance of improved governance in the areas of economic policies, human rights, well-functioning institutions, political participation and accountability and transparency in implementing all socio-economic activities.

Governance Issues and Gaps in Tanzania

While Tanzania claims to have maintained “political stability” since independence in 1961, this has not led overall to a higher measure of governance; there is a huge discrepancy between expectations and actual practices. The most significant and persistent gap in governance efforts in Tanzania is the lack of what I call *institutional mechanisms* needed to institute the underlined governance initiatives. For instance, the Arusha Declaration, which outlined the equalitarian principles of socialism, was in use for more than two decades starting in 1967. However, the three “enemies” (poverty, disease and ignorance) that the government had declared war against in the 1960s are still rampant (see also Mallya, 2000). For instance, according to the *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, in 2006 the life expectancy in Tanzania was 51 years, the adult literacy rate (ages 15 and older) was 72.0 per cent and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio was 54.3 per cent.

As Mallya (2000) argues, the “failed” Arusha Declaration has all the objectives of Vision 2025. For instance, the Arusha Declaration emphasizes human-centred development and the need to eradicate poverty, which is also the main agenda of Vision 2025. In other words, the Arusha Declaration aimed at a high quality of life for the population and clearly stated that in order for development to come about, there is need for “good leadership and sound policies”, which basically means good governance (see Table 2). While Vision 2025 argues that earlier development policies and strategies such as the Arusha Declaration were not consistent with the principles of a market-led economy and technological growth (United Republic of Tanzania, 1995, p. iii), I see “nothing new” in Vision 2025 that was not already introduced at least in spirit by the Arusha Declaration. Table 2 summarizes the similarities between the two.

In a similar example, Nyerere emphasized rural development as a strategy to allow local people to actively contribute to their own development (see Nyerere, 1967). The same strategy is used by the World Bank—Community-Driven Development (CDD)—an approach that gives control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups and local governments. CDD treats poor people as assets and partners in the development process, building on their institutions and resources (World Bank, 2002). In fact, according to the World Bank, CDD is the most effective approach to ensuring participatory decision making and community empowerment (<http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/>). In other words, the problem with Tanzania’s governance system is not a lack of sound development policies, but rather the institutional mechanisms necessary to implement those policies.

Effective Institutional Mechanism: A Missing Link

In common with many post-development thinkers, I have been asking myself for some time now, “*What is wrong with development initiatives in Africa?*” While this paper does not definitively close any avenues of further research, many of the institutional challenges and shortcomings discussed herein raise questions regarding the mode of governance used by the Tanzanian government and its development partners to eradicate systemic poverty in the country. Based on the analysis of this paper, there is a clear indication that the role to be played by institutions deemed necessary for the achievement of local development goals and good governance in Tanzania has become dramatically oversimplified if not completely forgotten.

Generally speaking, I think it is important to point out that one of the more practical ways of understanding the problems of the local governance system in Tanzania, as it is for many other Sub-Saharan African countries, is through new institutionalism. Central to new institutional perspectives is that institutions matter for political outcomes and that the quality of institutions is an important determinant of a well-functioning system of governance (see also World Trade Organization, 2004). As such, Tanzania’s development outcomes (good governance and reduction of systemic poverty) are greatly influenced by the country’s institutions of governance. I agree with Transparency International (2009) that when essential institutions of governance are weak or non-existent, corruption spirals out of control and the plundering of public resources feeds insecurity and impunity.

From the empirical evidence discussed in this paper, the discourse on engendering good governance in Tanzania (from the post-colonial socialist system to the present capitalist system) has relied almost exclusively on policy change while neglecting the institutional aspects that give meaning to those outcomes. It is this non-institutional thinking in governance that has led to a multiplicity of “unnecessary” policies and programs in Tanzania, akin to other African countries. As Sally Matthews has stated, “Africa has been subjected to development initiative after development initiative, and yet it remains impoverished . . .” (2004, p. 377). Accordingly, frequent changes of rules, policies, and programs in the governance system in Tanzania not only create disharmonious interfaces between the key actors and the implementation of programs, but also hinder the decision-making process in the action area.

While I believe that effective institutional mechanisms are necessary to realize good governance, the Tanzanian experience raises several questions about this arrangement. For instance, during the post-colonial Nyerere era, Tanzania had what I would call “very sound policies” of socialism and self-reliance, as stipulated in

Table 2. Comparison between the Arusha Declaration 1967 and Vision 2025

Arusha Declaration, 1967(Socialism-driven)	Tanzania Development Vision, 2025 (Capitalism-driven)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this country towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease. • To see that wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development of this country. • To see that the Government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of co-operative organizations. • To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High quality livelihood - A nation's development should be people-centred, based on sustainable and shared growth and be free from abject poverty. For Tanzania, this development means that the creation of wealth and its distribution in society must be equitable and free from inequalities and all forms of social and political relations which inhibit empowerment and effective democratic and popular participation of social groups (men and women, boys and girls, the young and old and the able-bodied and disabled persons) in society.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people. • To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status. • To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. • To see that the Government co-operates with other states in Africa in bringing about African unity. • To see that Government works tirelessly towards world peace and security through the United Nations Organization. • To co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace, stability and unity - A nation should enjoy peace, political stability, national unity and social cohesion in an environment of democracy and political and social tolerance.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country. • To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic socialist government of the people; • To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good governance - Tanzania cherishes good governance and the rule of law in the process of creating wealth and sharing benefits in society and seeks to ensure that its people are empowered with the capacity to make their leaders and public servants accountable. By 2025, good governance should have permeated the national socio-economic structure thereby ensuring a culture of accountability, rewarding good performance and effectively curbing corruption and other vices in society.

Continuation of Table 2

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education for Self-reliance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A well-educated and learning society - Tanzania envisages to be a nation whose people are ingrained with a developmental mindset and competitive spirit. These attributes are driven by education and knowledge and are critical in enabling the nation to effectively utilize knowledge in mobilizing domestic resources for assuring the provision of people's basic needs and for attaining competitiveness in the regional and global economy.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status. • To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth and shared benefits - Tanzania should have created a strong, diversified, resilient and competitive economy which can effectively cope with the challenges of development and which can also easily and confidently adapt to the changing market and technological conditions in the regional and global economy.

the Arusha Declaration. However, the institutional mechanisms available were very weak and unable to implement these policies. As Holtom (2005) has pointed out, Tanzania was a one-party state and its bureaucracy remained very weak. As such, power was centralized, and the bureaucracy did not emerge as a powerful independent actor. Moreover, Hyden (1980) argues, the rural development policies in Tanzania after the Arusha Declaration gave government officials opportunity to dispense a wide variety of goods and services to only those peasants who supported the party policies. Kelsall and Mmuya (2005) have noted further that even civil societies were neutralized through the ruling political system. I would therefore argue that post-colonial Tanzania failed to be developmental or progressive not because it lacked sound policies, as for instance the IMF and the World Bank have argued. I personally believe some of these policies are still valid even today. The problem was rather the lack of effective or even adequate mechanisms for implementation.

On the other hand, the World Bank and the IMF, who saw Nyerere's socialist policies as failures, came up with an agenda for *policy change*, which consisted primarily of the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of the early 1980s. As discussed earlier in this paper, SAPs involved minimizing the role of government through privatizing state-owned enterprises and eliminating government regulations and interventions in the economy. Nonetheless, these policies lacked internal institutional support and had unequivocally failed by the late 1980s. To rectify these failures, the World Bank came up with more participatory approaches to development, namely a new, dual-pronged policy proposal: governance on the one hand and the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs)⁸ on the other. Many of the countries in SSA adopted these

approaches, and in partnership with donor organizations and countries, they formulated new programs to implement them. In other words, this new paradigm of development seemingly allows developing countries to put forward their own comprehensive plans to foster good governance and poverty reduction (Cheru, 2006). However, here comes a central question: Were (are) there adequate institutional mechanisms in place for these programs to succeed?

As discussed in this paper, the National Framework on Good Governance (1999) in Tanzania was led primarily by the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) and there is clear evidence that it was undertaken more to make development partners happy than to meet Tanzania's own development priorities. While this National Framework outlines the important components of the key reforms, it has not made much of an impact since its launch in 1999. For instance, on coming to power in November 1995, former President Benjamin Mkapa appointed a commission led by former Prime Minister and First Vice-President of Tanzania, Judge Joseph Warioba, to assess the laws, regulations, procedures and modes of operation in the government and parastatal sectors, and to suggest ways of plugging loopholes and curbing the increase in corruption in the country. In 1996, the commission produced the highly regarded "Warioba report", which served as an inventory of corruption in Tanzania.

According to the Warioba report, corruption in Tanzania was systemic and fuelled by the weakness of state

⁸ Note that this paper focuses only on governance and not poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).

organs like the government offices, police, anticorruption bureau, and state security service. The report states that the police force ranks first in terms of level of corruption, adding that corruption was deep-rooted through the entire hierarchy of the force at the time of publication. The report also indicated that in all courts, from the primary court to the highest in the country, magistrates and judges were riddled with corruption. According to the report, judgments were written in the streets and in advance, without even giving a hearing to the disputing parties. The Warioba report recommended that the government start the fight against corruption by cleaning out top leadership ranks and keeping only good leaders who believe in and respect ethical standards. Furthermore, this report recommended that corrupt officials be severely punished by nationalizing and forfeiting their property in accordance with the law. However, the high standards of the Warioba report posed a major challenge for President Mkapa—after all, he had to find a way to fight corruption by using the corrupt state institutions themselves (see also Visram, 1997).

Although the report produced detailed evidence of corruption in the country, hardly any of the disciplinary and legal measures suggested were undertaken against those who were implicated in the report. The report also offers practical solutions, but again, most of these were never implemented. Conversely, the report led to the adoption of “new strategies,” including a comprehensive National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) and the establishment of the Commission for Ethics to administer and enquire into senior public appointees’ declarations of assets, and make recommendations to the President.⁸ Furthermore, this report led to the appointment of a good governance minister⁹ who would be responsible for monitoring the overall strategy and implementation of anti-corruption measures in the country. While externally Tanzania has been perceived as a good governance role model for other East African countries, internally corruption was and is still today institutionalized in every sector. In his address to the *Fourth International Investors’ Round Table (IRT) Meeting* in Dares Salaam, President Mkapa said:

We have persisted in our resolute struggle against corruption, including through rolling out

⁸ Note that, having been elected on an anti-corruption platform and having promised action, within one year of taking power, President Mkapa had declared his own and his wife’s assets publically. But with the exception of his prime minister and vice-president, no other leader has followed suit and the people had been left wondering if the war against corruption is running out of steam (see Visram, 1997). To his credit, President Mkapa left power in 2005 without declaring any asset he earned since he assumed office in October 1995.

⁹ This ministry is pure “hypnosis”, designed to convince people that good governance exists. In reality, the ministry has not done anything to improve conditions.

plans to combat corruption; the establishment of anti-corruption bureaus at the district level; and enhanced accountability for resources transferred from the central government to the district level. Tanzania’s efforts in fighting corruption are starting to win international recognition (November 23, 2004).

While President Mkapa assumed power with a high-profile drive against corruption and financial malpractice, corruption remained the major challenge of his presidency. The Controller and Auditor General’s report has estimated that no less than 20 per cent of the government budget is lost annually to corruption, theft and fraud (United Republic of Tanzania, 2008, p. 146).

Following in the footsteps of his predecessor, when the current President Jakaya Kikwete came to power in December 2005, he renewed the country’s commitment to fighting corruption at all levels of government. However, the integrity of his government and its commitment to the issue has been seriously questioned throughout his tenure in office. This is due to the extent of petty corruption within the country and also grand corruption scandals involving ministers and leading members of his ruling party. As a whole, these scandals lessened public confidence in the governance framework and the government’s overall commitment to effectively tackle corruption. According to Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) of the University of Dar es Salaam, the level of public dissatisfaction with President Kikwete’s government just in his first two-and-a-half years in power was much higher than during his predecessor, Benjamin Mkapa’s, 10-year reign. The report indicates that, whereas during the Mkapa administration from 1995 to 2005 there were between 18 and 25 public complaints over lack of accountability by government officials, under President Kikwete, this had risen to 34 (REDET, 2006). A good example is on September 9, 2009 where a number of citizens from across the country shared their concerns with President Kikwete on the integrity of his government in dealing with ongoing grand corruption scandals.¹⁰

CONCLUSION

Drawing on the discussions and analysis of this paper, I have come to the conclusion that when the system of governance is malfunctioning, something must be wrong with its institutional mechanisms. Simply stated, Tanzania (and other countries in SSA) can achieve significant development by beginning with institutions rather than policy outcomes. By devising good governing institutions,

¹⁰ President Kikwete was responding to questions from citizens live on the Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC).

policy successes and other development programs can be encouraged through citizens and officials learning to work well with those institutions. Notwithstanding, the purpose of this paper is not to suggest that any specific institutional mechanism would provide tangible political outcomes, but rather that, in broad terms, properly instituted, effective institutional mechanisms eventually contribute to capable states, engaged civil societies and improved accountability and transparency at all levels of governance. Based on this perspective, the new institutional analysis used in this paper can bring a new dimension to policy analysis in Africa by proposing how institutional issues in the governance system can affect the efficiency and effectiveness of local institutions in delivering desirable outcomes—good governance.

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Full Length Research

A SPECIAL MOVE IN THE AFRICAN UNION TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE CONTINENT

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The establishment of OAU had not brought significant change in the continent, particularly, in maintaining peace and security. AU, replacing it, could show great effort in establishing mechanisms so as to maintain peace and security. The establishment of APSA, in this regard, could be mentioned as important change at least in showing the special attention given for the peace of the continent. Accordingly, APSA could play some role; however, it has not been as to the expectation. Thus, though AU show a special move in maintaining peace and security as compared to OAU, it is expected to do more to go beyond a mere institutional arrangement.

Key words: African Peace and Security Architecture, African Union, Peace, Security.

INTRODUCTION

African countries suffered worst kind of exploitative colonialism besides the interstate and intrastate conflicts. As a result, pan African movement began abroad and subsequently the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 (Kumar, 2009). African leaders showed strong commitment in joining hands for African liberation, adhering to the principle of 'African solutions for African problems' (Cervenka, 1977; Kumar, 2008). Since some African countries were still under the yoke of colonialism, OAU from its very establishment assumed the task of supporting collective struggles for liberation (Cervenka, 1977; Abubakar, 2008). Accordingly, OAU had played a great role in the liberation of the continent and the development of a common identity and unity in the continent (Hassan, 2006; Siradag, 2012). However, since OAU was pre-occupied with the program of anti-

colonialism, it was found to be inefficient to respond to other challenges encountered, especially in the maintenance of peace and security in the continent. It was incapable of effectively addressing interstate and intrastate conflicts in the continent (Cervenka, 1977; Siradag, 2012).

Moreover, the OAU adhered to the inviolability of the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. For this reason, it could be a silent observer of intrastate conflicts in the continent, leaving aside intrastate conflicts as an exclusive mandate of the concerned governments (Abubakar, 2008; Murithi, 2008; Kumar, 2009; Moller, 2009).

The weakness of OAU and partly the reluctance of international communities to address crisis situations that occurred in Africa urged African leaders to discuss the

establishment of `African Union (AU) in the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on September 9, 1999 (Coning and Kasumba, 2010; Bogland, *et al.*, 2008). Accordingly, AU was established in 2002 in the inaugural meeting held in Durban, South Africa, to deal with the multifaceted nature of problems in the continent. Unlike the OAU, the security concept of AU widened to include democracy, respect of human rights, accountability, good governance and political openness (Bogland, *et al.*, 2008; Solomon, 2011). Member states in the Constitutive Act “determined to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law” in the continent. This shows AU’s dramatic shift of focus from OAU’s state-centric conception to human-centered security as it is devoted to the rights and interests of citizens. It came up with a broad vision for African people to the extent of protecting citizens’ wellbeing within the member states. This is underscored in the introduction of the principle of intervention.

Accordingly, leaders of African states conceded to the AU’s power of intervention to rescue the people from a grave suffering, which is not provided for in UN Charter (Bogland, *et al.*, 2008). In the interest of maintenance of peace and security in the continent, AU introduced the principle of intervention in the domestic affairs of individual countries in the cases of circumstances like genocide and severe violation of human rights. This is stipulated under article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act, being a major departure of AU from its predecessor. AU introduced this principle as a solution for the increasing nature of intrastate conflicts in Africa, which was apparent from the experience in Somalia (1990s), Rwanda (1994), DRC (1998 and 2003), among others.

African Union, which came as a panacea for the weaknesses of the OAU, made achievement of peace and security in Africa the main goal of its activities. This is clear from the preamble of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which was adopted at Lome Summit in 2000 and endorsed in 2002 at Durban meeting. It states that “the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda” (AU, 2000: 3). One can easily deduce from this that highest concern and priority have been given to peace and security issues of the continent as a precondition to realize the other goals of the AU. This is further underlined under Article 3 (h) of the Constitutive Act, which stipulates promoting peace, security, and stability on the continent as the main objective of the AU.

Moreover, cognizant of adverse effects of wars and conflicts in aggravating insecurity, poverty and deterioration of human condition across the continent, AU gives due regard to conflict prevention, management and

resolution (Aning, *et al.*, 2010). The establishment of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) underscores this fact. APSA is one of the most important recent developments in Africa with the role of conflict prevention, management, and resolution (Ganzle and Franke, 2010; Vines, 2013). The whole purpose of APSA is fostering Africa’s capacity in addressing the peace and security challenges of the continent (Brett, 2013). The establishment of this continental architecture reveals the significant emphasis made by AU on the peace and security issues of Africa.

Generally, as can be understood from the above discussion and evident in the following capability areas of APSA, one can draw a conclusion that AU is the most ambitious institution Africa has ever seen as far as peace and security matters are concerned. Besides, one can deduce that, AU has come up with a broad objective in the area of peace and security.

MAIN COMPONENTS OF AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

African Peace and Security Architecture is an overall framework and its aims of peace-building and conflict management are intended to be achieved through the cumulative effort of its interconnected components (Fisher, *et al.*, 2010; Vines, 2013; Coning and Kasumba, 2010). The main components of APSA are the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise and the Special Fund. These components are discussed in the sub-sections herein under.

The Peace and Security Council

African member states adopted *The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (the PSC Protocol) in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, which came into force in December 2003 (Moolakkattu, 2010). Accordingly, the PSC, as the most decisive component of APSA, was established in 2004 to coordinate peace-building efforts in the continent. The PSC was created modeling the UN Security Council although there are some important differences (Kumar, 2009; Adamu, 2008; Brett, 2013). For instance, the PSC has fifteen members, which are elected on the basis of equal rights. However, there are no member states with the right to veto the decision of the PSC and no state is entitled to permanent membership, unlike the UN Security Council system. Ten members are elected for a two year period, while the remaining five are elected for a period of three years representing the five regions, namely North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa

as defined by AU (Brett, 2013).

The establishment of the PSC brought significant emphasis to the restoration of peace and stability in the continent (Kumar, 2009). The PSC is the main mechanism of AU's conflict prevention and management architecture with the support of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (Moolakkattu, 2010). This can also be understood from Article 2 of the PSC Protocol. Accordingly, Article 2 (1) of the PSC Protocol affirms that the PSC is "a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts", which operates as "a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa". Hence, it is the principal decision-making organ of AU on all areas of security matters in the continent. In other words, it is this body, which decides, after analyzing the situation, whether certain action is to be taken so as to prevent, manage, or resolve conflicts. The decisions of the PSC are essentially made on the basis of consensus. If not possible to reach consensus, the PSC will adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters are made by a two-thirds majority vote (Article 13 of the PSC Protocol).

Besides, as a standing decision-making organ, the PSC has the power of legitimizing and coordinating the actions of all the other elements of the architecture, which are supportive agents to its broader function (Vines, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). Thus, the PSC is the prime concerned body with the leading role concerning the security matters of Africa, which is analogous to the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

As the primary responsible body of peace and security in the continent, the PSC has been provided with ambitious and broader functions to carry out on the area. Article 3 of the PSC Protocol stipulates wide ranges of functions of the PSC. These are advancing peace, security, and stability in Africa; predicting and averting conflicts; performing peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities; managing endeavors to avert as well as struggle against international terrorism; developing a continental defense policy; and encouraging democratic practices.

Thus, it is safe to say that the PSC is endowed with a significant power in the process of realizing the purpose of maintaining peace and security in the continent. However, it cannot unilaterally accomplish its purposes; rather it needs other agents to support its work. Accordingly, AU Commission, Panel of the Wise, a CEWS, ASF and a Special Fund are important instruments to support the work of the PSC pursuant to article 2(2) of the PSC Protocol.

To sum up, the creation of the PSC was taken as a historic turning point in the process of building a durable peace and security in Africa. This body made several

discussions over peace and security issues of the member states and authorized peace operations, *inter alia*, in Sudan, Somalia and Comoros (Boutellis and Williams, 2013) (the areas where most tragic scene of conflicts prevail, especially the first two).

African Standby Force

The idea of establishing a Pan-African military force is not a new phenomenon. It goes back to the early 1960s when Kwame Nkrumah proposed the establishment of African High Command for the primary purpose of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of newly independent African states (Girmachew, 2008; Vines, 2013; Biney, 2012). Besides, this force was proposed to intervene in intra-state and inter-state conflicts in Africa (Girmachew, 2008). However, due to suspicion of its impact on states' sovereignty, the proposal was objected (Dier, 2010; Girmachew, 2008; Biney, 2012). The continental military force, thus, was not realized during the age of OAU.

Later, on the emergence of AU by the Constitutive Act of AU, African leaders took common position in the establishment of Africa-wide military force, which seems that they took the brainchild of Nkrumah. Accordingly, African Chiefs of Defense and Security (ACDS) adopted *The policy framework document on the establishment of the African Standby Force and of the Military Staff Committee* (MSC) (the ASF framework) in May 2003 which was approved in July 2004 by African Heads of States (Cilliers and Malan, 2005; Coning and Kasumba, 2010). The establishment of ASF with the aim of providing AU with reliable deployable force is based on the model of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was created to improve the rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping force.

The emergence of ASF follows from the adoption of two historic documents. The first one is the Constitutive Act of AU, which provides AU the right of intervention in member states' crisis situation while the second is the PSC protocol, which recommended the establishment of ASF for the implementation of this right of intervention. Hence, it is the executing wing of the PSC. ASF is a multi-dimensional force - consisting military, police and civilian components - intended to be trained in line with the UN training standards to effectively perform a wide range of functions¹. Taking into consideration of the existing nature of conflict in Africa (Abubakar, 2008), ASF is intended to operate, in performing its functions², in line with the possible incremental ranges of scenarios² within their corresponding prescribed time limit. This is, ASF is assumed to respond to conflicts ranging from scenario 1

¹ See article 13(3) of the PSC Protocol

² See Paragraph 1.6 of the ASF framework

(simple military advise) to scenario 6, which is grave circumstances requiring a robust AU military intervention. To this end, according to the ASF framework and the *roadmap for the operationalization of the ASF*, the capacity development of ASF has intended to develop in two phases. In the first phase (up to 30 June 2005), ASF should develop the capacity to manage scenarios 1 and 2, while regions were anticipated to build standby brigade capable of handling scenario 4. Whereas in the second phase (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010), ASF is expected to manage up to scenario 5, while all regions should develop their capability to a standby brigade level and those that already established the brigade should raise their capability of rapid deployment. The understanding was by June 30, 2010 ASF will achieve its full operational capacity (Williams, 2011). However, the goal was not achieved to the entire extent; the force still may not respond to scenario 5 or 6 to the expected level (*ibid*).

The ASF undertakes its responsibilities in two forms: peace support missions from scenarios 1 to 5 and intervention which is scenario 6 (Batware, 2011; Solomon, 2010). Hence, peace support missions are deployed in the different level of conflicts which fall under scenarios 1-5 with the consent of the host country, whereas deployment in genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes as embraced by scenario 6 does not need the consent or request of the concerned country (Batware, 2011). It is logical not to wait the consent of the hosting country and to deploy within 14 days (the shortest time limit compared to other scenarios) in the case of scenario 6 taking into consideration of the dangers it entails. Nonetheless, having a vigorous troop and adequate logistics to respond to it has been challenging.

African Standby Force is not a single army unit. Rather, it is a combination of standby forces from five regional brigades. It is made up of the pledge of member states or the contribution of sub-regional brigades. Hence, ASF established to comprise five sub-regional standby forces in the Northern, Western, Central, Southern and Eastern part of Africa. Each of the five regions with 3,000 – 4,000 troops with a sixth formation at AU's Headquarters at Addis Ababa for a combined capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers constituted ASF (Neethling, 2005). All these constituting ASF expected to operate under the direction of a proper mandating authority. However, ASF is not still well equipped to serve its purpose.

Continental Early Warning System

Continental Early Warning System was established within article 12 of the PSC Protocol of 2002 as one important pillar of APSA so as "to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts". CEWS is an intelligence gathering and analysis mechanism that provides latest information on potential, actual and post conflict

situations to the AU decision-making organs and operational arms (Brett, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). Hence, it is important primarily for conflict prevention as it attempts to discover and informs timely the potentially serious threats to the Chairperson of the Commission, who, in turn, advises the PSC.

The PSC Protocol requires CEWS to consist observation and monitoring centre (the Situation Room) located at the AU's Conflict Management Directorate and five regional observations and monitoring units, which are linked with the situation room. The situation room is assumed to be in a constant communication with the regional early warning centers to get information on the regional situations. In this regard, a good progress was achieved after the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding, which strengthened the collaborative work of CEWS and regional early warning mechanisms (IPI, 2012).

The CEWS gathers security information from a variety of sources. It collects data from independent media, the AU's Liaison Offices and Field Missions situated in crisis areas, and from the sub-regional organizations (Vines, 2013; Brett, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). As stated in Article 12 (5) of the PSC Protocol, the data gathered from such sources will be used by the Chairperson of the Commission of AU to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and suggests appropriate responses to be taken. The information will have paramount importance in guiding the decisions of the PSC and directing the subsequent deployment of the ASF (Vines, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). However, this system is not without challenge. Lack of capacity of both AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) limits the full operationalization of the system (Kimathi, 2011; IPI, 2012).

The Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise consists of individuals who have a highly dignified personality. The Panel of the wise is one mechanism of the AU in the process of ensuring peace through the effort of well known African personalities. The Panel of the Wise is composed of five individuals representing the five regions of the continent, which are nominated by the Chairperson of the Commission and appointed by the Assembly for the term of three years with the expressed purpose of supporting the PSC to prevent conflict. As per article 11 (3) of the PSC Protocol, the Panel of the Wise is mandated to "advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa" (the PSC protocol: 16). It holds politically autonomous individuals assigned to advise the PSC and provide AU's initial response to crisis situations in the form of personal

mediation (Ganzle and Franke, 2010; IPI, 2012). They are supposed to perform actions pertinent to the prevention of conflict. As the *Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise*, adopted by the PSC on November 12, 2007, reveals the Panel of the Wise is mandated to carry out fact-finding missions as a means for conflict prevention. Thus, like CEWS it has the role of conflict prevention.

Moolakkattu (2010) noted Kofi Annan's mediation in Kenyan election crisis of 2007, Joachim Chissano's participation in Northern Uganda crisis, Thabo Mbeki participation in Zimbabwe's electoral tension as practical examples of wise men method of addressing crisis situations. This approach is applicable through employing the wisdom of the elderly and experienced personalities in addressing conflicting situations and maintaining peace and security (*ibid*). However, there is still a need to make the Panel of Wise more active, flexible and expeditious to serve its purpose effectively (IPI, 2012).

The Peace Fund

The Peace fund is associated with provision of financial budget for the purpose of undertaking different missions and operations in maintaining peace and security in Africa. Moreover, the objective of peace fund is designed to strengthening Africa financially to solve its problems by its own, promoting African unity and African overall development (Golaszinski, 2004). As illustrated in article 21 (2) of the PSC Protocol, the sources of peace fund may be AU's budget, the contribution of member states as well as other private sources in Africa.

Besides, the fund also comes from outside Africa. As per article 21 (3) of the PSC Protocol, "the Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the AU". As a solution to financial constraints, African leaders adopted a resolution at the African Union Summit in Maputo in July 2003, requesting the European Union to establish a Peace Facility from funds allocated to their countries under the existing cooperation agreements with the EU (Golaszinski, 2004). Accordingly, the European Council has taken positive step to promote African peacekeeping operations. Thus, the peace fund is a financial support of all activities in the area of peace and security. However, it is not sufficient enough to support AU's peace support operations financially.

In a nutshell, the whole purpose of all the aforementioned components under the umbrella of the APSA is to maintain peace and security in the continent and shows the significant focus made on the security policy of the continent. Components are characterized by uneven development; some components are relatively better developed (PSC, CEWS and the Panel of the

Wise) than the others (ASF and the Peace Fund) (Brett, 2013). Nonetheless, APSA as a whole has played a role in the reduction of conflict in the continent through its peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building and conflict transformation efforts (Addo, 2011). It has been responding to several crisis situations notably Mali (2012/2013), Darfur, Somalia, Northern Uganda, eastern DRC, Guinea-Bissau and South Sudan (Brett, 2013).

Needless to say, however, AU still has a number of shortcomings. AU requires a wider range of capabilities, beyond the above discussed APSA capability areas, to effectively address Africa's diverse peace and security challenges, *inter alia*, security sector reform, counter terrorism and maritime security (*ibid*). APSA's progress in these areas is negligible and it needs external support as well as partnership to effectively address those issues (*ibid*). AU is yet on the way of building up its capabilities in responding to crises; hence, it is confronted with multiple challenges. Thus, despite its ambitious plan and some practical contribution in the area, there are challenges ahead like coordination and capacity problem. Lack of commitment and political will of member states in terms of providing personnel, material and financial support could be mentioned as great challenges to the realization of AU's intended objectives.

CONCLUSIONS

Africa had experienced intrastate and interstate conflicts. It had faced serious insecurity and instabilities. Though OAU was established at the time, it was not in a position to address the issue and instabilities remained intact. Later, AU replaced OAU and placed the peace and security of the continent at the center of its main agendas. AU has laid down the framework of APSA. APSA consists of components mainly PSC, ASF, CEWS, The Panel of the Wise, and the Peace Fund. The whole purpose of these components of APSA is maintaining peace and security in the continent. Accordingly, they contributed some part in the continent. However, it is clear that great effort is yet needed to improve such components thereby to meet the ultimate objective of AU. Africa is not yet free from conflicts, especially, interstate conflicts. The strong commitment and political will of member states would have paramount importance in better achieving the AU's objective of maintaining peace and security in the continent.

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Full Length Research

The Panorama of Human Rights Violations in South Asia: A critical study

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The emergence of human rights thrust toward live on the better way with full fledged independence from the phlegmatic culture to praiseworthy culture is a hard discovery of our ancient ancestor discretion from the situation of sorrow, poverty ,famine , land lord domination , aristocracy suppressive rule and dominant class people atrocities and iron control over on the poor community people .This kinds of hard labored discoveries of our ancestors have given us a good governance ,good political democratic setup and education to enjoy natural resources as common as equal without disequilibrium as respecting human rights and values in mutual ways .The chief aim of human rights which was given by the god is to make prevail ubiquitously for the better life of all weak and non weak people .But ,unfortunately that was not made known to poor people except knowing some claver dominant community people in overall the world for exploit their natural resource , labor ,keep them slavery without freedom for the benefit and luxury life of upper caste community people .This upper people injustice attitude over on the poor people have been caused a great injuries at the heart of poor people and revolution in the world against those upper cast people who were hiding out the natural rights of weak people .

Key words: Human rights violation by war, Hindu caste system, Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

It seems very difficult to undergo the god given natural rights in day today life, which is not presented even not now but it is being practiced since emergence of world administration to up to now because of various reason of politics, social setup and people ruinous attitude over on the weak community in every village and cities of south Asian regions. Human rights are violated and disrespected based on the reason of war, ethnic conflict, resurgence, revolutions and terrorism. During these time human infrastructure , culture identity and occupations are violated without well plan to execute war on wanted person and not knowing the way to deal ethnic conflict

and non peace loving habits among the power holding people leads to violate their rights by others and sometime their attitude will violate their rights because of blind actions without thinking to take a good action toward solving day today social problems .So ,today scenario of world politics is running on the basis of power expanding rather than love expanding, it should rule the world politics to add values to existing human rights with basic protections to humanity with all facility through the good goal oriented rule rather than applying coercive policy to solve and attain the international political gain or power. Because, human rights are gift of god on which

god is traveling seeing whether people are being well or bad through constitutional authority and if so, government is doing good for humanity and if not, it will be considered as unfit government to people life. Indeed, that leads to change the government though people are being as ruler of their fate because, the government should provide security to them to keep afresh their fate through the using their rights for access government scheme. No way government should not be as disturber either directly or indirectly on people life while punishing one culprit or mass culprits with wise decision because people life and rights are considered as non renewable (Alston, 1988; Amarnathewary, 2014; Cuddlore, 2014; Bajwa, 1999; George, 2007; Ray, 2003; Indian Human rights, 2004-2010; Shashi, 2008; Baxi, 1987).

Impact of terrorism on human rights

Since Afghanistan is invaded by the Mongols, Persians, Russia, Britain and America, its people are not living with pleasure except panic of gun, aerial bomb, and armed fighters threatening that let them to deprive the basic human rights with fear of rebellions, armed forces and insecurity. Indeed, past three decade the continuous war has been going on Afghanistan since it is being as attractive centre place of south Asia, central Asia and west Asia having huge resources. For which, it has been becoming as a great victim at the hands of super power but the afghans resistance against aliens has been being as a major factor as a stop wall of yet to prevent forthcoming invasions and foreign disturbances. Terrorism, ethnic conflict and civil war in Afghanistan have been engulfed number of humans life from children to adult due to panic full situation and chance less situation to think to escape. Though Islam people feel their fight is holy fight against aliens rule but they don't bother about losing their life very soon without seeing this world beauty and whose emotions are instigated by the Pakistan to ward revenge the innocent country in South Asia. But it is a bad reflection goes to Afghanistan that it is a terrorism sponsoring country. Therefore, Afghanistan death toll has been estimated up to 30000 thousand people because of war and terrorism. So, countries of super power should follow a strict code of executing war to punish concern person rather than mass understanding human rights are inevitable than any other thinks

Pakistan Seduced terrorism in Kashmir

Since partition of Pakistan from India its continuous infiltration attacks and direct terrorism attacks have been relentless for revenge India in various ways though India has made so many agreement regarding to ceasefire and

loving voluntarily to establish Peace in the south Asia region. Therefore, the brotherhood relations of both countries have been being meeting low intensity love and mutual relation on account of Pakistan partisan feelings and interest to become south Asia regional dominant player. For which, it has been inducing terrorism weapons through the Islamic holy war cadre who are drawn from the various Islamic republic's for stop and sterilize India's total economic growth in heinous ways but as to this India has never opted a angry approach with Pakistan though it was being as continuous victims of all attacks of Pakistan initiated and supported. Because, India wants to maintain a good relations with Pakistan for the integrity of south Asia though Pakistan does not like it rather than like continuous contumacious attitude.

Therefore, the continuous revenging terrorism attacks, inflicts more damages on India's sovereignty and that kills directly the innocent people who are residing across the line of control (LIC) and makes them to be with fear and sleepless through their direct seen of Pakistan attacks in day light and night. which perpetuates them to be at unending panic of ambush attacks. Indeed on account of both country administration conflict and power mania interest leads to kill the innocent people who are living with ten feet land, petty shop, street vendor, labors and sweepers rather than people who have been residing at bungalow, landlords and money Lender. Therefore, respecting human values Pakistan should give-up its either direct attacks or indirect attacks on normal people respecting their human rights for the let them to enjoy a normal civics pleasure without terrorism worries within their 40 year low life expectancy.

Impact of Sri Lanka genocide war on human Rights

Tamil people migrated to Sri Lanka for search livelihood in Tea and Coffee estates based on the indenture labor without a permanent legal protection. They settled there in a particular geographic area through establishing cloth or plastic made camp. Gradually their profession had become standard in same geographic areas as not able to come back to Tamilnadu because they generated so many populations as equal to one Tamilnadu state. Their demands were regards to separate Tamil region with constitutional provisions from the Sinhalese since they meet so many incompatibility with them (Bakshi, 2008; Jalbert, 2000; Poonam, 2012; Shashi, 2008). To suppress Tamil people demands and slogans Sri Lanka government got involved to destroy the Tamil people who worked for the their country development and eradicate poverty, famine and increase wealth are considered as an international injustice of unpardonable crime. Therefore, this genocide war let to make people as never before seen or think about human rights violation in the

pitiful way of raping without dress ,killing alive organ wise, torture killed, killed telling their previous attitude against the Sri Lanka were uncouth as challenges to international Human rights Commissions and court (Ezhilarasan, 2014). This both system should have been hanged themselves as marks of their purposeful silence toward execution of indiscrete ,ignominious ,and barbarian culture over on killing of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Indeed in the world history the Sri Lanka war would be one of the war of parents killing their son and daughter in full committed fanatic and rancorous way and merciless while they scream fearing to die and that was broadcasted and uploaded in networks have been caused unforgivable human rights violations angry from the world people toward punish the culprit and cutthroat of Sri Lanka government.

Impacts of India's Hindu cultures on Human Rights Violations

India has been viewed by the world people that it is a democratic setup and secular political system where all category people would have been as equal as parity in terms of politics, socio and economic. But reversely its government organs, systems and functionaries are making India to shine externally for the appreciation of world people beside letting its constitutional systems to rule over the people in a coercive way ,creating discontentment society and preserving ruler community at the peak of comfortable life without worry of rest of people .For the global sight India is a democratic country but internally it is a aristocracy political setup to be selecting ruler from the money holder ,wealth accumulator and business man to rule all weak people for the profitable life of them and relatives .The status of rest of people in India's social systems is being as a slavery under the ruling community expecting 100 rupees for per day at their lands ,farmhouse and garden without a standard life and quality education .This all India's Hindus ideology are well plan of upper caste people for the luxuries travel of them over on the weak people sweat and labor .This kinds of difficult nobody knows from the outside of India and nothing would happen even victim say the true status of India's covert aristocracy policy toward suppress the marginalized people, because power holder to power holder have never worried about the other people. The reason to which is their power is sustained on the death and torture of the poor people. Ruler sitting at the esteemed seat of power is not guarantee to the security and safety of poor people across the India's villages but it is possible by means of implementing a stringent law and law follower with inescapable punishment over on who disturb and want to debilitate the vulnerable people in India. Most of the atrocities cases over on marginalized people are booked

on the upper caste people who are doing very bravely all crime since their people being as a continuous ruler as well as officers in police department and judiciary (Shoba, 2012; Travidamani, 2013; Sri Lanka, 1999).

Relevance of Hindu culture to protect vulnerable community

As everybody know apparently that Hindu culture setup of India, is no way useful to vulnerable and marginalized community developments except being as suitable for upper caste people developments in Politics and socio-economic sphere from time to time. Because the Hindu system have created a massive aversion and hating feelings among the village people on account of facing daily torture, financial problems, low income status and not able become live as per their needs because of this prevailing reason. This reason has been being as an ineradicable from long back, that makes marginalized people to be committing suicide since Hindu system allotted more lands to other upper caste people and gave better life on socio and economic fields. Therefore, this system is largely harboring toward upper people life success and benefits inflicting more pain on low class people.

Lack of income creates arrack habits among the vulnerable community

This is an ubiquitous picture of democracy beauty that establishing Arrack shop and liquor shop very close to marginalized and vulnerable residing villages to attract them knowingly that they are hard workers to do the works of upper people at their land ,farmhouse, relative house ,garden ,and other so many works which belongs undignified works . Indeed in order to relive them from the unsayable and intolerable pain they are used to have low standard arracks without vitamin contained food that causes tuberculosis, coughing, losing bones and meet premature death due to government establishing liquor shops adjacent to poor people for the profit of upper people costly life style through the suppressing ,killing and exploiting this vulnerable people .Indeed ,there are increasing so many widows in marginalized community not able to maintain and bring up children in honesty way rather than dishonest way due to arrack habits that prevails among the vulnerable male community people .Consequence of government established arracks shops adjacent to poor people villages which ruins their life and wife in below following ways:

- ❖ Husband death makes wife to be destitute and hopeless
- ❖ Husband death makes other people to give

sexual torture, symbols and causes disrespect to his wife

- ❖ Husband death causes on wife to be at endless sorrow until lifelong and considered as one wing bird as unable to fly.

- ❖ Society looks sarcastically on widows in respect of lack of income, family status, low standard children bring up and lots of husband support.

- ❖ Finally all widows of vulnerable community have been facing so many problems from either same caste people or upper caste people in the pattern of socio, economic and political needs.

- ❖ Therefore, government is ruled by the upper caste people community whose interest is largely to establish arrack shop around near to vulnerable community with interest to destroy poor people human resources to make large-scale widows for fulfill their sexual desire when widows are engaged at work at their land and on other hand, they wanted to keep them always political, economic slave without freedom.

Impact of love on India's soil

Really it is a widely ignominious and ridicule flash news of Upper people showing coercive attitude toward separate and distinguish a common sense and feelings of love as to make add value to their caste and thinking to prevent their daughter and son want to love lower caste people as naturally as innate sentiments irrespective of money, wealth, caste, and color. India is one of the country In the world maintaining silence to ward killing of weak people by upper people regarding poor people love on upper people community and It is one of the top most country in conducting politics successively based on the caste and religion toward not take an action about continuous destroying poor people young community and elder people on account of inter-caste love and marriage due to caste fanatic and religious ideology development and to keep this people as slavery to wash toilets ,clean cattle's garage and other so many works of elite people .Therefore ,love is not coming on upper caste people young hearts and lower caste people young hearts based on the economic expectation and to destroy each one community rather than it comes based on the heart ,pure feelings ,and mark less thought toward live each one each other as happily as lifelong irrespective of caste , color and community feelings .So love makes a unified and secular India ,its feelings should be respected and guarded by the government rather than allow politicians to play politics in poor people destiny for sustain and capture power by killing marginalized people and instigating caste fights in the villages.

Impact of Caste terrorism in India

In western countries terrorism is being as a major threat to their normal life with sporadic panic as not able to move outside but in India no external terrorism and infiltration against any caste except Indian Hindu system is getting destroying in merciless way same Hindu weak and non-economic people with permission of ruling upper caste people for the proud of their caste and develop caste ideology .Therefore ,In day today life the vulnerable people could not able to walk and speak bravely in nook and corner of India's villages because upper caste people controlling attitude to prevent weak people developments with aim to keep them at customary slavery position for to do whatever they like .Therefore ,once upon time politics were conducted based on the different angle for the country development but now days politics are conducted by the ruler toward splitting people feelings on caste based for capture power as there is any other way to conduct politics based on the ethics to do service for people .In this political game most of poor people have been becoming as a victim of upper caste people socio –economic and political advancement atrocities .Below following incident took place in Tamilnadu as result of upper people attempt to attenuate lower caste people life such as :

- ❖ In Tamilnadu in Vadukku Mangkudi village of Chidambaram town of Cuddlore district town the upper caste people and land holding community manhandled Dalit people entering forcefully in their residence and tortured them to not let them into village on account of upper caste people forced them to cast their vote for upper people candidate.

- ❖ In the same Chidambaram town cities in Annamalai nagar two Dalit brothers in a family were assaulted in a brutal manner during night time at 2 .AM by the upper people on account of intolerance over the Dalit community socio and economic development.

- ❖ In Tamilnadu in Dhrmapuri district a whole villages were set fired and conducted large attacks on Dalit people by the other community caste fervor functionaries on account of indigestible of Dalit socio –economic and political developments.

- ❖ In India in Maharashtra district four families were murdered as 40 piece for a Dalit boy did love over upper girl and a temple was washed in Bihar for Chief minister got entered into the temple on account of chief minister is Dalit as well as to maintain untouchabilities (Chandan, 2014).

- ❖ Like this daily Human rights violations, killings, and carving knife culture increasing are being so famous

in India's Hindu systems in South Asia sub continent as never before happen with the interest to suppress the lower people identity by the upper cast people.

Therefore, these news were brought to light with the help of mass media but still there are lot of issues are going on about cast untuchabilities and honor killings over on Lower caste people which are not able to make avail to public knowledge because of conducting it in baseless way and without news and evidence by other community people in India.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

India is so famous in either democracy or Hindu culture setup instead of being so famous in protecting people life and fulfilling people civics needs without distinguish between people through a parity approach because people do need life with education, employable situation, civics protection, resources according to population and unified secular society rather than get worries about types of government. Indeed, India's government structure have been just like as name sack which seems highly it to higher caste people life advancement from PM to V.A.O since birth of this world . The status, situations and expectations of rest of people have been dedicating to ruling and economic class people luxuries life through working at industries, as meason, plumber, upper people land, and pump set operator, land overseer, sweeper, and cattle manager by ending their life very soon through the liquor, arracks and poor nutrition food. This habits starts after 6 PM at arracks shops in each and every village of poor people for relief from the heavy work pain which they did for the upper people life progress with low salary that is 100 rupees per day. It is considered a great human rights violations of poor people and seen as an ineradicable disease of our India democracy because of ruling people resistance to eradicate all these social maladies for make an eyewash policies and politics regarding to poverty alleviation, human right violations and get rid of caste violence with intention to violate more, create more poverty, increase caste violence for sustain their power and exploit the poor people money. Therefore, today or past government were conducted only on the sweat and death of poor people, "so benefited community from the government are considered as more who are known as ruling and economic classes as per their low population size whereas died community who were expecting government benefits are considered as more as per their more population size who are known as weak and marginalized people."

RECOMMENDATION

Protection and preservation of human rights are only

possible and would be effective when politicians starts to behave and conduct politics on ethics way and make avail of socio and economic benefits without partial at the hands of poor people. Because of more economic possessing people are getting involved in killing of poor people, human rights violation and political violation without fear to police and judiciary based on the courage of accumulated wealth. Therefore, government should allot lands and employment to opportunities to develop poor people life development, economic development and protect themselves from the attacks and threaten of upper caste people since government is failed to protect them.

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Full Length Research

Why did the United States lead an invasion of Iraq in 2003?

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In the years since the invasion, there have been substantial disagreements among scholars regarding the explanations of why the United States invaded Iraq. Nonetheless, it is clear in the decision to declare war against Iraq was multifaceted and included political, economic, ideological, and strategic motives. This article will take into account the various reasons for the invasion of Iraq by U.S. military forces. This analysis of this study is derived from the hegemonic stability theory in the international relations which is based on a combination of power and consent. This study concludes that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was influenced by both declared and undeclared reasons, however, the undeclared causes such as ending the threat to Israel, oil interests, dominance in the Middle East and unfinished First Gulf War may be described as the main and primary reasons for deciding to go to war.

Keywords: Iraq, US foreign policy, George w. bush, hegemonic stability theory, neoconservatives, war and military intervention.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial actions of American military intervention was the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 (Lynch and Singh 2008, p.148). The U.S. decision to use force to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power was motivated by a variety of reasons, and from a number of perspectives (Duffield 2005). In the years since the invasion, there have been substantial disagreements among scholars regarding the explanations of why the United States invaded Iraq. Nonetheless, it is clear in the decision to declare war against Iraq was multifaceted and included political, economic, ideological, and strategic motives. This essay will take into account the various reasons for the invasion of Iraq by U.S. military forces. While this study argues that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was influenced by both declared and undeclared reasons, the latter may be described as the main and primary reasons for deciding to go to war. In term of theoretical aspect, the invasion of Iraq is a good case for testing the hegemonic theory in

the US foreign policy making during the Bush administration.

The argument will be structured around five main sections. Section One of these studies will examine the reasons given for the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and begins by examining the evaluation of the evidence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Secondly, the argument will focus on the sponsoring of terrorism by the Iraqi regime, which was one of the justifications for U.S. military intervention. Thirdly, the ideas of liberation and the promotion of democracy will be considered. Section Two will examine the threat to Israel as a motivation for the invasion of Iraq, and Section Three will present a discussion of the role of oil interests in the removal of the Iraqi regime. Thereafter, Section Four will consider the impact of power and U.S. supremacy in the Middle East as part of a global

hegemony. Finally, Section Five will explore the role the First Gulf War played in the decision to declare war, before a conclusion is provided.

Pronounced Reasons

Before beginning the war, in 2002, Condoleezza Rice's staff prepared the rationale for war in a paper entitled, 'Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime'. This paper provided a range of main reasons for the invasion of Iraq following the CIA assessment that Saddam Hussein had WMD: firstly, Iraq's WMD capability; secondly, its support for terrorism; thirdly, threats to its neighbours, and finally, its tyrannical nature (Feith, 2008: p.304). In a similar fashion, President George W. Bush announced that America's purpose in declaring war on Iraq was clear, and was characterised by three main reasons, including destroying their "weapons of mass destruction", to end Saddam's support of terrorism and the freedom of the Iraqi people (Cramer and Thrall, 2011: p.1). This section contends show the Bush administration created a case against Saddam Hussein. Therefore, this section will examine the three pronounced reasons for the war on Iraq.

"Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMDs)

The first part of this examination of the analysis of the U.S. attacks on Iraq is the statement that Iraq possessed WMDs. Before the war, the central dominant argument of the U.S. administration was centered on their belief in the possession and development of WMD by the Iraqi regime (Schmidt and Williams, 2008). This reason was identified as a core reason for the invasion of the Iraq by the Bush administration (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: p.156). The U.S. estimation was depended on an interpretation of the intelligence assessment that Iraq possessed WMD (Enemark and Michaelsen, 2005: p.548). Additionally, U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in the Security Council, provided evidence to show that Iraq was successively developing WMD programmes. Similarly, former Vice President of the United States, Dick Cheney, confirmed that "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us" (Cheney 2002).

In terms of WMD, neoconservatives had a significant role to play in the making of the decision to go to war, which had been advocating this case since the end of the First Gulf War (Halper and Clarke, 2004: p.202). As pointed out by Wolfowitz in 2003, "for bureaucratic reasons, the administration had to settle on weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on" (cited in Halper and Clarke 2004, p.202). The United States argued that the Iraqi

regime would use chemical weapons against the United States (Miller 2008, p.45). This was because Saddam Hussein had used chemical and biological weapon against the Kurdish people in northern Iraq in 1988 and against the Iranian people during the Iraq-Iran War. Following this line of argument, Bush pointed out that "Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons, against his own people. I do not want him in a position to use chemical agents again" (cited in Fisher 2003, p.391).

However, realist assumption rejected the assessment that the neoconservatives and the Bush administration, had made, with regard to the possession of chemical weapons by Iraqi regime (Schmidt and Williams, 2008: p. 208). In this regard, Mearsheimer and Walt strongly disagreed with the explanation of the neoconservatives and Bush's assessment that the Iraqi regime would use chemical weapons against the United States, also arguing that had used chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iranians, people who were completely different; because they could not "retaliate in kind" (2003). Therefore, Mearsheimer and Walt argued that "this sample logic explains why Saddam Hussein did not use WMD against U.S. during the Gulf War and has not fired chemical or biological warheads at Israel" (2003, p.55).

Contrary to expectations, in the aftermath of the war, finding certain evidence of Iraq's WMD failed, and the intelligence was not precise before going to War (Enemark and Michaelsen 2005, p.548). After the 1991 war, UN weapon's inspectors tried to dismantle Iraq's nuclear programme; therefore, it was difficult to find evidence of the possession of WMD. In this context, Hussein Kamil, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and head of Iraq's biological weapons program until his defection in 1995, arguing that Iraq secretly destroyed its WMD in the early 1990s (Kristof, 2003). Despite what many American policy makers believed, it may not be possible to find an effective point on this issue. While Iraq did not have any active and expanding WMD programs, there is a strong possibility that United States was created as a key justification for the invasion of Iraq.

Sponsoring terrorism

One of the most important factors in the justification for invading Iraq was the terrorism threat posed by Saddam Hussein. For the Bush administration, the invasion of Iraq was presented as an extension of the war on terror. The terrorist attacks of 11 September led to a paradigm shift and thus emerged a new phase in U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy. In the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11th, many U.S. policy makers called for the invasion of Iraq (Dumbrell, 2005: p.34). For instance, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld advocated using military forces against Saddam Hussein (Lieberfeld, 2005: p. 24). Cramer and Thrall argue that "the events of

9/11 provided a window of opportunity for the administration to do something they already wanted to do" (2011, p.17). Therefore, the Bush administration declared the use of military power; first, against Afghanistan and then against Iraq in reaction to the September 11th attacks (Galbraith 2007, p.5). From the standpoint of U.S., Saddam Hussein would have been supportive of international terrorism. As Bush stated, that Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda "work in concert" and that the Iraqi regime "has longstanding and continuing ties to terrorist organizations, and there are Al-Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq" (cited in Fisher 2003, p.399). The U.S. administration clearly tried to create a link between Iraqi regime and terrorism in order to give a persuasive reason.

Furthermore, Bush administrators and American decision makers acknowledged that there were widespread ties between the Iraqi regime and Osama Bin Laden. By way of illustration, Cheney said that evidence of a relationship between them was "overwhelming and had long-established ties with al Qaeda" (Pimcus and Milbank, 2004). The U.S. administration confirmed there was clear evidence for a relationship between the Iraqi regime and Al-Qaeda was Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and his links to Ansar-al- Islam, a terrorist organization effective in the northern Kurdish areas (Halper and Clarke, 2004, p.212). Consequently, Bush suggested that "We must strike because Iraq and Al Qaeda are connected, and Saddam has arsenals of weapons of mass destruction that he could make available to terrorist groups" (quoted in Phillips 2004, p.311).

However, the evidence in the case of terrorism does not support the U.S. decision makers. Despite the existence of Al-Qaeda activities in the northern part of Iraq, Senator Joseph Biden discussed the fact that reliable evidence had not been presented about the relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Fisher 2003, p.399). The evidence presented here suggests that the main point behind the established connection between Saddam and Al-Qaeda was the use of raw intelligence, in order to produce a public case for the war (Pillar 2006, p.20). Pillar argues that this misunderstanding about the alliance between Saddam and Al-Qaeda goes back to an intelligence policy analysis that was misused publicly to justify decisions (2006). Although, according to commission staff, it was reported that the "collaborative relationship" between Iraq and Al-Qaeda had not been found, it was possible that there was contact between each of them (Pimcus and Milbank, 2004). Overall, one of the more significant findings to emerge from this part is that the events of 9/11 provided a persuasive public opinion to military action in Iraq.

Liberation and the promotion of democracy

The United States announced that liberation was one of

the main reasons for war on Iraq. According to American policy makers, the Iraq war was entitled to be seen as a process of liberty, rather than invasion because Saddam's regime was described as one of the world's evil dictatorships. The U.S. administration and allied coalition military intervention began what was known in the United States as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The liberation and promotion of democracy had a significant role in the changing of the Iraqi regime (Global Security2005). In this regard, President Bush made his ambitions regarding freedom in speech in which he stated, "I believe the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world. And I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom"(quoted in Woodward 2004, p.88). As such, Bush has made it clear that the "American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger"(Bush 2003a).

The promotion of democracy during different periods has been the attention of U.S. policy makers. Since the time of President Woodrow Wilson, promoting democracy abroad has been one the main aims of U.S. foreign policy (Dalacoura2005, p.963). In particular, in the aftermath of September 11th, the promotion of democracy has become a key principle of U.S. administration in the Middle East (Dalacoura2005, p.963). Therefore, the U.S. administration was called to change the Iraqi regime to spread democracy and freedom. In this way, some support of liberal theory for the invasion, which Lieberfeld proposes, is that "decision makers were genuinely motivated by liberal goals" (2005, p.7).

In addition, the neoconservative ideology was providing the theoretical and policy content of the American foreign policy of the Bush administration (Schmidt and Williams 2008, p.194). For this reason, promoting democracy was a significant element of neoconservative which suggested that "the spread of liberal democracy improves U.S. security" (Dalacoura2005, p.974). Thus, many foreign policy analysts argue that the spread of liberal values and democratic institutions abroad are important for the United States, in both terms of economics and security. An example of this is a study carried out by Charles Krauthammer, who asserted that "with the decline of communism, the advancement of democracy should become the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy" (Schmidt and Williams 2008, p. 200). According to neoconservatives, the first step in the democratizing the Middle East was required to change Saddam Hussein regime (FoongKhong2008, p.258). It could be argued that Bush administration did hold some neoconservative perspective on the liberation and promotion of democracy

The liberation and promotion of democracy were articulated by the U.S as a vital reason for removing dictator, Saddam Hussein (Schmidt and Williams 2008, p. 200). For instance, in President Bush's 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, arguing that

"Iraqi democracy will succeed and that success will send forth news, from Damascus to Tehran- that freedom can be the future of every nation" (cited in Schmidt and Williams 2008, p.200). The American power was identified as representing a force for democratization and freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein. Hence, the U.S. effort in making the liberation process one reason for the invasion of Iraq was provided for the coalition and one that persuaded public opinion.

Ending the threat to Israel

The unique alliance and partnership formed between the United States and Israel to counter the developing strategic threats in the Middle East provided benefits for both parties (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: p.32). The security of Israel was of the utmost importance to the United States, which has supported the former since the 1990s as a result of the threat both countries feel from terrorist groups originating in the Arab or Muslim world and other rogue states (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: p.32). Thus, for Bush's administration, concerns about the security of Israel were paramount the decision-making process.

Despite the different reasons for the war on Iraq, it can be argued that the desire to make Israel more secure was perceived by the United States as a vital motive for the invasion of Iraq. This has been clearly illustrated by Philip Zelikow, a member of the Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, who asserted that the real threat from Iraq was not a threat to the United States, but a threat against Israel. As such, Zelikow has made it clear that the primary reason for the invasion of Iraq was to remove the threat to Israel (Mekay, 2004). American policy makers argue that Saddam Hussein remained a threat to the security of Israel in the Middle East, which was of key importance for the United States, as they are significant allies, who share strategic interests in the Middle East. Furthermore, Israel was supportive of the United States in the war on terror (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006). According to realist assumption, a secondary purpose for the targeting of Iraq would be to increase the security of Israel, the main regional ally of the United States (Lieberfeld, 2005: p.4).

According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2006), since the Second World War, the United States has provided economic, military and diplomatic support to aid Israel. In this respect, some notable neoconservative advisers, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perl had a successful "Israel Lobby" to change the Iraqi regime during the Bush administration.

The strategic position of Israel in the Middle East has been of significant importance for the neoconservatives. Thus, the security of Israel was a highly important motive, and it played a significant role in the administration's

decision to go to war with Iraq (Cramer and Thrall, 2011: p. 1). It is clear that the neoconservatives were predominantly concerned about the Iraqi threat to Israel, with Wolfowitz calling for the attack on Iraq before Afghanistan, even though there was no evidence of relations between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, this suggestion was rejected by Bush (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, p.55). It can be concluded that the security of Israel played an important role the decision to go toward in Iraq.

Oil interests

The relationship between oil and military power returned in the early years of the twentieth century (Klare, 2004: p.148), in this respect, the U.S. interest in oil and energy resources is not a new subject. By way of illustration, Sherle Schwenniger shows that the "American policy has been driven by two at times incompatible goals: the support of Israel and indirect control over the world's oil markets for more than three decades" (cited in Hinnebusch, 2007: p.216). In order to understand the real reason behind the war on Iraq, it is important to highlight the role of oil interests. In this section, this study evaluates and examines the possibility that oil was a major factor in the decision to declare war against Iraq.

Many scholars hold the view that, a key driver of the war and the core reason behind the invasion of Iraq was U.S. desire to control Iraq's oil reserves in order to secure future energy supplies (Hinnebusch, 2007: p.212). Gaining control of Iraq's oil was necessary so that the United States could become less dependent than European and East Asian countries on Persian Gulf oil (Zunes, 2006: p.29), and there is no doubt that the U.S. hegemony depends on oil and energy resources. As Simon Bromely illustrates, since the Second World War, the key pillar of U.S. hegemony has been dominated by U.S. companies and their control of the world's oil resources concentrated in the Middle East. Oil has also been essential in the provision of military power (Hinnebusch, 2007: p.212). In addition, Smith has argued that the Iraq war can be seen as part of a significant effort to control regional oil supplies in the Middle East (2005).

Moreover, in his work entitled "Blood Oil" Klare concludes that, for Bush, the top foreign policy priority was not terrorism or the need to control the spread WMDs, but rather to increase the energy sources from external suppliers to markets in the United States (2004). Recent cases reported by Phillips (2004, p.330) also support the hypothesis that, since the 1990s, oil supplies have become integral to U.S. concerns in the Middle East. In this way, the United States tried to find reliable energy resources in order to lessen its dependence upon Saudi Arabia, which can be unreliable and lacks stability in the long run (Cramer and Thrall 2011, p.11). By contrast, some analysts have opposed the oil hypothesis and explanation as a central reason for

the invasion of Iraq. For example, Cramer and Duggan argue that the cost of an invasion would be greater than the economic benefits of any such action (2011, p.228).

However, the evidence presented thus supports the idea that the oil interest was widespread and played a role in the assessment of an explanation for the removal of the Iraqi regime. The control of Iraqi oil provides considerable future geopolitical leverage for the United States (Smith 2005, p.184). Therefore, Kathryn Talentino argues that, 'for many, oil rather than principle seemed most relevant in the U.S. approach to Iraq' (2004, p.323). Although, oil justification has been absent among members of the Bush administration (Duffield 2005, p.109), one key driver of the Iraq war was controlling oil interests and energy sources. In short, oil is a central and major concern in any war in the Middle East. While it is widely recognised that it was not long after U.S. forces overthrew the Iraqi regime that the priority of oil as a real motive became apparent (Zunes, 2009: p.101), oil was not only the relevant reason for the invasion of Iraq.

Power and U.S. hegemony in the Middle East: Transforming a region

In order to understand why the Bush administration led the attack on Iraq, it is necessary to shift the focus from security threats against the United States to its strategic position in the Middle East. The Bush doctrine began with the assumption that the United States was at the time the only superpower in the world and one which attempted to preserve its hegemonic position for the indefinite future. As Robert Jervis argues, empire was the main element of the Bush administration (cited in Schmidt and Williams 2008, p.195). Hence, redesigning the Middle East was likely to be important to the success of this strategy (Hinnebusch, 2007: p.220). Philosopher and scholar Slavoj Žižek supports this argument, arguing that the real underlying reasons for the attack on Iraq was "the urge to brutally assert and signal unconditional U.S. hegemony" (2004), since the U.S. administration viewed Iraq as a ripe target in the Middle East (Ehteshami, 2006: p.107).

The National Security Strategy of the Bush administration reflected this agenda which called for translating America's "position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence" (Bush, 2002). It argued that the war on Iraq could be comprehended as part of U.S. hegemony. Hinnebusch (2007, p.219) therefore claims that the hegemony policy offers to provide a global currency for world trade, ensures the flow of cheap energy supplies to the global economy and spreads liberal economic rules universally. The United States needs to be the most potent military power in order to play this role in this region. As mentioned in the previous arguments, thinking about a new order in the Post-Cold War world can broadly be seen among U.S. policy makers. According to

Hinnebusch, the invasion of Iraq was part of the grand strategy of the United States and the Bush administration to maintain the dominance of its global hegemony (2007, p.219). In terms of a realist perspective, the invasion was a rational means for the United States to accomplish its key goal of demonstrating its power to allies and competitors alike (Lieberfeld, 2005: p.4). This desire goes back to the previous U.S. policy of strategy enlargement in order to fulfill this purpose; the first step began with the Iraqi War (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: p.58).

To support this claim, one of the common themes of the neoconservatives' unity is their focus on the Middle East and global Islam as the main threats to U.S. foreign interests (Halper and Clarke, 2004: p.11). Therefore, the neoconservatives played a significant role in the military intervention in Iraq, to obtain regional power and global strategic goals. In this context, the main concern for the United States was Iran, which impacted upon U.S. policy makers towards the invasion of Iraq, with Condoleezza Rice identifying that Iran presented the main setbacks to U.S. interests in the Middle East (Ehteshami, 2006: p.107). Therefore, the U.S. argued that the removal of the Iraqi regime would undermine Iran because after the war, Iraqi Shiites would become U.S. allies. According to Ehteshami, the war on Iraq could accelerate the process of developing to a new regional order in the Middle East (2006), which consequently was re-engineered by the neoconservatives. In order to obtain this aim, they used the image of a "cakewalk" as an enormous project in a variety of dimensions, including political, cultural, economic, and religious aspects for Iraq at the beginning of this project with Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia (Halper and Clarke, 2004: p. 202).

It has been argued that U.S. supremacy in the Middle East, as part of its global hegemony, was linked with the war on Iraq. According to U.S. policy makers, the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime as a threat to U.S. interests and its allies was necessary in order to change the strategic position of the United States in the Middle East. As American journalist Jay Bookman suggests, the war on Iraq would allow for the making of permanent military bases to control the region (Bookman, 2002). As a result of this, the invasion was not only about Iraq but was also relevant to the global role of U.S. hegemony in world politics. It can be argued that this goal could also be identified as the main reason for the invasion of Iraq.

The ongoing First Gulf War

Having discussed the various elements involved in the U.S.'s decision to go to war in Iraq, the final part of this study considers the First Gulf War as a primary reason. This war did not result a solution to the problems in the Persian Gulf because no stable political relationship was reached between the United States and Saddam Hussein. According to various scholars, the starting point

for the invasion of Iraq goes back to the Gulf War as part of the grand strategy of U.S. policy. For instance, Fawn argues that the war on Iraq was proposed as a continuation of the unfinished First Gulf War of 1990-1991, and that "Bush sought to finish his father's earlier war" (2006, p.1).

After the First Gulf War, the United Nations attempted to ensure that Iraq never again threatened its neighbours or world peace, and to prevent Saddam Hussein's aggression against the Iraqi people (Lake 1994, p.50). Therefore, after the end of the first Gulf War, the Security Council applied UN Resolution 687, which determined that Iraq should unconditionally accept the destruction and removal of all its WMDs and ballistic missiles. As a result, this resolution permitted the United States and its allies to use force in Iraq if it was proven that the country possessed chemical and biological weapons (Jakobsen and Jakobsen, 2009: p.666). Thus, the United States argued that Saddam Hussein had repeatedly violated this UN Resolution, largely because Iraq had rejected international inspections within its borders in 1998 (Fischer 2012, p.141). Subsequently, the Iraqi regime continued to pose challenges both to the United States and the United Nations (Jentleson, 2007: p.419).

Within this context, one of the most challenging questions to face the Clinton administration was Iraq's aggressive behavior since the end of the Cold War era, and thereby the containing of Iraq was a major element of Clinton's policy during the 1990s (Hyland 1999, p.171). In this regard, the Iraq Liberation Act was announced by the U.S. administration in 1998. Kenneth Pollack argues that Clinton believed that the only solution to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was to remove his regime (Pollack 2002, p.94) and, undoubtedly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was politically connected with the Gulf War. Then, Bush stated that "peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again" (Bush 2003b). Subsequently, the United States claimed that sanctions against the Iraqi regime were insufficient. Therefore, neoconservatives argued that the containment policy was not working and that military force was the only way to achieve U.S. aims (Foong Khong, 2008: p.258).

Consequently, the United States asserted that Iraq was developing WMD and was guilty of ceasefire violation with regard to Security Council Resolution 687 (Shah 2008, p.123). This dynamic process after the Gulf War was a contributing cause for the invasion of Iraq. The range of events from 1991 to 2003 was to a large extent linked to the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, the strategies of the First Gulf War played a highly significant role because unresolved conflict with Iraq provided a good reason for the invasion. This analysis is important to an understanding of why the United States entered into a war with Iraq. Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that the First Gulf War

had not ended, which served as a primary reason to topple Saddam Hussein.

CONCLUSION

This study has explored why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, providing an understanding of the evidences and reasons. The war on Iraq seems to have been motivated by different causes, including both declared and undeclared reasons. It could be argued that there is a significant gap between the U.S. administration's public reasons and the real reasons behind the invasion of Iraq. On the lines of this argument, three motives were given as public justification for the U.S. attack on Iraq, as declared by the Bush administration and official statements, including the presence of WMDs, the sponsoring of terrorism by the Iraqi regime and oppression of the Iraqi people. However, the Foundation of Intelligence and the Coalition could not find reliable evidence regarding the existence of WMDs in any part of the country. In the case of terrorism, there was no proof of a direct link with international terrorism, and no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the events of 9/11. As a consequence, the U.S. administration sought to build a persuasive case and manipulate public opinion for a war on Iraq as a response to the perceived threat.

Despite the challenges for foreign policy analysts to identify the most important reasons, this study shows that the invasion of Iraq was driven by undeclared reasons, such as ending the threat to Israel, oil interests, and dominance in the Middle East. These motives, therefore, provided the essential and specific context for the war on Iraq. From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the potential of oil-linked benefits to the United States was due to a regime change in Iraq. Furthermore, the protection of Israel was significant motivating factor. In addition, the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein as the first step in the process was motivated by a desire to transform the Middle East as part of a global strategy. Despite these significant reasons and motives, it is also possible that the unfinished First Gulf War could be a primary reason for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In examining links across the theoretical perspectives, the invasion of Iraq underlined as a consequences of US hegemony in world politics as well as neoconservative ideology played a significant role in the Bush administration's decision to declare war against Iraq, and has been involved in each of the reasons, building a case for invasion.

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Full Length Research

A Defense of Political Consent Theory Through an Analysis of Socio-Cultural Political Covenants

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This essay seeks to give social contract theory a new breath of life by blending its premises with two other concepts: the established theory of Samaritan duties, and a novel idea of socio-cultural political covenants. In order to do this, it first address the social contract theory as it is conventionally defined and defended by examining the consent theory outlined by Hobbes, Locke, and Beran. Then the essay outlines the alternative theory of Samaritan duties as described by Wellman. Finally, this essay this essay synthesizes the positions of social contract theory and Samaritan duties and couples it with a novel analytical framework we call socio-cultural political covenants. This new framework is meant to offer a deeper and more textured understanding of political obligation and all it entails.

Keywords: Social contract, political philosophy, consent theory, political obligation, Samaritan duties, covenants

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INTRODUCTION

Virtually all people today live within the borders of self-contained, clearly defined territories, or states. While this was not always the case, it has been the pattern of human existence to form collectives, the nature and extent of which have changed organically through the ages, growing in depth and complexity to their modern form. The contemporary state-society particularly that designated as "Western" has reached a height of intricacy unattained at any other time. States have come to be expected to be the furnishers of necessary public goods, such as security, that could not be obtained by

private action. Yet for all this time and corporeal development, and evolution of states and societies, the question of what generates and constitutes citizens' obligations to the state and the government remains an issue of contention among political philosophers.

It seems clear that the citizens and residents of all liberal democratic states, and indeed residents of all functioning states, have a political obligation to the state, and are thus in some way morally obligated to obey its laws. But of what does this moral obligation consist? One of the oldest and most dominant descriptions of political

obligation is the social contract theory of government. Relying on the idea of consent, social contract theory is frequently used in academic literature and in the rhetoric of political leaders, yet it is an idea that fails to take in much of the nuance of political obligation.

Thesis Statement

This essay seeks to give social contract theory a new breath of life by blending its premises with two other concepts: the established theory of Samaritan duties, and a novel idea of socio-cultural political covenants. In order to do this, it first address the social contract theory as it is conventionally defined and defended by examining the consent theory outlined by Hobbes, Locke, Gauthier, and Beran. Then the essay outlines the alternative theory of Samaritan duties as described by Wellman. Finally, this essay synthesizes the positions of social contract theory and Samaritan duties and couples it with a novel analytical framework we call socio-cultural political covenants. This new framework is meant to offer a deeper and more textured understanding of political obligation and all it entails. These covenants are idiosyncratic social constructs of citizens' general buy-in to the actions and powers of the nation-state of which they are members. This essay seeks to demonstrate their existence and their power in defending a concept of a revitalized social contract model based on implicit consent and Samaritan duties. After all, social contracts are at the heart of so much of our implicit relations with the state, but it is only through an understanding of socio-cultural political covenants that they may be considered philosophically defensible.

Examining Consent Theory

Some of the earliest efforts of political theorists to ascertain the link of obligation between citizen and state resulted in social contract theory, also known as contractarianism or consent theory, as initially put forward by thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. At the heart of this theory is the belief that, "Legitimate authority of government must derive from the consent of the governed," (Cudd, 2012). According to social contract theory, the fundamental need for government to exist is the chaos and ugliness of the world absent government, the state of nature. In order to escape anarchy, according to contractarians, individuals band together to form collectives and establish authority figures to govern relations and arbitrate disputes (Hobbes, 1651). As Finn (2006) put it, "Individuals must create a common power by a mutual transferring of rights," (p. 53). This view of political obligation is very attractive on its face, particularly to people of liberal political persuasion who

value personal freedom as the highest political aim. The notion that the state exists by the conscious will of the people, and the position of government as subordinate to the will of the people by being dependent on consent for its existence and authority, speaks to this belief very broadly. The idea holds a certain intuitive appeal, which is perhaps why it has stood the test of time despite near constant attack from a wide range of alternative theories.

The notion of obligation or the right of the state to claim duties from citizens, as derived from consent has found its most able modern day defenders in Harry Beran and David Gauthier, who each developed quite effective defenses of the social contract theory of obligation. Beran was especially effective in arguing for consent as the critical hurdle for the legitimacy of a state, arguing that, "Consent is a necessary condition for there being an authority relationship between a state and its members," (Beran, 1977, p. 261). Consent is the critical piece of the puzzle of obligation for most contractarians. There certainly is an intuitively appealing quality in Beran's analysis. Gauthier (1986) added further insights to the social contract theory by focusing the rationality of human beings and their mutual self-interest to create systems of authority. Gauthier's ideas hold many echoes of the ideas of Locke, but they are especially effective in explicating the apparent rationality of people and what could be called their "natural" decision to congregate in individual-state nexuses.

Criticisms of the Social Contract

Despite vigorous support from centuries' worth of philosophers, social contract theory does not hold up as a singular explanation of political obligation under careful scrutiny for three reasons. Firstly, there appears to be an inherent logical flaw in that citizens who do not wish to consent to the state are essentially forced to submit to its power, or perhaps emigrate, despite having not ever paid the state fealty. Indeed, a common refrain of opponents of the social contract is, "I didn't sign it," which, while hardly analytically rigorous, certainly calls into question contractarian theory's reliance on strict consent as the sole basis of political obligation and legitimacy. The strict social contract theory is simply unrealistic, as individuals living within states rarely if ever consider the fact of their living within that state as a matter of *explicit* consent, but instead simply as a matter of fact. At best it could be argued that the social contract operates as a sort of *tacit* consent, and do not view their compliance with law, in practice, as an obligation incurred by conscious consent. It is this construction of consent as tacit that will form a critical component of the argument for political obligations emerging from a socio-cultural covenant that will be put forward later in this essay.

The second problem facing the explicit formulation of

the social contract theory is one of moral justification. Indeed, Gauthier's (1986) position in particular has come under criticism for essentially assuming that a state can exert or possess moral authority prior to the consent of the people (Southwood, 2010). As Wellman (2001) put it, the state, "Somehow achieved a position of moral sovereignty over its territory even before it has the consent of its citizens" (p. 736). It is a problem of begging the question to assume that a state could be imbued with moral authority in this way. This issue is not of supreme import in this essay, as the issue of moral obligation is dealt with more resolutely in the later sections.

The third issue with the explicit social contract is one of the historicity of such contracts. As Wellman (2001) put it, social contracts are simply "historically fantastic" (p. 747). Indeed, most states arose from force and coercion, evolving only gradually from tribal authority, to monarchical authority, to more modern state-societies. There has rarely, if ever, been the case of a group of people collectively and unanimously handing over their rights by to a central authority mandated into existence by their common consent. Horton (2007) addressed this issue, pointing out that in the case of membership in a particular society, "Nothing particular needs to be done in the vast majority of cases to acquire such membership, which is, in a perfectly straightforward sense, non-voluntary" (Horton, 2007, p. 12). While individuals' citizenship, and thus membership in a state may be due to birth and be absent strict consent, and while these natural identities may be acquired by apparent chance or communal inculcation, the participatory buy-in to the state and its laws, whether a citizen ever truly consents in the Lockean or Gauthierian sense to the state can be rendered irrelevant, or at least less relevant, by moving away from the explicit construction of the social contract paradigm.

The problems created by explicit social contracts can be dealt with quite effectively by texturing what is meant by the idea of consent. When viewed from the more sensible position of a notional, implicit consent, based on the perception of buy-in, social contract theory holds more water. By notional consent we mean to posit that an individual is not so much consenting to participation, as opposed to dissenting or choosing total non-participation, but is rather notionally consenting to the existence of the state through a performative buy-in. Understood this way, consent theory can be understood to be applicable in the real world. By incorporating concepts of civic morality into the understanding of social contracts, one can begin to see that the consent theory can still be a powerful justifier of political obligations.

Understanding Samaritan Duties

Beginning with a similar stated goal as consent theory,

namely the escape from the state of nature, Christopher Wellman introduced the view that individuals may be coerced into obedience to the state and observance of political obligation to the benefit of everyone, including the coerced individual: "The state would be prohibited from coercing its constituents without their consent unless this coercion were necessary to rescue everyone from the perils of the state of nature," (Wellman, 2001, 746). Wellman avoided the pitfall of sounding overtly paternalistic by emphasizing the benefit to others and the necessity of maintaining the social order through coerced obedience for the benefit of the vast majority who will gladly comply with the directives of the states. Those who will not comply may secede (ie. emigrate) if they do not wish to comply with the state, unless their secession would undermine the state's ability to protect compliant citizens from the state of nature.

Wellman based his analysis on certain Samaritan duties held by individuals, and the state. These duties involve people's moral obligations to help one another, the state's obligation to help individuals, and thus individuals' obligation to obey the state in its prosecution of that aim. As Wellman (2001) put it:

The Samaritan model of political legitimacy explains that a state has a right to force even those who do not consent because this force is necessary to rescue this person and others. Adding Samaritan duties and fairness to this, we can now explain that each person has an obligation to obey the law as her fair share of this Samaritan task. By invoking fairness in this fashion, we may freely admit that no one would slip into peril if a single individual disobeyed the law. Instead, we point out that it would be unfair to shirk one's share of the Samaritan chore. Securing political stability is a communal responsibility that falls upon all of us; it is wrong to leave all the work to others. (p. 749)

According to Wellman, citizens have a responsibility to obey the law and to fulfill their obligation to the state for the benefit of the community. In order for the community to survive, the state must have the power to use coercive force against individuals who threaten the group, and to citizens generally for the promotion of the general welfare.

It is Wellman's particular emphasis on political legitimacy as separate from political obligation that is most important to note in his analysis, and is central to the synthesis that will be outlined in the next section. Social contract theory, as outlined previously, does not effectively differentiate these two concepts and treats them as correlates of one another. The issue of political legitimacy highlights the state's ability and tendency to use coercive force for the sake of the whole community,

and this is acceptable because, "One cannot lead a meaningful and rewarding human life unless one is minimally secure from attack...the coercive laws of the state secure us by providing others with practical reasons to respect our moral rights," (Wellman, 2001, 742). It is this focus on the separation of legitimacy and obligation that offers a key piece to the puzzle of the synthesis of obligations.

The Idea of Socio-Political Covenants

The two theories of political obligation outlined thus far can be synthesized to create a single clearer picture of political obligation. Doing so allows one to understand the abidingly important belief that individuals should accept that their government operates at least partly on the basis of consent. For example, it is neither for mere symbolic, nor empty hyperbole that the Constitution of the United States begins "We the People". That sense of the need to have a say in government is essential to the longstanding survival and continued obligation owed by a people to its government. An undemocratic regime may be legitimate in that it prevents society from descending into chaos within and holds back the marauders without, and it can command an obligation from its people to a degree, but ultimately a country's strength is its people and the popular will inevitably wins out against unaccepted tyranny, as was demonstrated at the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and in the groundswell of democratic movements and anti-dictatorial uprising in the Middle East and beyond in recent years. For this reason it is clear that consent in some form must exist for a state to survive and to claim the obligation of its citizens. This need not take the form of direct or representative democracy, but rather must simply, and of necessity, subsume as some form of feedback loop between governments and governed. It is thus clear, that a notional, or implicit, consent is key to legitimate government, which is government to which citizens are obliged to defer. This notional consent is not the sort of consent of the strict contractarians, whose position is little more than a fiction and has no antecedent in history to lend it truth. Instead, the 'conferral of rights' as described by Locke and Hobbes is a sort of symbol, a shared quasi-fiction citizens can accept as binding them to the state in a reciprocal relationship. This relationship of necessity pervades every political culture, for without it the government will soon find itself overrun with rebellion and civic anger that no amount of repression could halt in the long term.

Beyond the mere democratic process, citizens perceive the state as something they are part of, not in the acculturated manner described by the theory of associative duties, as put forward by scholars such as Horton (2007), but as having a buy-in to the system that

will deal fairly as it is, or at least proximal to, a manifestation of collective will. This sense of buy-in is only possible with a consent-based structure of political will and obligation, which places emphasis on the personal agency of citizens in the creation and legitimization of the state. The acceptance of consent as a source, though not the sole source, of political obligation, is thus extremely valuable to the long term stability and functionality of a polity.

This quasi-fictional, or symbolic, consent, while key to our common understanding of political obligation as it is generally described and viewed by ordinary citizens, is insufficient to describe entirely the obligation of citizens to obey the state, as consent alone cannot bind citizens to the state incontrovertibly, as explained earlier. Rather, there is a need in this philosophical examination to acknowledge the occasional necessity of coercive force to secure the state and its citizens. Because the state provides public goods, services that are essential to society and can only be provided by the state, it has the power to coerce citizens to whom it supplies these collective goods, and citizens likewise are obliged to comply with the dictates of the state. This obligation is based not simply on the arbitrary power of coercion, but rather is keyed into the notion of Samaritanism. This concept, described previously, fits well with political reality. Citizens are protected by the state in such a way that they could never hope to protect themselves alone, or in a state of nature, and thus owe it an obligation so as to do their part in contributing to the collective security. In order to avoid free riders, the state thus requires the power to force participation, but because this force is used to benefit the citizen and his or her fellows, the citizen has a genuine obligation to comply. Citizens of countries the world over recognize this obligation to the state, and recognize such inconveniences as taxes as a necessary component of life in a civilized society.

Samaritanism, like consent theory, is inadequate of itself to delineate the obligations of citizens to the state. Rather, combining the two allows for a more complete, and more realistic, depiction of political obligation. Consent, notional or otherwise, is imperative to the psychic acceptance by individuals of political obligations, just as the need for the state to be able to compel certain behavior of its citizens, irrespective of specific consent on an issue, is imperative to the success of society. By combining consent with Samaritanism, a degree of synergy is achieved, with the necessary obligation of citizen to state defined by both his willingness to participate in that state on at least a notional level, and the power of the state to coerce action, while not stepping beyond the bounds of justice as speculatively laid out through that consent.

We call this synergistic relationship a socio-cultural covenant. It is the bond that links individuals within societies beyond consent or state paternalism. Rather, it

is an intergenerational compact that preserves the state-society as a coherent entity through time and endows it with a specified purpose for the maintenance of the common good of the polity. At the same time, we must recognize that the exact character of this covenant must vary widely across countries. Taking the example of the United States versus European states, we can see that American citizens still expect a greater protection of their personal liberty, which translates broadly into less paternalistic policies and protections of rights such as the right to bear arms. In Europe, on the other hand, we see by and large a tendency toward greater acceptance of a more overbearing state and a collective buy-in to the idea of the government as a purveyor of more services and a greater constrainer of personal liberties. Much of the strife in political discourse and in political philosophy over the ideal nature of a state and its institutions can be laid to rest through the examination of the idiosyncratic characters of these socio-cultural covenants. They exist and are bought into force by the citizens of these states and manifest differently in accord with the underlying nature of the tacit agreements between these citizens and their governments about what constitutes the appropriate bounds of public and private life and action.

CONCLUSION

Culture is frequently dismissed in the discussion of political philosophy, which so often tries to find a single explanation for a complex concept like political obligation. This essay has sought to show that by combining and expanding two of the prevailing theories can yield a powerful concept of socio-cultural political covenants that serves to unpack some of the issues with more pragmatic analysis of the relationships of citizens with their states. Citizens are not merely wards of the state, and nor is there a strict or explicit social contract to bind them to the state's will. Yet both of these concepts combined show the function of the state as an actor that can only function with a tacit consent and when it acts in the general interests of its citizens.

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Full Length Research

ETHIO-ERITREAN POST-SECESSION HOSTILITY: LESSONS FOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

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The central focus of this paper is on drawing lessons for Sudan and South Sudan after examining the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession hostility. Through examining various documents qualitatively and ascertaining the view of key informants, the study has come up with the following findings. First, the post-secession Sudan and South Sudan destabilization and proxy engagement need to be repudiated since it complicates the normalization process and widen the existing mistrust and animosity. Second, the culture of militarism needs to be replaced by a new political and diplomatic approach. Third, the negative implications of unaccountable and authoritarian rule should be overcome and replaced by a democratic system of governance where the power of the elite is limited, the voice of the public heard and the rights of civil-political organizations guaranteed. Fourth, the forceful and abusive deportations of nationals of each other must come to an end since it threatened bilateral relations and people to people cordiality. Fifth, the issue of political will and compromise is also fundamental to Sudan and South Sudan to solve various unresolved issues including border disputes. Institutionalization of their relations and implementation of the agreements in good faith is the other compelling lesson to be drawn thereof by the Sudan and South Sudan.

Key words: Secession, Normalization, Lesson, Hostility, Peace, Conflict, War.

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INTRODUCTION

Historical Overviews on Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sudan-South Sudan Relations

Eritrea was an integral part of Ethiopia until it was brought under Italian control in 1890 (Girma, 1993; Kidist, 2011; Tekeste, 1997). However, the Italian East African colony was ended in 1941 and Eritrea became a

mandate territory of British until 1952 (Andargachew, 1993; Girma, 1993; Kidist, 2011). The subsequent diplomatic efforts of the Imperial Government to the United Nations (UN) federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. However, the dissolution of the federation promoted the Eritrean armed insurgency for independence (Girma, 1993; Mesfin, 1990). The war for

independence was first initiated by Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) both of which were the prominent liberation movements in Eritrea (Tekeste, 1997). The activities of the liberation movements also persisted after the downfall of monarchical rule and the coming to power of the military regime. In collaboration with Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the EPLF facilitated the dissolution of the military government in 1991 (Healy and Plaut, 2007).

The defeat of the military regime, *Derg*, and the coming to power of the EPRDF witnessed a remarkable development on the final fate of Eritrea as a result of which, Eritrea became independent following the 1993 Referendum. In the initial years of independence, Ethiopia and Eritrea established close relationship in economic, security, political and social fields (ICG, 2003; Kidist, 2011; Tekeste, 1997). They began formal state-to-state relations by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 13 July 1993 (Kidist, 2011). However, such alliance and cordial relations did not last long since it was not free from suspicions and mistrusts, and in 1998 the two years border war flared up around the Badme area.

Following Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, South Sudan is the second case of a successful secession in postcolonial Africa. South Sudan and Eritrea gained sovereignty with the consent of their former 'motherland', though after a long and violent struggle. Sudan and South Sudan faced a destructive armed struggle and civil wars since their formal independence from British colonialism (Kimenyi, 2012). The discontent in the process of decolonization and the forced Islamisation done by the Muslim North brought the civil war in Sudan from 1955 to 1972 (Rolandsen, 2005; Varma, 2011).

On 27 February 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was signed between South Sudan Liberation Movement (popularly known as *Anyanya*) and the central government of Sudan (Rolandsen, 2005). The Addis Ababa Agreement made Southern Sudan as an autonomous region with its own parliament and a High Executive Council (Ibid). However, violation of certain provisions of the Addis Ababa Accord by the Sudanese regime instigated the Southern rebel forces to realign and restart the war, which led to the eruption of a Second Civil War (Rolandsen, 2005; Varma, 2011). The Second Civil War, in which an estimated 1.5 million people died, began in 1983 and ended only in 2005 with the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Varma, 2011).

CPA was concluded granting self-government to the South under the leadership of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and providing for holding a Referendum to be held in 2011 on the region's future status. CPA was perceived as an opportunity to restore trust in the broken relationships between North and South Sudan. Some of the key factors that fueled the conflict

were resolved, but the issue of national identity was not. South Sudan formally declared its independence in July 2011 after 98.8% of its people voted for independence in the Referendum and now became Africa's 54th state (Seri-Hersch, 2013).

As noted by Kimenyi (2012), the post-Referendum relations between the two Sudans are on a downward trend; one that could easily result in escalation of war. Tensions over resources as well as borders heightened, which further create a complexity on the relationship and reconciliation process (Varma, 2011).

Thus, the overall focus of the study is to examine the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession hostility with the view to draw lessons that South Sudan and Sudan can learn from the experience of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the process of harmonizing their relationships and alleviating differences.

The Sudan-South Sudan Conflict and the Lessons to be drawn from the Ethio-Eritrean Post-Secession Experience

South Sudan formally declared its independence in July 2011 after the majority of its eligible voters decided in favor of independence. Despite the formal separation, the present relations between Sudan and South Sudan are tense and the two countries contested over a range of unresolved issues. Among others, the two Sudans entered into protracted disagreement on the issues of border, citizenship and financial arrangements, including those pertaining to revenues from the sale of South Sudanese oil that transit through Sudan for export. The alleged engagements of the two countries in supporting rebels of each other also bedeviled their relations. Taking into consideration the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience, the following lessons are drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan that could help them in the process of normalizing their relations.

The Border Disputes

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended over two decades of the Civil War called for the demarcation of the borders of Sudan and South Sudan within six months (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Pursuant to the Presidential Decree of September 2005, a Technical Border Committee (TBC) was established to demarcate the boundary between Sudan and South Sudan based on the 1956 map (ICG, 2010). The TBC was expected to submit its finding to the Presidency by identifying areas that could not be agreed upon. While the TBC agreed on most of the boundaries, a handful of the areas remained contested (Ibid). The areas contested by the two countries cover the northern-most border running from Upper Nile to the White Nile State, the oil fields of Unity State and the Southern Kordofan, the area

that forms the western-most dividing line between Bahr-el-Ghazal and Southern Darfur as well as the northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and south Darfur (ICG, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Hence, the border between the two Sudans was neither fully delimited nor demarcated during the interim period.

Remarkable border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan witnessed following the independence of the latter (Kimenyi, 2012). Divergent claims with respect to territorial issues ensued and open armed clashes occurred over Abyei, Southern Kordofan (which contains the disputed Heglig oil field) and Blue Nile regions (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013). In the hope of crushing the insurgents within its territory, the Sudanese government started a new campaign of attacking the rebels around its southern part specifically in South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Subsequently, the Sudanese air force crossed the border of South Sudan and entered Unity state, considering this area as the haven for dissident groups (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013). Sudan's infiltration into the territory of South Sudan reflects the act of hostility against the government of South Sudan (Ibid), which also took a retaliatory measure and entered into the territories of Sudan notably the town of Heglig (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; Hsiao, 2012). Open armed clashes also took place in another contested territory, Abyei (For more details see section 4.2.). Due to such provocative military maneuvers, South Sudanese and Sudan forces were heavily deployed.

After months of bloodshed and tension, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to maintain a safe border through which different socio-economic activities can be carried out easily. Greater emphasis was given to the swift demarcation of shared borders as well as establishment of Integrated Border Management approaches. The agreement also called for the formation of a Joint Demarcation Committee and Technical Team with the mandate to supervise the demarcation process and provide technical assistance during the actual demarcation process respectively. However, according to Omer Salih Abubakr, demarcation of the border is not yet finalized even if the two countries agreed on it critically.³

The border between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained un-demarcated at the time of the independence of the latter. It was described as not-urgent issue, which later forced the two countries to pay heavy cost. The un-demarcated border was used as a pretext for the outbreak of the brutal and devastating war that cost the lives of thousands of peoples from both sides. Millions of dollars were also expended for the procurement and acquisition of sophisticated weapons. The issue of border is still very

contentious despite the ruling of the EEBC (Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission) and the un-demarcated border is becoming a state of frozen hostility thereby exposing peoples living along the common borders to different hardships (Plaut, 2005/2006).

The un-demarcated border between Sudan and South Sudan is quite worrying as well, given the heavy reliance of both states on oil revenues coming from border areas. As Kimenyi (2012) stated, much of the known oil deposits of the two Sudans located along the common border. Not only oil, the disputed areas between the two countries are rich in other minerals including the arable land itself (Ibid). Demarcation of border thus becomes the question of determining who have the authority over a certain resources located in different colliders. The presence of huge natural resources along the common frontiers can create the possibility of forceful grabbing of fields that do not officially belong to them. Though the government of Sudan denied (Sudan Tribune, 9 April 2014), South Sudan accused the unusual movement and incursion of the Sudanese army along the border areas (Sudan Tribune, 8 April 2014). The Ethio-Eritrean intimate relations were partly shuttered by the skirmishes and provocative military maneuvers that took place around border areas. Sudan and South Sudan, therefore, shall curtail such sorts of provocative moves and military adventurism along the common boundaries so as to harmonize their relations. In this regard, Berouk strongly contends that mutual recognition and respect of the shared borders is decisive for these two countries to live in peace.⁴

As the saying goes "good fences make good neighbors" (Kimenyi, 2012: 7), mistrust and anxiety and insecurity can be mitigated as far as the two countries fully operationalize and demarcate their borders. In this regard, Esayas⁵ (2014) and Berouk (2014) argued that Sudan and South Sudan can come out of the prevailing border deadlocks when there is political will and readiness to compromise for anything that must be compromised (see Rolandsen, *et al.*, 2012). According to Abebe, demarcation of borders and normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations remain unresolved due to the absence of "political will" and the uncompromising stances of the two governments.⁶ It is quit challenging to curtail border deadlocks and normalize relations without the willingness and commitments of the parties to the conflict. It is also obvious that demarcation of the borders

³ Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1 April 2014

⁴ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies, 28 February 2014

⁵ Interview with Esayas Girmay, a Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 25 February 2014.

⁶ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014

may not satisfy the interests of the two Sudans on equal basis. In the light of this, the two Sudans are forced to adopt and follow compromise in any forthcoming negotiations with regard to border demarcation and normalization process. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further reveals that ascertaining the ideas and opinions of peoples living along the disputed border areas would be of paramount importance to solve the border problems. According to Kalewongel (2008), the overall peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea was unable to bring an end to the conflict in general and the border dispute in particular due to the exclusion of local peoples living along the disputed areas from the peace deal. The EEBC failed to ascertain the ideas of local peoples before passing its ruling thereby leading to the occurrence of the flawed decisions. In this regard, the two Sudans shall better consult and involve local peoples during the negotiation and the signing of agreements. The rationale here is that implementation of the deals become easy when it is conducted involving the public in general and local peoples living in the disputed territory in particular. Besides, ascertaining the ideas of local peoples is also essential to avoid the unnecessary divisions of homesteads and relapse of territories that do not belong to the other.

Analysts, on their part, argued that demarcation of borders between Sudan and South Sudan should be better "soft", which allows traders, pastoralists and migrant workers to move easily and form socio-economic and cultural linkages (Musso, 2011; ICG, 2010). The September 2012 Border Accord between the two Sudans also emphasized the establishment of such kind of arrangement. According to Omer Salih Abubakr (2014), peoples from both sides shared pasture and water sources for centuries and formed socio-cultural linkages. Thus, the establishment of "soft" borders can benefit communities living on both sides of the border whose potential to avert local disputes is high.

Centrality of the Abyei Dispute

Abyei straddles the border between Sudan and South Sudan. It is a small territory permanently settled by the Ngok-Dinka, a subset of South Sudan's largest ethnic group (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The nomadic Misseriya of Sudan also extensively used the land and water sources in Abyei for seasonal grazing and herding of cattle. It is this mixed use of the land that prompted the transfer of Abyei to Kordofan in 1905 (Ibid). The Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka co-existed in Abyei for centuries and their relations were smooth (Jensen and Fick, 2009; Johnson, 2010). However, relations between these groups were severed following the independence of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian rule (Ibid). The discovery oil in Abyei exacerbated disputes between the Sudan and

South Sudan the spillover effect of which impacted the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka cordiality.

Though the CPA called for the demarcation of the Abyei boundaries before the end of the interim period, consensus was not reached between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. As per the requirements of the CPA, the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) passed its decision and based on the decision of the Commission the Heglig and Bamboo oil fields fell within Abyei (ICG, 2010). The government of Sudan rejected this decision of the Commission noting that the Commission placed a significant portion of its oil reserves in the disputed territory-Abyei (ICG, 2010; Jensen and Fick, 2009; Winter and Prendergast, 2008). As a result of such discord, the case was then presented to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2009, which redefined the Abyei area and placed Heglig and Bamboo fields outside of Abyei (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; ICG, 2010). The government of Sudan once again opposed the ruling of the PCA resulting from its quest to control the remaining oil reserves of Abyei and the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline that crosses this area (ICG, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Implementation of the decision of the PCA, therefore, was practically voided and fighting for Abyei remains a real threat.

The economic importance of Abyei to both sides is very potent thereby making the area the hot spot for the disparity between Sudan and South Sudan currently. However, based on the decision of the PCA, most oil fields were labeled outside Abyei and hence, the main sources of contention has been lessened. In this regard, Greenidge (2011) stated that the historical and political importance of Abyei still outweigh its economic or strategic value. The SPLM and the people of South Sudan considered Abyei as an area that was wrongly taken from the south on the basis of an agreement with a local chief before Sudan's independence (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The permanent settlers of Abyei, the Ngok-Dinka, also served as the political wing for SPLM in its struggle against the power elite in the North (Greenidge, 2011). Hence, the government of South Sudan strengthened their claim over Abyei assuring the Dinka that the land of Abyei belongs to them. Similarly, the government of Sudan seems unwilling to lose Abyei because it was part and parcel of Sudan since 1905 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Besides, the government of Sudan maintains that the Misseriya will turn against Sudan when are they excluded from participating in the Abyei issue (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The Misseriya groups are the pro-Sudanese forces who sacrificed a lot during the two civil wars. Hence, for Sudan, Abyei is an area that must be secured at all cost and compromise on Abyei is thus unthinkable (Greenidge, 2011).

With the ambition of securing Abyei, both sides turned into protracted disagreement on the eligibility of voters

who would participate in the Abyei Referendum. The South claimed that only the permanently settled populations should participate in the Referendum while the North proposed the inclusion of the Misseriya as voters in the Abyei Referendum (Greenidge, 2011). The government of Sudan demanded the Misseriya tribes to take part in the Referendum in order to outweigh the numerically small Ngok-Dinka and put Abyei under its control (Ibid). Due to the absence of progress in moderating positions, the issue of Abyei became a delicate issue during various high-level meetings and the Referendum to be conducted following South Sudan's Referendum is not yet finalized (Sandrai, 2013) as a result.

The two-year Ethio-Eritrean war and the post-war stalemate highly revolved around a small territory-Badme. As Berouk (2014) aptly noted, though Badme is not resourceful as Abyei, it remains a "flashpoint and a curse" in enhancing the Ethio-Eritrean post-war disparity. The two governments entered into a bloody fight so as to secure Badme the ownership of which is the sticking point on the demarcation process. The two sides feared public criticism and the prospect of political crisis once compromise is done on Badme. Badme, therefore, is a highly politicized spot which is compounded with deeper passion, animosity and misgivings that can complicate the future engagement between the two countries. Similarly, Abyei is a highly politicized territory with greater potential to fuel conflict and entrench stalemate between the two Sudans.

In the bid to make the Misseriya the permanent residents of Abyei, the Sudanese government is in favor of the Abyei stalemate (Rendón and Hsiao, 2013). The uncompromising stance of the two countries on the implementation of the Abyei Protocol, on the other hand, is capable of pushing the two sides into full-scale bloodshed. The issue can trigger another intractable conflict between Sudan and South Sudan (Debay, 2012; Akol, 2013; Winter and Prendergast, 2008). Besides, the implementation of other outstanding arrangements incorporated under the CPA or other interstate concords signed between the two countries can be dragged once the Abyei issue remains stalled for unlimited period of time (Jensen and Fick, 2009; Debay, 2012). The two governments are thus required to soften their positions regarding Abyei and operationalize the Protocol to end the Abyei deadlock.

Furthermore, the dispute over Abyei is not limited to interstate conflict but also involves the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya groups as well. The relations between these two groups deteriorated for the last few decades and series of disputes between them provoked following the independence of South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 13 April 2014). The cost of the Abyei stalemate is pivotal in fueling and deteriorating the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka relations including groups who have a historical right on

land and other sources in Abyei. In this vein, the October 2013 unilateral referendum held by the Ngok-Dinka communities depicts the growing grievance on the flawed nature of the Protocol itself (Arrno, 2012). As Omer Salih Abubakr (2014) stated, the two ethnic groups are agro-pastoralists that rely on the pasture and water resources of Abyei and their fights emanate from using such resources. The two governments can mitigate the clash between these two groups through changing their life style and improving livelihood.

Political elites from both Sudan and South Sudan used tribalism very seriously. Unless the status of Abyei is determined, the Sudan-South Sudan proxy engagement in crisis regarding Abyei is inevitable. In this regard, since the signing of the CPA, the government of Sudan encouraged different armed groups to displace the sedentary Ngok-Dinka southward (Johnson, 2011; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The Sudanese government still supports and collaborates with armed members of the Misseriya tribes and armed groups to forcefully seize Abyei as well as expel the Ngok-Dinka from the area (Sudan Tribune, 17 March 2014, 13 April 2014). The continued attacks organized by the government of Sudan further undermined the longstanding co-existence of the Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya. In the same manner, Omer Salih Abubakr(2014) and Berouk (2014) strongly argued that the use of ethnic clashes as a means of realizing sectarian ends should cease if peace is to prevail in Sudan-South Sudan relations. Instead of engaging in proxy wars, governments of the two countries require to maintain good relations with important constituencies in Abyei and facilitate independent dialogue between the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya to strengthen and build confidence.

The Issue of Citizenship

The other major debacle that adversely impacts on the relations between Sudan and South Sudan is the issue of citizenship/nationality. Controversies between the two governments surfaced with respect to the determination of the status of southerners living in North and northerners in the South. The government of South Sudan advocated for the establishment of dual citizenship in that southerners living in the North and northerners in the South should be allowed to possess citizenship of both countries (Manby, 2012; Musso, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). Accordingly, the 2011 Nationality Act of South Sudan allows dual nationality to South Sudanese irrespective of the place where they live (Manby, 2012). Contrary to the demand of its South Sudanese counterparts, a month later, the government of Sudan amended the old nationality law that automatically abrogated the nationality of South Sudanese living in

Sudan (Manby, 2012; Musso, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). This position of the Sudanese government was also hinted during the interim period in that the government made clear that citizenship to South Sudanese living in Sudan would not be granted once the South secedes (Sikainga, 2011; Debay, 2012). Hence, over 350,000 South Sudanese have already been deported from Sudan since November 2010 while more than half million still remain in Sudan (Manby, 2012; Kimenyi, 2012).

Though the governments of the two countries initiated the "Four Freedoms Agreement", gives the citizens of both countries the freedom of residence, movement as well as the freedom to dispose property and undertake economic activities in either country, in March 2012, implementation of the deal was stalled and the government of Sudan ordered the South Sudanese to leave the country by April 2012 (Kimenyi, 2012). Southerners residing in Sudan have been dismissed from their work and children have been deprived to enroll in schools and to get health care services as a result of which thousands of Southerners, notably the university students, government officials, private and public workers, etc, returned to South Sudan (Manby, 2012). As a counter measures, the government of South Sudan also issued a press release announcing that Sudanese citizens should hold valid visas to enter the South (Ibid).

After a period of deadlock, Sudan and South Sudan signed another agreement on the status and treatments of nationals of each other and related matters. This agreement resembles the March 2012 "Four Freedoms Agreement". According to this Agreement, the two states affirmed the establishment of a Joint High Level Committee to oversee the adoption and implementation of joint measures as regards the status and treatment of nationals of each state in the territory of the other. Parties to the treaty agreed to allow nationals of both countries the freedom to reside, move, acquire and dispose of property, and undertake economic activities in both States. This agreement was intended to bolster positive interactions among peoples and build socio-cultural and economic ties that will enhance relations between the two States.

Since the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war, governments of the two countries arbitrarily expelled the citizens of each other living in their respective territories. Though the Ethiopian government allowed Eritreans to live inside Ethiopia, it had forcefully expelled around 75,000 Eritreans from Ethiopia following the escalation of the war (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The documents proving Ethiopian nationality of people of Eritrean descent were confiscated, property rights were cancelled and travel papers in many instances were marked "Expelled—Never to Return"(Ibid: 3). Deportation of Ethiopians from Eritrea already started in 1991, which led to the expulsion of 50,000 people without taking any of their possessions with them (Abbink, 1998). Detention

and expulsion of Ethiopians from Eritrea also continued with great vigor following the outbreak of the war in 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Such arbitrary, forceful and abusive expulsion of citizens raised mutual suspicion and deepened antipathy and hatred among peoples of the two countries (Abbink, 1998, 2003a).

As discussed above, millions of South Sudanese are currently living in the territory of Sudan and most of them want to establish their domicile there forever (Manby, 2012). They have no desire to return to South Sudan. As the Ethio-Eritrean experience further entails, the consequence of forceful and abusive deportations of nationals of one another is most threatening to interstate relations and people to people cordiality and trust as well. Sudan and South Sudan are thus required to end the forceful expulsion of nationals living in each other's territory. Instead, the two countries expected to undertake joint actions to keep the safety and welfare of all the Sudanese and South Sudanese. In this regard, a strong arrangement that pave the way for the peaceful repatriation (if mandatory) of each other citizens with their possession is needed.

The other option is to allow citizens the freedom to choose their places of domicile. In this regard, Debay (2012) strongly argues that, though maintenance of dual citizenship is quite challenging, allowing nationals of both countries to choose their domicile in either part would have greater importance to end the question of nationality. Taking into account the tragedies observed in Ethio-Eritrean relations, Esayas and Berouk also argued that, instead of engaging intensively to deport citizens of each other, promoting conditions that facilitate cross-border trade, cultural exchanges and other mutually beneficial activities can have significant impetus in the process of normalizing relations and building confidence between the two Sudans. Forming integrated economic activities and socio-cultural intermarriages can have the potential to cool down the deep-rooted antipathy and mistrust that the peoples of the two countries harbored so far (Kimenyi, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012).

Resource Utilization

The secession of South Sudan is quite worrying to Sudan as 75% of oil production originates in the South (Lunn and Thompson, 2012; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012) and hence the loss of much of the oil reserves resulted in a significant loss of the revenue (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). As a result of the reduction of the revenues from oil, the government of Sudan demanded the South to pay \$32 per barrel for oil shipments through the pipeline to Port Sudan (Ibid). Contrary to the proposal of the Sudanese government, the regime in South Sudan wanted to pay transit fee based on the international norm

of \$1 per barrel (Ibid). As a result of the absence of a mutually acceptable transit fee and the rumors that the Republic of Sudan was stealing South Sudan's oil, the government of South Sudan shutdown all oil production on January 2012 and refused to use the pipelines and port facilities that are owned by Sudan (Kimenyi, 2012; Lunn and Thompson, 2012).

The impasse created during the shutdown of oil production schemes endangered the revenues of both countries. The revenues earned from oil production declined thereby forcing the two countries to introduce budget austerity (Sandrai, 2013; Rolandsen, *et al.*, 2012). Besides, the two countries were obliged to cut billions of pounds from their budget to agriculture, education as well as health care services (Kimenyi, 2012). Closing of oil productions thus means taking a suicidal path since oil is the principal sources of revenue for both countries. The closing of oil production also augmented inflation and depletion of oil reserves (Kimenyi, 2012; Sandrai, 2013). After months of deadlock, Sudan and South Sudan reached an agreement in September 2012 as a result of which South Sudan agreed to pay 1.60 US\$ per barrel to Sudan for oil processing services and 8.40 US\$ per barrel for transportation services.

Subsequently, the recent deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to have prompted Sudan and South Sudan to deal with the impasse once and for all. Though varying in degree, the virtual breakdown of their relations and the cost of the post-war disparity are too devastating to the economy of both Ethiopia and Eritrea (Plaut, 2005/2006; Kidist, 2011; Trivelli, 1998). As a result of the prolongation of the stalemate and the hostility with Ethiopia, the Eritrean government is exposed to different economic mishaps. The stalemate forced Eritrea to abandon its economic role as the external trading partner for the Ethiopian hinterlands (Healy, 2007). The revenues earned from port services come to an end since Ethiopia turned to use the Port of Djibouti rather than Assab and Massawa (Plaut, 2005/2006). Eritrea lost hundreds of million dollars that it used to earn from port services. The consequences of the disparity also forced the Ethiopian government to lose the age-old and convenient nearby sea outlets and pay an increased fee for port service to Djibouti (Robera, 2011).

Though South Sudan possessed huge oil resources, the available pipelines, refineries and port facilities to prepare and ship its oil to the international market belongs to the Republic of Sudan (Kimenyi, 2012). The oil is shipped via Port of Sudan and the refineries are located in Sudan. In the long run, South Sudan can build its own pipeline through other routes. However, the current capacity of the country to build different pipelines and other infrastructural services, which are important to access the global markets, is quite challenging and too expensive (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Therefore, South Sudan must strike an acceptable deal to have

access to the service of the oil infrastructures and refineries owned by the Sudan until it constructs its own. The benefit of cooperation between the two countries is imperative to the Republic of Sudan as well. Sudan can generate incomes from transportation fees levied on oil piped from the South to the coast, rent from port, as well as charges from the processing of South Sudanese oil.

The forgoing discussion thus indicates that the two Sudans can benefit mutually from forming cordial relations. Cooperation enables peoples of the two countries to access goods and services easily from either part. Sudanese and South Sudanese cooperation also enables both to offset unnecessary defense costs. Taking into account the conflict-ridden fragility of the region, Esayas (2014 and Abebe (2014) argued that the cooperation and cordiality between the two Sudans not only maximize the interests of the two parties but the spillover effect of their cordiality would have tremendous impact on the stability of the region at large. To be better off and mutually benefit from such economic engagement, the two countries need to institutionalize their relations and calm down aggression towards each other (Musso, 2011). The establishment of strong institutions enables both countries to outwrought greed and curtail aggression through making a level field suitable to channel dialogue for any divergence that unfolds.

Transition to Democracy

As one closely looks at the current situation, transition to democracy in Sudan and South Sudan is minimal or even non-existent. The political environment prevailing in both countries is inimical to the existence of pluralistic political process, where press freedom was guaranteed, dissents are heard, civil societies are allowed to operationalize, and the rights of political parties are respected.

A press release by the Human Rights Watch (2012) conveys that the government of Sudan has stepped up censorship of the print media. The newspapers are subjected to various methods of censorship and punitive measures have been taken for publishing articles on sensitive issues (Ibid). Harassing journalists and political parties spread in the wake of the recent fighting with South Sudan as well (Ibid). The government arbitrarily shutdown several civil society organizations and other liberal forums, which are working for the promotion of multiculturalism, democracy and human rights in the country (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 2013). Since the deterioration of the bilateral relations and the outbreak of the war with South Sudan, the Sudanese government banned the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) as a political party and many of its members were subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention for which the National Intelligence

and Security Services are largely responsible (Ibid). The space for dialogue and negotiation on human rights and other critical issues to determine the future of the country has severely shrunk. The scale of violence unleashed by the government drastically increased in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur areas thereby leading to the proliferation of different insurgent groups.

Contrary to the promotion of diversity, tolerance and pluralism, the government also seems to be inclined to impose a singular Arab- Islamic identity throughout the country (Sikainga, 2011). Once the South secedes, the President promised to turn Sudan into an Islamic state where "Sharia and Islam will be the main source of the Constitution by declaring Islam, the official religion, and Arabic the official language" (Kron, 2010). As the President made clear in his speech, the place for cultural diversity will come to an end in Sudan (Ibid). Analysts, on their part, strongly criticized such trends taking into account the diverse nature of Sudan's population and its impact in fuelling conflict in the country. The oversimplified ambition of creating an Islamic state can intricate grievances among many communities thereby leading to the proliferation of rebels and insurgent movements (Hsiao and Jones, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). According to Hsiao and Jones (2011), the prevalence of instability and unrest in the country provides an incentive for external powers including South Sudan to engage in the pursuit of self-interest. Thus, the project of Islamizing the country through negating diversity needs to be challenged.

Like in Sudan, the political transition of South Sudan did not witness remarkable progress. The government that holds power developed a "winner-takes-all" mentality (ICG, 2011) as a result of which around 97 percent of the seats in parliament was seized by the SPLM and affiliates (Thomson, 2013). State authority is excessively centralized in the hands of the executive branch of the government and decisions are often made unintelligibly without consultation or oversight (Knopf, 2013). The constitutional making process was conducted excluding the wider population and the Constitutional Review Commission was dominated by the ruling party (Jok, 2013). Building a participatory civilian party structure with authentic grass-root mobilization and organization across communities and identity groups becomes an illusion (Knopf, 2013). The concept of political opposition appears to be missing and opposition political parties are regularly intimidated and harassed by SPLM-affiliated security agents (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The government was too suspicious and defensive in its engagement with civil society and the creation of a favorable environment for the operation of different civil societies thus shrinks down (Knopf, 2013). Informing the public on the progress of Sudan-South Sudan negotiations is uncommon (Jok, 2013) and public opinion was disregarded as well as media independence and autonomy was curtailed (Knopf,

2013). Even within the internal political structures of the SPLM, debates are not encouraged, dissents are not voiced, and participatory decision making remains farfetched (Ibid).

The regular removal of different officials from office characterized the political environs of South Sudan too (Ibid), which can lead to the segmentation of elite. The President removed officials and replaced them by his preferences and most cabinet ministers are constituted of the Dinka Rek clan at present (Sarwar, 2013). The government is repeatedly accused of discriminatory attitude towards other ethnic groups and failures in ensuring equal representation for all ethnic groups in the government structures (Ibid). The December 2013 South Sudanese crisis partly indicates the inequitable and the non-inclusiveness of ethnic groups in the government structure and the regular removal of officials from their positions. The point to be drawn thereof by South Sudan here is that the unequal representation and excessive centralization of power is pivotal in fueling disparities, which create a breeding ground for protests and intervention of other actors. The prevalence of intractable instability further provides an incentive for external power interventions for the sake of advancing power base or destabilization agenda. Besides, the consequent internal regime insecurity in South Sudan can affect North-South normalization process.

The political environs created after Ethiopia and Eritrea separated partly is indicative of less transition to democracy and open public debates. Secrecy and hostility to open public debate characterizes the political space available in the two countries (Trivelli, 1998). Lack of accountability and public debates not only shadowed the bilateral relations but also blurred the resolutions of the conflict itself (Dima, 2006). Suppression of the media and different civil-political groups characterized the political features of the two countries. As a result of the unfolding authoritarianism in both countries, the issue of normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations is subjected to the will of elites only thereby perpetuating the prevailing no-war no-peace situation.

Hence, the point to be drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan is to curtail authoritarianism and unaccountable administration. Transition to democratic systems of governance can have the potential to maintain internal stability thereby widening opportunities to Sudan and South Sudan to get more time for the resolution of unresolved issues. Besides, elite's propensity to war can be calmed down once the two countries established a well institutionalized democratic system. According to Rolandsen, *et al.* (2012), resolution of the Sudan and South Sudan conflict could not be addressed by the leadership of the two countries alone but requires more parties to take part in dialog around the negotiating table. It should not be limited to elites only but the chance for different civil-political or other groups including common

peoples of both countries to take part in the normalizations process must be enlarged. Berouk (2014) also further stated that these sections of the society can contribute a lot in the resolution of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict through devising alternative solutions, ensuring accountability, building confidence, as well as lobbying. Therefore, the predatory political structures of both countries that suppress dissent, political pluralism, civil society organizations and the autonomy of the media need to be transformed into an all-inclusive and accountable dispensation.

Cessation of Destabilization

Ongoing development nowadays shows that Sudan and South Sudan are replete with and threatened by domestic military and political oppositions. In Sudan, for instance, ongoing crisis is witnessed in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur areas resulting from political and socio-economic marginalization perpetrated by the central government of Sudan (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). Since the separation of South Sudan and the deterioration of their relations, Sudan and South Sudan accused each other of participating in destabilizing one another. In this regard, Omer Salih Abubekr (2014) acknowledged the inevitability of accusation as far as conflict of interests is concerned.

The continuation of instability and conflict in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur regions provide a perceived mechanism to South Sudanese design to destabilize the regime in Sudan through supporting different insurgents. Accordingly, the Sudan government repeatedly accused South Sudan of extending assistance to the rebels in those areas (Christian, 2012). The government expressed the allegation to the Security Council noting that South Sudan is supporting rebels that operate in Sudan. The message expressed that the government of South Sudan assisted rebels in Sudan with finance, logistics and material. Though the government of South Sudan denied lending support to the insurgents of Sudan, the reality on the ground revealed that it is supporting the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) and the rebels in Darfur (Christian, 2012; Hsiao, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012). The military and logistical cooperation between SPLA and SPLM-N are still powerful despite their official split since July 2011 (Christian, 2012; Rolandsen *et al.*, 2012; Hsiao, 2012).

Similar with its Sudanese counterparts, South Sudan also faced a growing numbers of armed conflicts both within and beyond its border since independence. Well armed insurgents and military groups existed in Unity and Jonglei states (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The government of South Sudan did not hesitate to blame the Sudanese government for exacerbating the crisis in these

areas. The government alleged that the government of Sudan is supporting the armed militias and rebels in Unity state and Jonglei (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011; Hsiao, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012). The regime in Sudan poured arms and other logistical support to the Nuer militia, also called the South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army in Unity state and to South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army in Jonglei and Upper Nile states (Small Arms Survey, 2012; Hsiao, 2012;). Recently, South Sudan also blamed Sudan for providing support to the rebels led by Riek Machar who fights the central government (Sudan Tribune, 9 April 2014). Hence, through supporting rebels, Sudan and South Sudan de-legitimize and destabilize each other.

Although there appears to be less direct confrontations, the Ethio-Eritrean engagement to destabilize each other through supporting different dissident groups has been witnessed over the last few years. Arming internal oppositions and other proxy forces characterized the post-war relations between the two countries. While the Ethiopian government backed the Transitional Government of Somalia to fight different insurgents and terrorist groups destabilizing the region, Eritrea assisted and sided with the Somali insurgent forces such as al-Shabab and Hozbul Islam as well (Kidist, 2011; Kidane, 2011). As Berouk and Esayas stated, the Ethio-Eritrean mutual destabilization and proxy engagement subsequently perpetuates the animosity and mistrust. Likewise, the post-secession destabilization in Sudan and South Sudan is quite worrying since it undermines the ongoing normalization process and fuels the already tense relations. Normalization of relations between the two becomes too difficult to achieve as long as both countries intervene in the affairs of each other. The involvements of the two governments in proxy arming of dissident groups can create an insecure environment and a new power centre that the two countries can no longer control. Sudan and South Sudan thus need to end mutual intervention and de-legitimization of each other's sovereignty so as to make their future bright.

Cessation of Militarism

Around the end of the First Civil War in Sudan, oil was discovered in different parts of the country. As a result of the outbreak of the Second Civil War, effective utilization of such precious resources was not observed so far. Since the beginning of the 21st century, however, government revenues from oil substantially increased that allowed securing sophisticated weaponry. The use of force and violence to secure territorial or resource claims dates back to the independence of the Republic of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian rule. For instance, since the discovery of oil in South Sudan in the late 1970s, the government of Sudan attempted to forcefully redraw the

boundaries and carve the oil abundant region out of the southern territory (Indris, 2005; Girma, 1997). The post-CPA period also shows that the ethos of using force as an instrument for maximizing the interests of the regime is powerful. The crisis in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions best manifest the regimes tendency of using military invincibility to suppress dissents. Instead of solving the crisis in these areas diplomatically, the regime in Sudan waged war and used force.

The government that was established in South Sudan during the interim period also spent significant amount of its budget for the security sector. Preoccupied with the issue of maintaining national security and implementation of the CPA, the SPLA purchased different armaments with the intention of empowering its military strength (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The expenditure allocated to the security forces exceeds the budget allocated for education and health care services by four and five time respectively (Mutiga, 2011). The SPLA, the national army of South Sudan, consists of around 210,000 personnel (Small Arms Survey, 2012) as a result of which South Sudan currently is one of the heavily militarized states in the Horn (Mutiga, 2011). Though the government promised to disarm and demobilize its force until 2017, the ongoing reality reveals that SPLA continues importing sophisticated weapons to upgrade its capabilities (Small Arms Survey, 2012).

According to Abebe (2014), the major factor that severely contracted interstate relations and the stability of the Horn of Africa is the longstanding tradition of using force, military, as the means to realize national interest or self egos. Since the formal split, deemed by their military might, Sudan and South Sudan turned into direct confrontations over the control of most congested areas. The military engagement of Sudan and South Sudan in Abyei and other disputed areas has been occurred (Debay, 2012; Hsiao, 2012). Both used the militias and other spoilers in an effort to influence the political situation of one another (Ibid). They deployed their armies that stand in close proximity along the North-South border. According to the Satellite Sentinel Project 2013 Report, the September 2012 Agreement required for the demilitarization of forces from shared and contested borders. However, the two countries violated the agreement through positioning their forces within the agreed-upon demilitarized buffer zone (Ibid). The use of force as an instrument to realize self-egos undermines not only the bilateral relations between the two countries but the stability of the region at large.

In this regard, the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience must remind Sudan and South Sudan to terminate militarism so as to harmonize their relations. The use of might as a principal means to dominate neighbouring countries characterized the post-secession political disposition of the Eritrean government. The leadership of Eritrea upheld and prioritized the view that

military invincibility as a means of its state building and hegemonic project (Gebru, 2006). It is this tenacity that severed Eritrea's relations with neighbouring countries including Ethiopia. The longstanding history of Sudan and South Sudan also dictates recognition that the use of physical force did not fulfill any of the "Arabization and Islamization" projects of various elite groups after the end of Anglo-Egyptian rule.

Sudan and South Sudan hence require prioritizing negotiation and dialogue as the viable mean to effectively address and deal with their various differences than embarking on mobilization or militarization of forces. Instead of using coercive means to realize self interests, the two countries are expected to adopt negotiation and other amicable dispute resolutions mechanisms. According to Omer Salih Abubakr, all the issues on which Sudan and South Sudan contested can be solved only through political dialogue or round-table discussions than military means. Omer Salih Abubakr further added that the use of force could not be a viable option to harmonize their relations and differences. In the words of Hsiao (2012) and Musso (2011) too, negotiations remain the best means for the two parties to settle their differences. The culture of militarism that arduously harmed millions of their ancestors during the First and Second Civil Wars thus need to be repudiate unconditionally.

The Issue of "Good Faith"

Last but not least, Sudan and South Sudan should build good faith and trust in implementing the different bilateral agreements accordingly. After months of bloodshed and tensions, Sudan and South Sudan concluded different agreements in September 2012 regarding border issues, security arrangements, treatment of nationals of each other, port-service benefits, oil, trade and other economic matters. These agreements raised the expectation that South Sudan and Sudan were on the path to peace (Ismail and Kumar, 2013).

All the agreements signed between the two parties were meant to be implemented in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion by both parties. However, six months later, none of these happened (Ismail and Kumar, 2013; Akol, 2013). In this regard, as Ismail and Kumar (2013) stated, the government of Sudan is less cooperative and uncommitted to put the agreements into effect thereby putting the maintenance of peace questionable. The government of Sudan presented various preconditions regarding the implementation of the September 2012 agreements (Ismail and Kumar, 2013). The alleged participation of South Sudan on the side of different rebel groups of Sudan complicated the situation in this regard (Akol, 2013). The relative intransigency of the Sudanese government on the implementation of the mutual concords was also witnessed even during the

interim period (Ismail and Kumar, 2013). The uncooperative stances of the Sudanese government on the implementation of various agreements further perpetuated the suspicions on the part of South Sudan officials (Hsiao, 2012). Officials from South Sudan maintained that the regime in Sudan has strong intention of destabilizing the South (Ibid).

According to Berouk, the cultures of abiding to certain concords and the belief in negotiations and dialogue were unlikely when one looks at the political environs of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Though Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded several protocols before the opening of the hostility, the implementations of the accords in good faith was not that much encouraging or even non-existent. Esayas attributes the unimplemented nature of the various accords to the failure of the Eritrean government and thus considered the leadership of Eritrea as "rogue" whereby the habit of respecting international law and other inter-state agreements became futile. The unfolding of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrea war also resulted from the lack of implementation of the various agreements including the Algiers Agreement too. The two countries agreed to solve their border problems through International Court of Arbitration given that the decision of the EEBC remained on paper. Normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations was thus stalled not only because of the unresolved nature of border issues or the act of destabilization but also the inability to put the agreement into effect on the part of both.

Therefore, the Ethio-Eritrean experience should serve as a lesson for Sudan and South Sudan to be committed and willing enough to operationalize the mutual understandings fully. Various incompatibilities between the two countries are solvable if the two sides cooperate and commit to put all the accords into effect. Any sort of delay and indifference on the implementation of agreements concluded so far can complicate the normalizations process. Resolution of conflicts can be hindered and maintenance of durable peace between the two countries becomes a mirage when the conflicting parties lack genuine commitment to carry out the terms of the agreements reached.

CONCLUSION

Despite the formal split, the Sudan-South Sudan relations in the post-secession periods remains tense and the two countries entered into protracted disagreements over border, Abyei and citizenship issues including the financial arrangements particularly those pertaining to the revenues from the sale of South Sudanese oil that transit through Sudan for export. Hence, in this paper, attempt has been made to shed light on how the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience provides lessons for Sudan and South Sudan in the process of normalization of their

relations.

The border between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained un-demarcated at the time of the independence of the latter. The cost of the un-demarcated border between the two countries later forced them to pay heavy costs and the post-war strained relations were also intertwined with border issues. Similarly, the border between Sudan and South Sudan is still not demarcated and the two countries contested over a range of territories. Border areas of the two Sudans are rich in oil and other resources and hence the presence of porous boundary between the two countries is quite challenging. It widens opportunities for the two countries to forcefully grab fields that do not officially belong to them thereby leading to intractable disputes. Considering the consequence of the un-demarcated borders and based on the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience, Sudan and South Sudan should undertake swift actions to end the border deadlocks. In this regard, the issue of political will and commitment through entering into negotiations and compromise is decisive for Sudan and South Sudan to solve impending border problems and normalize their relations. It should be recalled that the intransigency and the uncompromising stances of the two governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea culminated in the border discord and normalization of their relations became an illusion. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further implies that involving and ascertaining the ideas of local peoples living in the disputed territories is crucial to solve border disputes since local communities can play a lot in the process of carrying out various deals with regard to border issues. Besides, through involving local peoples living on both sides of the borders the two Sudans can overcome the unnecessary division of homesteads and socio-cultural and economic sites.

Similar measures have to be taken so as to bring an end the Abyei dispute, which is a flash point that arduously impacts the Sudan- South Sudan relations. Abyei is nowadays a highly politicized spot with the potential to fuel conflict and entrench stalemate between the two Sudans. The two countries entered into an open conventional war over Abyei since the independence of South Sudan. The military engagement of the two countries either in the form of proxy war or direct military moves are evidently observed until recently. Such kind of provocative stances can lead both countries into intractable conflict. It is such provocative moves that flared up around Badme that further diverted the Ethio-Eritrean cordiality into an open hostility. Governments of the two Sudans thus need to soften their position regarding Abyei and end their military engagement and implement the terms of the Abyei Protocol so as to end the deadlock.

The Ethio-Eritrean experience also revealed that the arbitrary, forceful and abusive expulsion of nationals of each other can raise mutual suspicion and deepen

antipathy in people-to-people and interstate relations. From the very beginning, the forceful and abusive expulsion of nationals is contrary to upholding the very fundamental rights of the peoples. The impact of forceful deportation of nationals can leave bad psychological perception particularly to those who are the victimized in the process. Sudan and South Sudan thus should consider ending the forceful expulsion of nationals living in each other's territory. Instead, the two countries are expected to undertake joint actions to keep the safety of each other's nationals and peacefully repatriate (if mandatory) them with their possession. Allowing peoples to choose their place of residence is also the other option to end the issue of citizenship.

The other point to be drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan is curtailing authoritarian and unaccountable sorts of rule. The rationale here is that the presence of authoritarianism produces grievance and instability thereby widening opportunities for the prevalence of mutual intervention through the extended support of each other's insurgent movements. The war-mongering stance of political elites can be controlled through developing a well-institutionalized democratic system. Besides, creation of an amicable political environment where civil societies, experts and coordinated and responsible opposition groups participate freely can provide the leverage to break the stalemate and normalize the relations between Sudan and South Sudan. These sections of the society can generate alternative solutions for the resolution of the conflict and normalization of the relations between the two Sudans. The predatory political structures of both countries that suppress dissent, political pluralism, civil society organizations and the media, therefore, need to be transformed in a comprehensive, accountable and transparent manner. It is due to the absence of well-institutionalized democratic systems of governance that the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations were bedeviled and the discrepancy persisted so far.

The relations between Sudan and South Sudan in the post-secession period were marked by mutual recriminations and destabilization. The two countries involved in destabilizing one another by extending support to rebels that operate in each other's territory. In this regard, the government of South Sudan backed the SPLM-N in the fight against the government of Sudan while the government of Sudan supported different insurgents in Unity state, Jonglei and Upper Nile areas. The consequence of mutual intervention is thus quite threatening to the peaceful co-existence of the two countries. The normalization of Sudan and South Sudan relations can be hindered as long as the two governments intervened in the affairs each other. Repudiation of mutual intervention is one of the important lessons that Sudan and South Sudan should draw from the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience.

The post-secession Sudan and South Sudan destabilization and proxy engagement marked the culture of recourse to conflict. The point here is that the belief in the use of force cannot solve any of the outstanding problems that the two countries face. The history of the two countries openly speaks that militarism did not solve the north-south longstanding issues rather than leading to the death of millions during the First and Second Civil Wars. Unless the two Sudans replace the culture of militarism by a new political and diplomatic proficiency, peace will not prevail and normalization of their relations will become a mere wish. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further strengthens this claim and the compelling lesson here is that recourse to arms could not be taken as an option to solve various contested issues.

The issue of good faith is the other important factor that Sudan and South Sudan should take into account. Various issues that Sudan and South Sudan contested on can be solved through putting all the agreements into effect. All the agreements signed between the two parties are meant to be implemented in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion by both parties. Commitment from both parties is needed to operationalize the agreements and maintain durable peace. Such kind of culture was largely absent as one looks at the political environs of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The unfolding of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war and the post-war stalemate partly resulted due to the failure to implement the bilateral agreements reached. Hence, implementing those agreements signed before and after the Referendum is the other compelling lesson to drawn here for the two Sudans in the process of halting the prevailing stalemate.

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